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ABSTRACT 
Defined as an opinion by the rating agencies on the ability and willingness of a sovereign 
government to meet financial commitments in full and at an agreed time, a number of studies 
argue that sovereign credit ratings are a de facto requirement for gaining access to international 
capital (Cantor & Packer, 1995; Larraín, Reisen & Von Maltzan, 1997; Siddiqi, 2007), While a 
number of studies such as  that by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) have tested the short-term 
announcement impact of the sovereign credit rating adjustments on the bond and equity 
returns. Kim and Wu (2008) attempted to close this knowledge gap by investigating the impact 
of S&P issued sovereign credit ratings on emerging economies’ financial markets and different 
types of capital flows. In addition, studies on sovereign credit ratings focus on emerging 
economies, leaving out a majority of the African countries that are largely classified as 
developing economies. 
 Accordingly, the primary aim of the present study is to investigate the relationship between 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and the 
different types of capital flows in Africa. In addition, the study investigates how the imminent and 
actual rating migration announcement by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P impact the aggregate equity 
stocks and nominal exchange rate returns in Africa.The study addresses these two questions by 
using a comprehensive data set of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P on a cross-section of 28 African countries, between 1994 and 2011. 
Through a panel data regression framework, the study investigates the long-term influence of 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the different types of capital flows (foreign 
direct investment, portfolio equity, portfolio bond and commercial bank and other private 
institutions) while controlling for economic and country governance factors. The second 
question of the study is addressed by applying event study analysis, to test the transitory impact 
of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings daily aggregate equity stock returns and 
nominal foreign exchange rate.  
Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the history of the portfolio equity, FDI and 
borrowings from commercial banks and other private institutions, represented by the lag of the 
capital flows, is the most significant variable determinant of these types of flows. For the 
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borrowings from commercial banks and other private institutions, empirical evidence also 
suggests that debt rescheduling is a significant determinant for future access to this type of 
capital.  Long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
on the other hand, show a marginal influence on the portfolio equity, FDI and borrowings from 
commercial banks and other private institution capital flows with the RATING variable 
reinforcing, as opposed to substituting, for the primary determinants of these types of capital 
flows. For the public and publicly guaranteed and non-guaranteed portfolio bond flows, where, 
except for South Africa, many African countries have a limited history of borrowing from the 
international bond markets, the lag of the dependent variable is insignificant.  Empirical 
evidence further shows that the public and publicly guaranteed and non-guaranteed portfolio 
bond flows respond differently to the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued 
by the different rating agencies. While S&P issued RATINGS variable is significant for the public 
and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond net flow rates (PPGBOND) model, when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample, Fitch issued RATINGS variable is significant for the non-guaranteed 
portfolio bond net flow rates (PNGBOND).  
Interestingly, the empirical evidence show  that South Africa’s Fitch, Moody’s and S&P issued 
RATINGS have a positive relationship with both  portfolio bond and commercial bank and other 
private institutions net flow rates to countries other than South Africa. In particular, the public 
and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond (PPGBOND) and commercial bank and other private 
institutions net flow rates (PPGCOMM) for countries other than South Africa, respond positively 
to the S&P and Fitch issued South Africa RATING, with own country RATING becoming 
insignificant when the S&P issued South African RATING is introduced to the model.  Similarly 
both the PPGCOMM and PNGBOND net flow rates to countries other than South Africa, 
respond positively to the Moody’s issued South African RATING.  
Event study analysis show that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings upgrade, 
downgrades eminent rating changes have a short-term announcement impact on both the 
aggregate equity stock and nominal foreign exchange rate returns in Africa.  In particular, the 
event study results show that there is an incentive for a positive rating announcement for below 
investment grade ratings while there is no punishment for a negative rating announcement.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 The interest in credit rating agencies and the ratings they issue on financial securities and 
assets, dates back to the credit rating issues on American utility and rail companies (Grier & 
Katz, 1976; Katz, 1974). While the earlier studies, such as that by  Weinstein (1977), Ingram 
(1983) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), focused on the assets or securities issued by 
corporates, municipalities and utilities, access to the international debt markets by emerging 
markets, specifically access to the Yankee bond markets through the Brady bonds in the late 
1980’s, resulted in the increase in the number and interest in sovereigns rating issues 
(Cantor & Packer, 1995, 1996a).  
 
While the rating agencies explicitly state  that the rating issues are an opinion  on default risk 
1 (Fitch, 2010; Gaillard, 2009), this point has been lost to many of the studies on the ratings, 
with questions continuously been asked about their ability to predict systemic market risk 
that leads to economic crises (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 1999; Mora, 2006). Indeed, following 
a number of financial crises in emerging markets in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the credit 
rating agencies’ ability to predict crises and their role prior to, during and after  the crises has 
been of interest to a number of scholars and researchers (Kräussl, 2005; Mora, 2006; 
Reinhart, 2000). Alsakka and ap Gwilym  (2009) for example, argued that the rating 
agencies exacerbated the capital reversal from the East Asian crisis of 1997 by downgrading 
countries as they entered the crisis, as opposed to prior to entering the crisis, resulting in the 
deepening of the crisis across the region and emerging markets. This agrees with the 
argument by Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2003), that sovereign credit ratings were 
procyclical and may therefore not have an  on influence capital flows.This also supports the 
assertion by Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) that the rating agencies follow as opposed to 
leading the market,  upgrading sovereign credit ratings during periods of high economic 
growth and downgrading the ratings during economic turmoil, leading to a boom-bust cycle.  
                                            
1
The recent Eurozone debt crises however suggest that sovereign credit ratings may not be the best measure of default risk with Moody A3 
rated (investment grade) Greece requiring Euro-zone bail out in May 2010 to prevent debt default bankruptcy and the similarly highly rated (A 
rated)  Ireland following in November 2010.  
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Credit rating agencies and the ratings that they issue however, remains a key feature in the 
global financial markets. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that an announcement on 
the sovereign and corporate credit rating adjustments is accompanied by an adjustment  on 
the cost at which corporates and sovereigns access capital (Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich, 
1992; Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). In addition, regulatory endorsement, through 
designations such as the Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSRO), 
make credit ratings a de facto requirement when issuing debt on international markets 
(Partnoy, 1999; S&P, 2011; SEC, 2003). Peter and Grandes (2005), for example, show  that 
in the case for South Africa the sovereign credit rating appeared to be the single most 
important determinant of the corporate yield spreads, especially for financial services 
companies, suggesting that corporates can piggyback on the sovereign credit rating to 
access foreign debt at favourable rates. Studies such as that by Hooper, Hume, and Kim 
(2008), Li, Jeon, Cho and Chiang  (2008) and Reinhart (2002), also show that  sovereign 
credit ratings provide stock and foreign exchange markets with new tradable information, 
with ratings actions significantly impacting the United State of America’s Dollar (USD) 
denominated stock market returns and volatility, suggesting a direct impact on portfolio 
equity flows. The study by Brooks, et al. (2004) also  show that a sovereign credit rating 
downgrade announcement has a negative impact on the dollar price of the local currency. 
This, the authors argue, results in the fall in investor confidence in the value of future local 
currency denominated cash flows, suggesting an indirect impact on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), specifically market seeking FDI. 
 
Despite the  suggested influence of sovereign credit ratings on  access to capital, many of 
the studies on ratings issued by the three top rating agencies, namely Fitch Ratings (Fitch), 
Moody’s Investors Services (Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P) 
have focused on their short-term (transitory) impact, as opposed to their long-term structural 
impact on capital flows. In particular, the studies have sought to investigate the ratings 
announcement impact on bond yield spreads and equity market returns (Bach, 2008; Cantor 
& Packer, 1996a; Ferreira & Gama, 2007).   
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1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to apply regression analysis to test whether the sovereign credit 
ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P have a structural long-term influence on capital 
inflows in Africa. In addition, the study extends previous work by applying event study 
methodology to investigate the short-term (transitory) sovereign credit rating adjustment impact 
on aggregate equity stock market and the nominal foreign exchange rate returns in Africa.   
1.2   Background and context of the study 
Africa’s share of capital inflows as a percentage of Gross National Product remains one of the 
lowest of all the developing regions (Asiedu, 2003; Loots, 1999; Lumbila, 2008; Martin & Rose-
Innes, 2004; McDonald, Treichel & Weisfeld, 2006). Indeed, despite the proportion of capital 
flows to low and middle income countries having increased from approximately 40% in 2007 to 
just under 50% in 2009, as presented in figure 1, the proportion of FDI inflow to Africa is still low 
at approximately 3% of global FDI flows in 2009 from 2.8% in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2010).  
 
Africa’s share of private capital flows however, has not always been low. Africa’s share of 
developing economies private capital flows in 1976 for example, was approximately 28%, which 
has since fallen to around 9% in 2007 (IMF, 2011). In addition to that, Osei, Morrissey, and 
Lensink (2002) show that private capital inflows to most African countries show a greater degree 
of volatility than those of the Asian and Latin American countries, the cause of which  Gabriele, 
Baratav and Parikh (2000), attribute to socio-political instability.  
As a region of largely developing economies, it is generally believed that an inherent regional 
risk, policy uncertainty and the lack of transparency are some of the factors retarding Africa’s 
access to international private capital (Bhattacharya, Montiel & Sharma, 1997; Easterly & 
Levine, 1997; van Wyk & Lal, 2008). Gelos and Wei  (2000), for example, found that there was 
clear evidence that international funds invest systematically less in the least transparent 
countries and that herding among investment funds, tend to be more prevalent in less 
transparent countries.  
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database 2011 
Figure 1: Distribution of global FDI flows.  
 
Sidiqqi (2007) argues that, due to the transparency and discipline required to acquire and 
maintain a sovereign credit rating, the process may assist in improving capital flows to 
developing countries, such as those in Africa. The author further argues that sovereign credit 
ratings provide differentiation where there is information asymmetry among financial market 
participants. Indeed, Kaminsky, et al. (2004) argue that in addition to local and neighbouring 
news about international economic agreements, credit rating agency news explain a significant 
proportion of the capital inflow to emerging countries. Ferreira and Laux (2009) agree, 
suggesting that sovereign credit ratings not only affect capital inflows to the sovereign 
government, but also to private firms domiciled within the sovereign country.  
 
It is within this context that the United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of African 
Affairs and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched programs to assist 
Africa and other developing economies, to acquire sovereign credit ratings, in order to promote 
transparency and improve access to global capital markets (S&P, 2003; USDepartmentState, 
2002). Not all sovereigns that seek ratings do so to seek immediate access to foreign debt 
markets however. As suggested by Standard and Poor’s  (S&P, 2003),  in addition to the  
transparency and the prestige associated with the rating, sovereigns request the ratings to ease 
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corporates domiciled within the sovereign. Chile, for example, requested their first rating from 
S&P in 1992 and only issued their first sovereign bond ten years later (S&P, 2003). Indeed it 
has been shown that sovereign credit  ratings have an influence  not only on the sovereign’s 
cost of capital but also on the cost at which resident corporations access debt through bonds 
(Peter & Grandes, 2005). This, it is suggested, is through the principle of country ceiling, where 
the sovereign credit ratings are in most instances the best rating in the country (Borensztein, 
Cowan & Valenzuela, 2007)2.   
 
1.1 Significance of the study 
As an opinion on a country’s willingness and ability to meet financial obligations, sovereign 
credit ratings encapsulate a number of macroeconomic  and governance factors about a country 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, Brooks & Yip, 2006). Previous studies show that sovereign credit 
ratings encapsulate  macroeconomic fundamentals such as the economic growth, per capita 
income, inflation, external indebtedness,  an indicator for economic development as well as 
financial default history (Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Mora, 2006; Poon, 2003; Ratha, De & 
Mohapatra, 2007). In addition, rating agencies suggest that the sovereign credit rating take into 
account qualitative factors (political and policy development), through input from the respective 
national authorities or rated entity (Gaillard, 2009).  
   
Given the process and the factors encapsulated in a sovereign credit rating,  as well as the 
suggestion by authors, such as Gelos, et al.  (2003) that capital flows are attracted to 
investment rated sovereigns, it is conceivable that sovereign credit ratings not only bring new, 
valuable information to financial markets but that they are also a signal of transparency required 
to improve developing economies’ access to capital, as suggested by Saddiqi (Siddiqi, 2007). It 
is therefore surprising that the focus of many studies on sovereign credit ratings has been on 
their short-term announcement impact on the cost of capital and not on their long-term structural 
                                            
2
 Country ceiling doctrine reflects the transfer and convertibility risk, an opinion on the degree of control that is exercised by the sovereign on the 
entities domiciled in the sovereign with regards to foreign exchange convertibility and transfer (Fitch, 2010) 
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impact on capital flows (Bach, 2008; Brooks et al., 2004) . While Bevan and Estrin (2004) and 
Janiki and Wunnava (2004) tried to close this gap, their studies were focused on survey based 
Institutional Investors’ country credit ratings.  The twice a year issued Institutional Investors 
country credit ratings are published by the Economist Magazine and are based on information 
provided by economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and securities firms, 
making it an opinion of the investment community, with direct influence on capital allocation as 
opposed to the independent ratings issued by the rating agencies. In addition, the Institutional 
Investors’ country credit ratings are issued twice a year at predetermined periods and are not 
actively monitored, as is the case with the  independent rating agency issued ratings (Fitch, 
2010; Gaillard, 2009; Moody, 2011). 
 
It was not until the study by Kim and Wu (2008), who investigating the influence of sovereign 
credit ratings issued by S&P on the development of financial markets and capital inflows in 
emerging markets, that the impact of the independently issued sovereign credit ratings on 
capital flows were investigated. Kim and Wu’s (2008) study, however, has  a number of gaps, 
including that:  
 The study focuses on the sovereign credit ratings issued by one agency as opposed to 
the three leading agencies namely Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. The authors suggest that 
these were informed by availability of sovereign credit ratings data, which showed that 
S&P produced more sovereign ratings as well as being more active than other rating 
agencies. Studies such as that by Gaillard (2009) however, suggest that sovereign credit 
ratings issued by the different rating agencies  have an asymmetric impact on financial 
markets, suggesting that different agency issued ratings will have asymmetric influence 
on the different types of capital flows. While, for example, Gaillard (2009) shows that  
bond yield spreads movements were more significant on sovereign credit rating 
downgrade announcements by S&P and upgrade announcements by Moody’s, Brooks, 
et al. (2004) found that only Fitch and S&P had a significant downgrade impact on 
aggregate stock returns. In addition, by 2011 Fitch issued 22 ratings on African countries, 
as many sovereign credit ratings as those issued by S&P, suggesting that a study 
focusing on only one of these agencies issued ratings, will leave a gap in the subject of 
agency ratings on capital flows. The current study closes this gap by investigating the 
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long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by all three leading rating 
agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P); 
 Studies on sovereign credit ratings, such as those by Brooks, et al. (2004), Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Kim and Wu (2008), focus on emerging economies and 
consequently include only three African countries namely Egypt, South Africa and 
Tunisia. In addition to maintaining investment grade ratings for the most part of the early 
2000’s as opposed to many other countries in the region that are rated below investment, 
these countries are also leading recipients of capital in the region. South Africa, in 
particular, has relatively more developed financial markets compared to many of the 
economies in the region (Ncube, 2008) and the flows to the country are more skewed 
towards portfolio flows (Arvanitis, 2005) as opposed to FDI and commercial bank debt 
flows. South Africa is also a leading investor in the region, making South Africa both the 
source and recipient of capital flows3 (UNCTAD, 2010, 2011). Previous studies show 
asymmetric financial markets reaction to credit ratings adjustment for investment (largely 
developed economies) and below investment (largely developing economies) rated 
issues, suggesting that a generalised finding that does not take into account the quality 
of the rating may be misleading4. The current study closes this gap by testing the impact 
of the quality of the rating (investment or below investment grade) on capital flows. In 
addition, the study attempts to isolate the influence of South Africa by testing two 
separate models, one with a full sample that includes South Africa, as well as one that 
excludes South Africa; and   
  Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) point out that despite the rating agencies attempt to 
move away from the sovereign ceiling doctrine, sovereign risk transfer to private 
borrowers remains. This, the authors suggest, is through the sovereigns’ power to levy 
taxes, impose capital controls or even seize the firm’s assets when government capacity 
so necessitates. The authors further posit that the sovereign credit rating impact on 
private capital flows may be less significant for subsidiaries of multinationals not 
                                            
 
4
 Refer to Hand, et al. (2002) and Brooks, et al. (2004) for the asymmetric rating impact on investment and below investment grade issues.  
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domiciled in the rated sovereign as they may have better access to their parent company 
lineage, suggesting that there may be no impact on bond, commercial banks and other 
private borrowing where the borrower is a large multinational. This is supported by 
Cantor and Packer (1989; , 1996b) and Durbin and Ng (2005),  who found that some 
firms yield spreads were lower than similarly rated sovereigns,  with  investors ignoring 
the sovereign ceiling doctrine especially for firms with sustainable export earnings as well 
as those with close relationships with foreign parents or governments. While testing the 
impact of S&P issued sovereign credit ratings on the different types of capital flows, Kim 
and Wu (2008) do not separate between public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) and non-
guaranteed (PNG) portfolio bond and commercial, bank and other private inflows. The 
current study closes this gap by separately testing the impact of sovereign credit ratings 
on public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) and non-guaranteed (PNG) portfolio bonds and 
commercial, bank and other private inflows. 
In addition, the current study closes a number of gaps, by extending previous studies on the 
short-term impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial markets such as those by Brooks, 
et al. (2004) and Li, et al. (2008) as follows: 
 Many of the African stock exchanges are still in their infancy, with a number of operating 
stock exchanges increasing from 7 in 1989 to 23 in 2007 (Giovannetti & Velucchi, 2009). 
Until recently, this has made it difficult for studies to include African countries, other than 
Egypt, South Africa and Tunisia in the international finance studies (Larraín et al., 1997; 
Rowland, 2006; Westphalen, 2001).   The current study closes this gap by including all 
the African countries with national equity stock markets; and 
 Despite the over 300% increase in daily foreign exchange turnover in 10 years between 
1998 and 20075,  only three studies by Brooks, et al. (2004),  Li, et al.  (2008) and 
Hooper, et al. (2008) investigated the impact of sovereign credit ratings on the foreign 
exchange rate market. The current study closes this gap by investigating the 
                                            
5
 Daily average foreign exchange turnover in the spot markets in the 10 emerging markets in Asia, Latin America, Central Europe and South 
Africa rose from 71 billion USD in April 1998 to 337.3 billion USD in April 2007 ((BIS, 2007), 
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announcement impact of sovereign credit ratings on the nominal foreign exchange 
returns, in Africa.  
1.2 Hypothesis  
Özatay, Özmen and Sahinbeyoglu (2009) show that financial markets in countries with low 
ratings, such as those in Africa,  are more affected  by downgrades, than those with higher 
sovereign credit ratings. In addition, Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini (2004) suggest that 
due to their ability to predict default risk, a good sovereign credit rating improves capital flows to 
emerging markets. This, the authors argue, may lead to a boom-bust cycle as excessive capital 
flows to investment rated sovereigns and result in real exchange rate overshoots. This is 
followed by countries finding it more costly (with increasing debt service cost) to repay non-
contingent debt (debt that will not be affected by future events) increasing the sovereign’s 
probability of default, subsequent downgrade and capital reversal (Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri & 
Roubini, 2004).  These studies, however, like those by Brooks, et al. (2004) and Li, et al. (2008), 
only test the short-term transitory impact of sovereign credit ratings and do not close the 
knowledge gaps identified above. In order to close these research gaps, the current study 
systematically tests three hypotheses: 
  Hypothesis 1 – Long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings do not have a long-
term marginal effect on the foreign private capital flows (Commercial bank and other 
private institutions, FDI and Portfolio bond and equity) in Africa. 
The null hypothesis, H0, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings 
do not have a statistically significant long-term influence on private capital flows in Africa.  
The alternative hypothesis, HA, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings have a statistically significant long-term influence on private capital flows in Africa. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings do not have a 
statistically significant announcement impact on the aggregate equity stock returns in 
Africa 
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The null hypothesis, H0, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating 
actions do not have a short-term statistically significant announcement impact on the aggregate 
equity stock returns in Africa.   
The alternative hypothesis, HA, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
rating actions have a short-term statistically significant announcement impact on the aggregate 
equity stock returns in Africa.  
Hypothesis 3– Long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings do not have a 
statistically significant announcement impact on the nominal foreign exchange rate 
returns in Africa 
The null hypothesis, H0, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating 
actions do not have a short-term statistically significant announcement impact on the nominal 
foreign exchange returns in Africa.   
The alternative hypothesis, HA, to be tested is that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
rating actions have a short-term statistically significant announcement impact on the nominal 
foreign exchange returns in Africa.   
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
The study is organised in 5 sections. Section 1 introduced the background and the analytical 
context of the study, by outlining some of the key issues related to the independent sovereign 
credit ratings. The gaps in existing literature on sovereign credit ratings were identified. Section 
2 provides detailed definitions of sovereign credit ratings, the theoretical framework underlying 
the issue of a sovereign credit rating as well as the definition of the rating scale. The section 
further explores related empirical work on the relationship between the sovereign credit ratings 
and the financial markets and capital flows.   Section 3 defines the analytical framework for the 
impact of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on capital flows and financial 
markets as well as the relevant modelling issues related to the empirical analysis.  Empirical 
analysis results of the study are documented in section 4 and section 5 summarises the key 
findings of the study, major contributions and suggestions for future research.  
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2 RELATED WORK REVIEW: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE  
While the history of the sovereign credit ratings goes back to the 1940’s, when Moody’s issued 
the USA a long-term local and foreign currency rating, Moody’s had been rating specific 
government bond issues since 1919 (Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Gaillard, 2009). Sovereign credit 
rating issues increased in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as more emerging economies 
sought to issue debt on the international markets, following the establishment of the Brady 
bonds to convert bank loans of mostly Latin American countries in 1989 (Cantor & Packer, 
1995).  This, according to Cantor and Packer (1995), resulted in the assigned median rating in 
the 1990’s to be the lowest possible investment grade, BBB-/Baa3, as opposed to the  AAA/Aaa 
before 1985 when the ratings were largely assigned to developed economies.  
The first African sovereign credit rating was issued in September 1994 when Fitch issued the 
long-term sovereign credit rating to South Africa. Sovereign credit rating issues on African 
countries accelerated in the 2000’s, from 7 in 2001 to 22 by 2010,  following the US Department 
of State, Bureau of African Affairs and UNDP initiatives (Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009; S&P, 
2003). Between 1994 and 2011, 28 sovereign credit ratings were issued on African countries by 
at least one of the three leading rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P), a majority of which 
are below investment grade as shown in figure 2.  
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Source: (Fitch 2011; Moody’s 2011; S&P 2011)  
Figure 2: Africa's Sovereign Credit Ratings Distribution as on 4th March 2011  
 
2.1 Defining sovereign credit ratings 
A sovereign credit rating is an opinion by the rating agency, on the ability and willingness of a 
sovereign government to meet financial commitments in full and at an agreed time (Hooper et 
al., 2008; Ratha et al., 2007; Reisen & von Maltzan, 1998). It is within this context that Gaillard 
(2009) cautions against the incorrect assumption that sovereign credit ratings are an all-
encompassing opinion on the nation’s credit rating. However, while agreeing that a sovereign 
credit rating is not an all-encompassing opinion on the nation’s credit rating, Cantor and Packer 
(1996a), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Brooks, et al. (2004) point out that an entity 
domiciled within the sovereign is more likely to be rated equal to or below the sovereign, making 
the sovereign rating the “best" credit risk in a country, as also illustrated by  Arteta and Hale 
(2007) and Borensztein, Cowan and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Sovereign credit ratings are issued on request by the rated sovereign government who also pay 
for the rating issue. In some instances,  such as that of US Department of State, Bureau of 
African Affairs and UNDP initiatives ,  the rating issue is funded through a sponsor (Fitch, 2007; 
Gaillard, 2009; S&P, 2003). It remains incumbent  however, irrespective of the rating issue 
funder, upon the rated sovereign to be open and transparent about the information and data 
upon which the rating will be based (Fitch, 2007). Haque, et al. (1989), Lehmann, (2004) and 
Saddiqi (2007), for example, argue that, due to the benefits derived from the transparency and 
disciplining effect involved in the process of issuing and maintaining a sovereign credit rating, it 
is beneficial for the rated sovereign to be transparent about the information and data upon 
which the rating is to be determined. 
 It is, however, the commercial aspect of the rating process, among other factors, that has been 
a source of concern for a number of observers. Several studies, for example, have argued that  
due to the business benefit to the agencies attached to the rating issue, some sovereigns (and 
debt issuers) may shop around for a favourable rating in order to reduce their cost of capital 
(Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009). Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) however found that this was  
rare for municipal, corporate and sovereign ratings as opposed to securitisation issues. The 
strongest criticism against sovereign credit ratings however, comes from the suggestion that 
their influence flows from their  regulatory endorsement, as opposed to their informational value 
(Partnoy, 1999). Some investors, for example, do not invest in unrated assets, making the rating 
a de facto requirement for accessing capital (Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Chue & Cook, 2008; 
Rigobon, 2001). In addition, recommendations on banking laws and regulations, such as Basel 
II, recommended that a rating issue be an integral part of banks’ capital requirement 
determination process (Al-Sakka & ap Gwilym, 2009; Ferreira & Gama, 2007; Lehmann, 2004; 
Mora, 2006)6.  
Three international rating agencies in particular, namely Fitch, Moody’s and S&P,  dominate the 
sovereign credit rating market (S&P, 2011; SEC, 2003). As in 2012, Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
accounted for approximately 90% of the global sovereign credit rating market,  with S&P issuing 
                                            
6
 Additional due diligence requirements have since been introduced to accompany the use of external ratings under the new securitisation 
framework (BIS (2010)). The Basel Committee’s response to the financial crisis: report to the G20, last, from www.bis.org. 
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126 sovereign credit ratings, followed by  Moody’s with 113 and Fitch with 100 (Fitch, 2010; 
Moody, 2011; S&P, 2011).  Indeed, until 2003, the three agencies were the only rating agencies 
endorsed by the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO), making their 
rating issues the de facto ratings for accessing in particular the US financial capital markets 
(S&P, 2011; SEC, 2003)7. 
A number of studies have argued that the regulatory endorsement, combined with the agencies 
commercial interest as well as their failure to predict structural changes, has resulted in their 
rating opinions’ failure to anticipate  a number of emerging market  crises in the 1990’s and 
2000’s.  Reinhart (2000), for example, argues that while they have been able to predict 
sovereign defaults, sovereign credit ratings have  systematically failed to predict currency 
crises, and tend to lag these crises with downgrades. This is supported by Mora (2006), who 
showed through regression analysis that  assigned ratings exceeded predicted ratings before 
the Asian crisis of 1997 and mostly matched the predicted ratings only during the crisis period.  
In addition, Claessens and Embrechts (2003) found that while internal and external ratings are 
driven by similar factors, both underestimate event risks  with  external ratings (those issued by 
the rating agencies)  slower to respond to a financial crisis.    Hooper, et al. (2008) further argue 
that the subsequent downgrades during the crisis were a clear case of overreaction and 
contributed to the intensity of the crisis  by the rating agencies.   
 
2.1.1 Measuring the sovereign credit ratings 
In broad terms, there are two categories of ratings (investment grade and non-investment 
grade), separated according to the type of financial obligation (foreign or local currency) and the 
time to maturity (short and long-term) of the obligation8. Fitch, Moody’s and S&P apply an 
ordinal scale in assigning sovereign credit ratings, with each symbol in one agency having an 
                                            
7
 In the US   the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits investment banks and broker-dealers to use the NRSRO credit rating 
agency (CRA) for certain regulatory purposes such as the net capital requirements. Similarly,   in terms of the  previous Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Basel II agreement ), banking regulators could allow banks to use credit ratings from certain approved rating agencies or 
"External Credit Assessment Institutions" when calculating their net capital reserve requirements (Basel II, SEC 2003, 2011)., 
8
 Long-term ratings are those that have more than 13 months to maturity, while short-term rated securities are those that will mature within 13 
months. 
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equivalent in the other agencies (Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009), allowing for a comparison across 
the ratings issued by the different agencies.  
Fitch and S&P use similar ordinal scales for the long-term ratings, ranging from AAA, denoting 
the lowest expectation of credit or default risk, to D where an entity has defaulted. A plus (+) or 
minus (-) modifier may be appended to the long-term rating category between AAA to CCC,  to 
indicate their relative status within the category (Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009). For the short-term 
rating however, the two rating agencies used a different ordinal scale.  Fitch short-term ratings 
begin with F1 for the highest credit quality, to D for an entity that has defaulted on short-term 
financial obligations with the plus (+) or minus (-) modifiers appended to categories rated F1 to 
indicate their relative status within the category (Fitch, 2007). S&P short-term ratings, on the 
other hand, start from the highest A1 for financial obligors with the highest capacity to meet 
short-term financial commitments to D for short-term obligations in default (Gaillard, 2009). 
The highest long-term rating by Moody’s is Aaa for obligations judged to be of minimal credit 
risk, to C for the lowest rated credit class, with little prospect for recovery of the principal or 
interest. Long-term ratings are further enhanced through appended modifiers 1, 2, and 3 for 
ratings between Aa through to Caa to indicate relative ranking within each category (Moody 
2011). Moody’s short-term ratings range from P-1 (Prime-1) for issuer with superior ability to 
repay short-term debt obligations to NP (Not Prime) for issuers with a high risk of defaulting on 
short-term debt obligations (Gaillard, 2009). Table 1 summarise the long and short-term rating 
categories for Fitch, Moody’s and S&P.  
Table 1: Agency sovereign credit rating scales 
  Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 
Long 
Term  
Short 
Term 
Long 
Term  
Short 
Term 
Long 
Term  
Short 
Term 
Investment 
Grade 
Aaa 
P-1 
AAA A1+ AAA F1+ 
Aa1 AA+ 
A-1 
AA+ 
F1 Aa2 AA AA 
Aa3 AA- AA- 
A1 A+ 
A-2 
A+ 
F2 A2 
P-2 
A A 
A3 A- A- 
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  Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Baa1 BBB+ 
A-3 
BBB+ 
F3 Baa2 
P-3 
BBB BBB 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
Speculative 
Grade 
Ba1 
Not 
Prime 
BB+ 
B-1 
BB+ 
B 
Ba2 BB BB 
Ba3 BB- BB- 
B1 B+ B+ 
B2 B B 
B3 B- B- 
Caa1 CCC+ 
B-3 
CCC+ 
C 
Caa2 CCC CCC 
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
Ca CC CC 
C C C 
  D D D D 
Source: (Fitch 2007; Moody’s 2007; S&P 2007)  
2.1.2 Determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
Using regression analysis, Cantor and Packer (1996a), showed that sovereign credit ratings 
encapsulate a number of macroeconomic indicators namely per capita income, inflation, 
external indebtedness, growth (GDP growth), an indicator for economic development (proxied 
by the IMF classification of an economy as either industrialised or not industrialised),  and an 
indicator for default history. Cantor and Packer (1996a) further show that these observable 
macroeconomic indicators  explain 90% of S&P and Moody’s issued sovereign credit ratings.   
Subsequent studies have confirmed the findings by Cantor and Packer (1996a) with 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, et al. (2006) showing through ordered probit and case-based 
reasoning, that, in addition  to a proxy for technological development, specifically mobile phone 
use, GDP growth and inflation rate explain the sovereign credit ratings. Mellios and Paget-Blanc 
(2006), on the other hand, show  through principal components analysis that  the most 
significant variables in assigning a sovereign credit rating are per capita income, government 
income, real exchange rate (RER) stability, inflation rate and the sovereign default history . 
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In addition, while agreeing that a sovereign credit rating encapsulate quantitative (financial and 
economic)  factors, the agencies also point out that  the agency’s own  judgement as well as  
qualitative (political and policy development) factors that may not be publicly observable, are 
taken into account when issuing a rating (Gaillard, 2009). Moody’s (2006) further argue that, 
due to their forward looking nature, a sovereign credit rating analysis requires forward looking 
evaluation of risk of default over a medium to long-term horizon, necessitating medium to long-
term projections. This, Moody’s points out, involves a construction of a range of scenarios to 
stress test the vulnerability of the rated sovereign to internal and external economic, political 
and financial shocks. This supports the findings by Cantor and Packer (1996a),  that at least 
10% of the sovereign credit rating could not be explained by the macroeconomic factors, 
showing through regression analysis that quantitative models performed poorly in predicting 
small differences in the sovereign credit ratings, suggesting a greater qualitative review and 
agency intervention in the determination of a sovereign credit rating.    
2.1.3 Sovereign credit rating actions  
According to the rating agencies (Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009; Moody, 2011), announcements on 
a sovereign credit rating outlook, watchlisting, affirmation and movement across the different 
notches constitute a credit rating action.  Rating agencies, for example, make announcements 
on the actual rating between the different notches (A and A-) as well as the potential future 
direction of rating (stable, positive or negative outlook or watchlist)(Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009; 
Moody, 2011). In the case of Moody’s, for example, a rating outlook is an opinion on the likely 
direction of a rating in the following 18 to 24 months, while the watchlist is a formal active rating 
review on the direction of the rating in the following 3 to 6 months (Moody, 2011). This supports 
the findings by Hamilton and Cantor (2004),  that in addition to the actual rating migration 
between the  different notches, outlooks and watchlists were a good predictor of the possible 
rating migration and therefore , bring equally critical information to the international financial 
market9.   
                                            
9
 Fitch (2010) refers to a rating action as a rating upgrade, downgrade, affirmation, confirmation, watch-listing, or a change in the rating outlook. 
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Rating migration between the  different notches, outlooks and watchlists are not regularly 
paced, but are brought on by changes in the underlying economic, financial and policy 
conditions that they encapsulate, suggesting an active monitoring process (Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick et al., 2006; Cantor & Packer, 1995; Fitch, 2007). Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007), 
for example, further showed that the rating changes by the different agencies also follow a 
similar direction and magnitude, suggesting a level of herding in the rating movements. This 
supports the argument by Sy (2002) that a rating event  may also be brought on by a need to  
self-correct in cases where there may be rating splits (a difference in the rating on the same 
sovereign by the different rating agencies).   
 
While the rating agencies argue that a sovereign credit rating is a forward looking opinion on the 
potential default on financial obligation, a number of studies have also suggested an upward 
bias by the rating agencies, resulting in sovereign credit rating actions that lag as opposed to 
leading the financial markets.  Mora (2006), for example, found through regression analysis, that 
the agency assigned ratings exceeded the model predicted ratings, before the Asian crisis of 
1997, with the agency assigned rating downgrades following the financial crisis, self-correcting 
to match the model predicted ratings. This supports the findings by Larraín, Reisen and Von 
Maltzan (1997) that, prior to the Mexican Peso devaluation in 1994, S&P rated the Mexican debt 
favourably two days prior to the Peso devaluation at one step below investment grade with a 
positive outlook10. Indeed Mora (2006) also noted that Russia defaulted on its financial 
obligations during the year that  the sovereign debt was rated investment grade.  In addition, 
Block and Vaaler (2004) found that the rating actions responded to political cycles, with adverse 
movement in the sovereign credit ratings  immediately prior to an election and only normalising 
once the election results have been universally accepted. 
                                            
10
 The recent Eurozone,debt crisis however suggest that sovereign credit ratings may not be the best measure of country risk with first Greece 
requiring Euro-zone bail out in May 2010 to prevent debt default bankruptcy, while rated A3 (investment grade) by Moody, followed by the 
equally highly rated (A rated)  Ireland in November 2010. 
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2.2 The significance of the sovereign credit ratings  
Given their regulatory endorsement, with investors such as mutual and pension funds investing 
only in rated securities as opposed to similar unrated securities, it is conceivable that credit 
ratings will have an  influence on both the access and conditions at which capital is accessed 
(Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002; Rigobon, 2001). Cantor and Packer 
(1996a), for example, showed through regression analysis, that  92% of sovereign bond yield 
spread variances were explained by an announcement on a sovereign credit rating adjustment 
(rating event) . In addition, the authors showed that, while the marginal impact of the sovereign 
credit ratings declined to 91.4%, their explanatory power remained at 1% significant level when 
their regression model was controlled for macroeconomic factors, suggesting a robust 
relationship between sovereign credit ratings and bond yield spreads.  
 
While the findings by Cantor and Packer (1996a)  supports  the assertion by Reinhart (2000) 
that sovereign credit ratings have done well to predict sovereign defaults, this contradicts the 
argument by Partnoy (1999) that markets, through the sovereign bond yield spreads, are a 
better indicator of the country risk. Indeed, a number of studies such as that by Larrain et al. 
(1997), support the assertion that  sovereign credit ratings do bring new information to the 
financial market. In the short-term at least, the studies demonstrate that sovereign credit ratings 
have a significant announcement impact on sovereign yield spreads. In particular, Larrain, et 
al.(1997) argue that the rating adjustments were anticipated as opposed to lagging the financial 
market, reflected by the yield spreads rising days prior to the negative outlook announcement 
and declining before a positive outlook announcement.  Concurring with Larrain, et al.(1997), 
Norden and Weber (2004) showed that corporate stock and credit swap markets anticipate both 
the downgrades and negative outlook announcements, with S&P and Moody outlooks exhibiting 
a bigger impact than the actual downgrade.  Larrain, et al.(1997), however, also show that the 
yield spreads reverse once the announcement has been confirmed, suggesting a transitory as 
opposed to a long-term structural impact. In addition, the authors show that the causality 
between sovereign credit ratings and yield spreads was both ways, with the sovereign credit 
rating adjustment also following yield spread adjustments.  
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2.2.1 Sovereign credit rating and financial markets 
Despite the criticism and calls for more transparency in the rating process (EU, 2011; Fang, Lai 
& Miller, 2009), a number of studies have shown that sovereign credit rating adjustments bring 
new information to the financial markets. Brooks, et al. (2004), for example, show that the 
sovereign credit rating adjustments have a cross asset impact in addition to influencing the 
rated bond issues. The authors show that sovereign credit rating downgrade announcements 
have a negative impact on aggregate equity stock returns as well as on the dollar value of the 
domestic currency (exchange rate). The cross asset impact of the sovereign credit rating 
adjustments  was confirmed by  Ferreira and Gama (2007) who also show across border 
contagion of the sovereign credit rating adjustment. The authors show that the sovereign credit 
rating for downgrade adjustment announcements have a significant negative spill-over effect, 
with the geographic proximity and emerging market status of the affected neighbouring country 
amplifying the impact. In addition, the impact extended to industry level, with the traded goods 
and small industry effect more pronounced (Ferreira & Gama, 2007).  
 
Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) concur, showing  that in addition to firm-specific variables, debt 
issue characteristics and macroeconomic conditions, sovereign risk and global factors account 
for the variances in corporate bond spreads. The authors posit that the transfer of risk from a 
sovereign credit rating to the  private borrowers will remain as the sovereign government has 
the power to levy taxes, impose capital controls or even seize the firm’s assets when 
government capacity so necessitates. Indeed, Borensztein, et al. (2007) point out that while 
agencies are gradually moving away from sovereign ceiling doctrine, it appears that sovereign 
ratings remain a significant determinant of the ratings assigned to corporates domiciled in the 
sovereign, even after controlling for macroeconomic factors as well as corporate performance 
indicators.  
 
Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) however, caution that transmission of risk  from a sovereign to 
private borrowers was not universal, with the  transmission from the sovereign to the private 
borrowers less significant for subsidiaries of multinational companies. This is supported by 
Cantor and Packer (1996b) and Durbin and Ng (2005), who found that some private corporate 
borrowers were rated more favourably than their sovereigns and that in some instances, 
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corporate yield spreads were lower than similarly rated sovereigns. Durbin and Ng (2005) argue 
that investors tended to ignore the sovereign ceiling doctrine especially for firms with 
sustainable export earnings as well as those with close relationships with foreign parents or 
governments. In the case of South Africa, for example, Peter and Grandes (2005) found that for 
local currency ratings, the sovereign ceiling doctrine did not apply to multinationals and where 
the doctrine is applied, it is more pronounced for financial services firm spreads. 
 
In addition to the asymmetric impact on private corporate borrowers, the impact of the sovereign 
credit ratings adjustment has been shown to be dependent not only on the type of the rating 
action (downgrade or upgrade), but also on the rating agency. A number of studies, for 
example, have shown that the rating adjustment impact was  significant for  downgrades and 
not for the rating upgrades (Brooks et al., 2004; Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Gaillard, 2009). 
Indeed, while Cantor and Packer (1996a) found that the sovereign credit rating upgrade and 
downgrade adjustments have an impact on the sovereign bond yields, the study found that the 
sovereign credit rating announcements were more pronounced for below investment grade 
ratings. Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) further show that the sovereign credit rating 
adjustments impact was significant only when a country was put on review for possible 
downgrade. This agrees with the findings by Ferreira and Gama (2007), who found that there  
was a negative stock market return spreads (the return differential vis-a-vis the US NY stock 
exchange) to a sovereign credit ratings downgrade but no significant reaction to upgrades. This 
is in line with the findings by  Brooks, et al. (2004) and Hooper, et al. (2008)  that the rating 
adjustment impact was dependent on the type of the economy, with the adjustment impact more 
pronounced for emerging markets economies whose credit ratings are usually of lower credit 
quality .    
 
Brooks, et al. (2004) further show that only sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch and S&P 
had a significant downgrade impact on aggregate stock returns as compared to those issued by 
Moody’s and Thomson. Gaillard (2009) concurs, showing that  for sovereign bonds, the rating 
downgrade adjustment by S&P and upgrade adjustments by Moody’s have the most significant 
impact on yield spread movements. In addition, Gaillard (2009) shows that Moody’s issued 
sovereign credit ratings disagree more with the market than Fitch and S&P.  This is contrary to 
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the findings by Ratha, et al. (2007)  who showed that there was a high correlation between 
sovereign ratings issued by different agencies, with bivariate correlation co-efficiencies ranging 
between 0.97 and 0.99 for Fitch, Moody and S&P in 2006. The authors argue that the 
differences in the ratings were found to be arising from the timing of the rating as opposed to the 
interpretation or biases by the rating agencies. While Cantor and Packer (1996a) confirm the 
consistency on assigned Moody and S&P ratings, they found that agencies differed more 
frequently on below investment sovereign bonds ratings than they do on corporate bonds. This, 
the authors suggest, was brought about by difficulties in assessing political and economic 
conditions for developing economies. The rating agencies (Moody, 2007; S&P, 2007) however 
suggest that the rating splits may be due to the analysts’ experience and judgement and not on 
any biases by the agencies, suggesting that the asymmetric reaction to the rating adjustments 
by the different rating agencies may be due to the market confidence in the respective agency 
capability.   
 
2.2.2 Sovereign credit ratings impact on capital flows 
According to Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Özatay, et al.  (2009), sovereign credit 
ratings address the information asymmetry by bringing new information, especially for non-
transparent economies, improving their ability to attract private capital flows. While Cavallo, et 
al. (2004) agree, they also caution that an investment grade sovereign credit rating issue on an 
emerging market economy, attracts excessive inflows that they fail to handle, leading to real 
exchange rate overshoots (devaluation in excess of the long run equilibrium level) and potential 
currency crises. In line with Cavallo, et al. (2004), Larrain, et al. (1997) suggests that emerging 
market sovereign credit rating downgrades have the potential to dampen excessive private 
portfolio capital flows, with cautious investors reducing their exposure to emerging markets 
following a downgrade.  
In contrast to Cavallo, et al. (2004), and Larrain, et al. (1997) however,  Gelos, Sahay, and 
Sandleris (2003) could not detect significant punishment of defaulters by the credit markets. 
This is supported by  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) who argue  that serial default is nearly 
universal as countries struggle to transform from emerging to advanced economies. Reinhart 
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and Rogoff (2008) also show that crises frequently emanate from financial centres with 
transmission through interest rates and commodity prices, suggesting that in the absence of a 
conducive global environment, private capital flows will dry up irrespective of the prevailing 
domestic environment or sovereign credit rating. This is supported by Kasekende, et al. (2009), 
who posit that the minimal financial impact experienced by Africa during the 2008 global 
economic and financial crisis, was due largely to the declining demand and falling commodity 
prices as opposed to financial contagion.  
 
While not disagreeing with Gerlos, et al. (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on the 
importance of the global environment on investment flows, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano  
(2003) argue that countries whose Institutional Investor country credit Index was very low, had a 
high probability of default and were least likely to access the international private capital 
markets while their country credit Index was very low. The authors show a history of default 
reduces the debt to Gross National Product (GNP) threshold of debt intolerant countries 
(countries that have no capacity to carry debt and continue to meet financial obligations) to as 
low as 15%, suggesting a correlation between debt capacity as reflected in the country credit 
Index and access to capital. 
 
The findings by Reinhart, et al. (2003), are supported by  Kaminsky, et al. (2004),  who show  
from a sample of 104 countries, that the largest decline in net capital inflows as a proportion of 
GDP, was correlated to the decline in Institutional Investor country ratings for the middle-income 
countries. Indeed, Hernandez, Mellado and Valdés (2001) earlier found that one of the factors 
that negatively impacted on portfolio flows to developing economies between the 1970’s and 
1990’s was the country’s indebtedness and creditworthiness, as represented by their country 
credit ratings.  This is further supported by Janicki and Wunnava (2004), who show that the the 
Institutional Investor's country credit rating was a significant determinant of FDI inflows to  
emerging central and eastern European countries. In addition, Bevan and Estrin (2004) also 
show that  that there is a two way  causality between the Institutional Investor's country credit 
rating and FDI inflows, with FDI enhancing International Investor country’s credit rating with a 
lag, leading to increased future FDI inflows that created a self-reinforcing cycle.  
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While the studies, such as those by Reinhart, et al. (2003), Kaminsky, et al. (2004), Bevan and 
Estrin (2004) and Janicki and Wunnava (2004) demonstrate the effect of a country rating on 
capital flows, these studies do not address the question of rating agency issued sovereign credit 
ratings on capital flows.  The studies are based on the Institutional Investor country ratings that, 
unlike the rating agency issued sovereign credit ratings,  are based on a survey input from the 
investment community such as senior economists, sovereign risk analysts at leading banks, 
money management and securities firms 11. In addition, the Institutional Investor country ratings 
are issued periodically in March and September of each year, as opposed to the continuously 
monitored sovereign credit rating issues by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P (Fitch, 2010; Gaillard, 
2009; Institutional-Investor, 2013; Moody, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, studies such as those by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002),  Cavallo, et al. 
(2004) and Larrain, et al. (1997), while investigating the Fitch, Moody’s and S&P sovereign credit 
ratings, only analyse their short-term adjustment impact on financial market performance, as 
opposed to their long-term structural impact on capital flows.  Indeed, while confirming a  highly 
significant short-run negative rating adjustment announcement impact on emerging-market 
sovereign bond yields,  Larrain, et al. (1997) caution against overestimating the long-run impact 
of the sovereign credit ratings, leaving a knowledge gap in the effect of independent sovereign 
credit ratings on capital flows. Kim and Wu (2008) attempt to close this gap by investigating  the 
long-term effect of S&P issued ratings on financial sector development and capital flows, on 51 
emerging market countries. The authors investigate the effect of both the long-term and short-
team  foreign  and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the different types of capital flows 
(FDI, Portfolio Bond, Portfolio Equity, Portfolio investment, excluding liabilities constituting foreign 
authorities' reserves, total assets minus total liabilities of BIS reporting banks against individual 
countries and total loans minus total deposits from BIS reporting banks against individual 
countries) for the period between 1995 and 2003. 
  
                                            
11
 See (2004) and Janiki and Wunnava (2004) for studies on the impact of Institutional Investor country risk rating FDI inflows in the  central and 
Eastern Europe transition economies 
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The key findings from Kim and Wu (2008) are that S&P issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings improved the financial intermediary markets. The study also 
demonstrated a positive correlation between the S&P issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings and capital flows, suggesting that the impact on capital flows is 
transmitted through the financial intermediary markets.  Kim and Wu (2008),  however, found 
that the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings was not 
significant for all types of capital flows, with the  statistically significant effect only on the  bank 
flow variables (total assets minus total liabilities of BIS reporting banks against individual 
countries and total loans minus total deposits from BIS reporting banks against individual 
countries) but not for the portfolio bond, portfolio equity and the ratio of FDI to GDP. While the 
authors find that the long-term local currency sovereign credit ratings do improve the local 
market development, the study concludes that the long-term local currency sovereign credit 
ratings and both the local and foreign currency short-term sovereign credit ratings do not 
improve the international capital inflows with the short-term sovereign credit ratings retarding 
capital flows.  
 
2.3 Conclusions  
This chapter introduced sovereign credit ratings, defining factors that inform the sovereign credit 
rating as well as the impact sovereign credit ratings have on financial markets. Empirical 
evidence show that a number of macroeconomic factors identified by Cantor and Packer 
(1996a) and confirmed by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, et al.(2006), determine the sovereign credit 
rating. In addition, the rating agencies suggest that the agency’s own insights are critical in the 
determination of new rating issues as well as in the adjustment of existing ratings (Fitch, 2007; 
Moody, 2011; S&P, 2007).  This is supported by Cantor and Packer (1996a), who show that, on 
average, the publicly available macroeconomic indicators explain 92.4% of the variability in the 
average sovereign credit ratings (90.5% of Moody issued ratings and 92.6% of S&P issued 
ratings), suggesting that the remaining unexplained variability was brought on by the rating 
agency insights.   
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While the rating agencies make it clear that the issued sovereign credit ratings are an opinion 
on the sovereign’s ability and willingness to meet its financial obligations,  the interest in the 
ratings and the rating agencies has focused on their role on financial crises.  In some instances, 
it has also been suggested that the rating agencies have an upward bias, issuing ratings above 
the sovereign’s ability to meet financial obligations, leading to default risk and financial crises 
(Mora, 2006; Sy, 2004). In particular it is posited that sovereign credit rating issues lagged  
emerging market financial crises in the 1990’s, reacting  instead to the crisis through a 
downward adjustment (Gelos et al., 2003; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart, 2000). This, it 
is suggested, exacerbated the crises, with the capital flow reversals following the downgrades.  
 
Empirical evidence however, suggests that sovereign credit ratings do bring new independent 
information to financial markets. A number of studies, for example,  argue that sovereign credit 
ratings fill the information asymmetry that is characteristic of the developing economies, in 
addition to potentially providing differentiation between these economies (Ratha et al., 2007; 
Siddiqi, 2007). This concurs with studies such as those by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002),  
Cavallo, et al. (2004) and Larrain, et al. (1997), that suggest a strong relationship between Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P sovereign credit ratings and access to foreign capital at favourable 
conditions. These studies, focused on the short-term rating transition impact on financial 
markets performance, show a rating transition announcement impact on the bond yield spreads 
and equity stock returns (Ferreira & Gama, 2007; Hooper et al., 2008; Rowland, 2006). 
Empirical evidence from these studies shows that it is the insights of the rating agencies as well 
as the interpretation and projection of the future outlook on the publicly available 
macroeconomic indicators that bring new information to the financial markets. As shown by 
Cantor and Packer (1996a), while the macroeconomic indicators explain 85.6% of the variance 
in the sovereign yield spread, the sovereign credit ratings explain 91.9% of these variances, 
indicating a market information value flow from the sovereign credit ratings. Indeed, while 
subsequent studies show mixed reaction to the sovereign credit rating downgrade and upgrade 
adjustments, the studies agree with Cantor and Packer (1996a)’s study that sovereign credit 
rating adjustments do bring new information to the financial market. Reisen and von Maltzan 
(1998), for example, show that sovereign bond yield spreads reacted to negative (downgrade) 
sovereign credit rating adjustments but not to the positive (upgrade) adjustments.  This is 
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confirmed by Brooks, et al. (2004) who showed that sovereign credit rating downgrades, 
specifically those by Fitch and  S&P, resulted  in the negative aggregate stock market and 
foreign exchange rate returns. Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) however, while not finding any 
evidence of positive rating announcement impact on yield spreads, show a positive rating 
adjustments bond yield spread and stock market returns volatility. 
 
Empirical evidence also shows an asymmetric impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial 
markets, based on the type of economy (developed and developing economy).  Ferreira and 
Gama (2007) and Kaminsky and Schmulker (2002), for example, show that the rating 
adjustments impact is more pronounced for emerging markets as opposed to developed 
economies.  This supports the findings by  Reisen and Von Maltzan (1998) and earlier findings 
by Cantor and Packer (1996a) who showed that the sovereign credit rating adjustment impact 
was specifically pronounced for below investment rated sovereigns that are predominantly 
developing economies. In addition, Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Kaminsky and Schmulker 
(2002) show that the sovereign credit rating adjustment  impact on emerging markets bond 
yields and equity stocks has a spill over impact on neighbouring countries, with Kaminsky and 
Schmulker (2002) showing that this is more pronounced during a financial crisis. Indeed  
Kaminsky and Schmulker (2002) argue that there is herding mentality by market participants in 
emerging markets, which is reflected during  rating adjustment.  
 
Literature on sovereign credit ratings further suggests a relationship between the rating 
adjustment and access to capital. Cavallo, et al. (2004), for example, suggest that higher 
sovereign credit rating improves capital flows to emerging markets, with an investment rated 
sovereign issue leading to a higher capital inflow. This is in line with the argument by Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002) and Özatay, et al.  (2009) that  sovereign credit ratings address the 
information asymmetry on emerging economies by bringing new information, especially for non-
transparent economies, improving their ability to attract private capital flows.  Kim and Wu 
(2008) go on to test this conjecture, showing  that long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings issued by S&P not only improved the financial development of emerging markets, but 
that they also have a positive relationship with the different types of capital flows to emerging 
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economies. This supports the earlier findings by Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Janicki and 
Wunnava (2004), who showed that a different type of country rating (International Investor 
issued country rating), explained the differences in FDI flows to emerging central and east 
European countries.  Indeed,  Partnoy (1999) argues that due to their regulatory endorsement, 
rating agencies have the power to influence access to capital flows. This concurs with the 
argument by Cantor and Packer (1995) that, since the establishment of the Brady bonds in the 
late 1980’s, sovereigns credit ratings have become a de facto requirement for emerging 
economies to access international debt markets with investors such as the mutual and pension 
funds investing only in rated securities as opposed to similar unrated securities (Cantor & 
Packer, 1996a; Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002; Rigobon, 2001).  
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3 ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS IMPACT–
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter defines the analytical framework for the impact of long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings on capital flows and financial markets in Africa.  First,  the  chapter 
defines the  analytical framework for the long-term structural relationship between the long-term 
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P and the different 
types of capital flows namely, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity (EQUITY), 
portfolio bond (Bond) and commercial borrowing from private banks and other private 
institutions (COMMERCIAL). The chapter proceeds to define the short-term, transitory rating 
adjustment impact on the aggregate equity stock and nominal foreign exchange rate returns. 
 
The analytical framework does not attempt to derive new fundamental models from the first 
principles, but is based on widely used frameworks with adaptations to reflect the inclusion of 
the proposed additional variables as well as the empirical analysis techniques employed. Two 
quantitative techniques, widely used in economic and financial research, are used to test the 
impact of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on financial markets and 
capital inflows in Africa, namely the event study technique and regression analysis.    
  
3.1   A framework for empirical measurement of the long-term 
structural effect on capital flows  
In empirical research in particular, a theory is tested in order to confirm or support a prevailing 
theory or null hypothesis before a regression model is accepted as the best estimate of the true 
value of the dependent variable (Brooks 2008).  The burden of proof is normally on proving an 
alternative theory or the alternative hypothesis, by testing the existence of a significant 
relationship between two or more variables (Albright, Winston & Zappe, 1998). According to 
Koop (2008),  for the prevailing theory or null hypothesis to be rejected (and for the alternative 
theory to be accepted) a  statistical significance of the estimated marginal effect of the 
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independent variable(s) on the dependent variable must be estimated. This statistical 
significance is based on the level of confidence that the estimated values of the regression 
model  are closer to the true value of the estimated variables (Koop, 2008).  The confidence 
level, a reflection of the estimation error (or point estimate) of a regression model, is presented 
as a range of values, that represent the confidence level of estimation (90%, 95% or 99%), with 
the higher value indicating a higher accuracy of the estimated value.  
For the current study, regression analysis is applied to test the null hypothesis that long-term 
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings do not have a statistically significant long-term 
influence on private capital flows in Africa. This involves an estimation of the marginal influence 
of the sovereign credit ratings (the independent variable) on the different types of capital flows 
(dependent variable), while controlling for variables previously proved to have an effect on the 
different types of capital flows.  According to literature , a number of specific macroeconomic 
variables and country risk factors that are observable by investors at the time of making  an 
investment, explain the differences in  capital flows to emerging economies (Hernandez, 
Mellado & Valdés, 2001). These macroeconomic variables and country risk factors form the 
basis for the empirical analysis of the long-term structural relationship between the long-term 
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and the different types of capital flows, as described 
below.   
a. Recipient country market size  
Empirically there is agreement that a large market size implies increased demand for goods and 
services, and is one of the key pull factors of capital flows, in particular market seeking FDI 
inflows (Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Loots, 2005; Malefane, 2007). Mhlanga, Blalock, & Christy 
(2010), for example, found that the host country market size has a positive impact on FDI flows 
to SADC countries irrespective of the source, sector or type of investment. This agrees with an 
earlier study by Malefane (2007), who  found through co-integration analysis, that export 
seeking FDI  flows to Lesotho, were targeting the larger South Africa’s GDP, as opposed to the 
smaller local GDP.  
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b. Trade openness 
As demonstrated by  Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Bevan and Estrin (2004), openness, as 
presented by external trade in goods and services , is one of the key determinants of FDI flows 
from the European Union member states to the emerging central and east European countries. 
As demonstrated by Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Malefane (2007), the ease and ability to 
access a larger external market is  critical for attracting export seeking FDI to smaller 
developing economies, where the domestic demand for goods and services may not justify 
market seeking FDI. 
c. Sovereign indebtedness  
According to Hernandez, et al. (2001), one of the factors that negatively impacted on portfolio 
flows to developing economies between the 1970’s and 1990’s was the country’s indebtedness 
and creditworthiness. This was confirmed by Gelos, et al.(2003), who found that in addition to 
the government debt levels, the ability to service the debt represented by the country’s liquidity 
was a key determinant of government ability to access international bond and bank loan 
markets. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) concur, arguing  that the lack  of capital flows  from 
developed countries to poor countries is related to, among other factors, risk that the sovereign 
will default on its financial obligations.  
d.  Monitory policy stability  
Monetary policy instability as represented by inflation rate, negatively impact  capital flows to 
developing countries, as investors lose confidence in the value of the returns to be derived from 
the weakened and often volatile local currency (Asiedu & Lien, 2004). In particular, in an 
unstable monetary policy environment, foreign investors are particularly concerned with the 
erosion of local currency denominated returns in an environment of high  inflation rates (Bevan 
& Estrin, 2004). 
e. Infrastructure development 
One of the key considerations for manufacturing investment in developing economies is the 
potential cost advantage of the host economy.  Good infrastructure, as shown by Morisset   
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(1999) and Asiedu (2003), is expected not only to improve productivity but to also reduce the 
cost of doing business. In addition, Kim and Wu (2008) found that investors were also more 
likely to invest in economies that invested in future production capacity, as represented by 
investment in productive capacity. 
f.   Quality of the host country’s institutions   
Investor surveys suggest that in addition to favourable macroeconomic factors, a conducive 
investment climate is required to encourage capital flows to developing economies (Asiedu & 
Lien, 2004). Jenkins and Thomas (2000), for example, show that in addition to an unstable 
macroeconomic environment, investors identified regulatory uncertainty as a key factor in 
discouraging capital flows to Southern Africa. An empirical analysis by Asiedu (2003) confirms 
this observation, with the results of a regression analysis on the determinants of FDI to Africa,  
showing that macroeconomic stability, efficient institutions, political stability and a good 
regulatory framework explain the differences in FDI flows.   
g. Financial intermediary development  
A level of development of financial intermediaries is necessary to facilitate the absorption of the 
capital inflows to an economy (Portes & Rey, 2005).   As demonstrated by Ndikumana (2000), 
for example,  higher financial intermediary development leads to increased future levels of 
investment and capital accumulation. This supports an earlier study by Lensink and White 
(1998) who found that an indicator for financial development represented by the ratio of broad 
money to GDP , was one of the significant independent variables in a regression model of the 
determinants of capital flows to developing economies. 
h. International environment 
As suggested by Taylor and Sarno (1997), and supported by Manasse, Roubini and 
Schimmelpfennig (2003), Dailami, Masson and Padou (2005) and Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) 
external factors, such as the investor country economic environment have an effect on capital 
flows to emerging economies. The studies in particular show that capital flows to vulnerable 
economies, with low country ratings in Latin America, East Asian and Eastern Europe, were 
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more sensitive to US interest rates movements than those with investment grade country 
ratings.   
3.1.1 Specification of the long-term structural capital flow equation 
   Based on empirical analysis and in line with the reduced form equation specified by Edwards 
(1984), the long-term relationship between capital flows and long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings can be modelled as follows:  
 
                             
       
                           
 
   
           =1   −1       , +                                                                          (1)  
Where: 
          , represents alternatively the different  types of foreign capital flows namely 
FDI, portfolio bond,  portfolio equity  or commercial bank and other private institutions 
measured as the ratio of the annual  net capital inflows to GDP;  
              represents alternatively a single period lag of the different  types of foreign 
capital flows namely FDI, portfolio bond,  portfolio equity  or commercial bank and other 
private institutions measured as the ratio of the annual  net capital inflows to GDP; 
      ,   and          represent the average annual sovereign credit rating of country i at time  
t, and the average annual sovereign credit rating of South Africa at time t respectively; 
              represent the annual national macroeconomic control variables discussed in 
a to h  above; and 
           represent the indicators of quality of country governance (voice and 
accountability,  political stability, government effectiveness , regulatory quality and  the rule 
of law)12 
                                            
12
 See Kaufmann et al. (2005). for the description of the details of the construction of indicators of quality of country governance 
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a. Data descriptions and modelling issues  
The data set for the current study covers 28 countries for which long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings were issued by either one of Fitch, Moody’s or S&P for the period 
between1994 and 2011. The period coincides with the year in which the first long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating was issued for an African country, when South Africa was 
issued a BB long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating by Fitch on the 22nd of 
September 1994. 
i. Foreign capital flows 
 
The current study takes into account  the different types of foreign capital flows as identified by   
Sula and Willett (2009)  and Williamson (2005) . These include net flows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio equity (EQUITY), portfolio bond (BOND) and commercial banks and 
other private institutions (COMMERCIAL). Net flows from portfolio bond and commercial banks 
and other private institutions are further divided into those that are public and publicly 
guaranteed (PPG) and those that are nonguaranteed (PNG), to distinguish between the 
underlying security provided by the borrower. In order to ensure consistency of measurement 
and source, all the capital flows were sourced from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators databases. This also ensured the consistency of definition as described below:  
 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) - are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest, described as  10 per cent or more of voting stock, in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments;  
 Portfolio equity (EQUITY), net inflows (BoP, current US$) - are the net inflows from equity 
securities other than those recorded as FDI and includes shares, stocks, depository 
receipts, and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors; 
 Public and Publicly Guaranteed bonds (PPGBOND) (NFL, current US$) – are public and 
publicly guaranteed debt from bonds that are either publicly issued or privately placed 
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and the net flow received by the borrower during the year constitutes disbursements 
minus principal repayments; 
 Public and Publicly Guaranteed commercial banks and other creditors 
(PPGCOMMERCIAL) (NFL, current US$) – are public and publicly guaranteed long-term 
commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions received 
by the borrower during the year, constituting disbursements minus principal repayments.  
 PNG or Nonguaranteed (PNGBOND) bonds (NFL, current US$) – are nonguaranteed 
long-term debt from bonds that are privately placed and the net flow received by the 
borrower during the year, constituting disbursements minus principal repayments  
 PNG or Nonguaranteed (PNGCOMMERCIAL) commercial banks and other creditors 
(NFL, current US$) – are nonguaranteed long-term commercial bank loans from private 
banks and other private financial institutions received by the borrower during the year, 
constituting disbursements minus principal repayments 
        
Each one of the capital flows were converted to net inflow rates as a ratio of GDP in current US 
dollars. 
ii. Annual average sovereign credit ratings  
The current study considers all long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) on African countries between 1994 and 2011, a 
total of 28 countries, 5 of which are rated by all 3 rating agencies, 16 of which are rated by 2 
and 7 by one rating agency (See Appendix A for the list of the countries). For each one of the 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings, the study identified rating events that 
constitute an announcement on the changes in the rating status by the rating agencies on long-
term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings as well as the annual average sovereign credit 
rating for each country. Each rating was sourced from the respective rating agencies to ensure 
consistency of measurement and the timing of rating changes (Fitch, 2011; Moody, 2011; S&P, 
2011).  
 
 
Sovereign credit ratings by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P are presented in ordinal scale and a 
transformation to a numerical scale was required in order to carry out regression model 
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estimation. Borrowing from Cantor and Packer (1996a) and Grande and Parsley  (2005), the 
data is linearly transformed to time series data as presented in Table 2 
  
Table 2: Linear transformation of the foreign currency sovereign credit ratings. 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch Conversion 
Investment 
Grade 
Aaa AAA AAA 20 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 19 
Aa2 AA AA 18 
Aa3 AA- AA- 17 
A1 A+ A+ 16 
A2 A A 15 
A3 A- A- 14 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 13 
Baa2 BBB BBB 12 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 11 
Speculative 
Grade 
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 10 
Ba2 BB BB 9 
Ba3 BB- BB- 8 
B1 B+ B+ 7 
B2 B B 6 
B3 B- B- 5 
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 4 
Caa2 CCC CCC 3 
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 2 
Ca CC CC 1 
C C C 0 
  D D 0 
Outlook 
Positive Positive Positive 0.25 
Stable Stable Stable 0 
Negative Negative Negative -0.25 
Credit 
Watch 
Positive Positive Positive 0.5 
Negative Negative Negative -0.5 
 
 
The transformation of each rating to a numerical annual average rating that could be used for 
statistical analyses followed a four step approach as follows: 
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 First a numerical value was attached for each rating -  from 20, for the highest long-term 
foreign currency ratings  AAA for Fitch and S&P and Aaa for Moody’s to 0, for a default 
rating C or D; 
 Each rating is adjusted for the outlook and Watchlisting, such that each rating is the sum 
of the actual rating and the rating outlook or watchlisting. For example where the rating is 
S&P B- with a positive outlook the numeric rating will be 5.25 (5 for the B- plus 0.25 for 
the positive outlook); 
 The third step involves determining the daily rating  by assigning the rating for each day 
from the day of the rating announcement to the date of the next rating announcement – 
for example where Moody’s announced a Baa1 rating with stable outlook on the 2nd of 
January that was followed by a Baa1 rating with a negative outlook on the 23rd of May the 
daily ratings will be assigned as follows: 
o A daily Moody’s numeric ratings of 13 is assigned between the 2nd of January and 
the 22nd of May followed by a daily rating of 12.75 from the 23rd of May onward; 
and    
 Lastly the average annual rating is determined through a weighted average number of 
days for each rating, with 365 days as a baseline. For example where the daily rating is 
12 for 175 days and 12.25 for 190 days, the annual average rating  was calculated as 
12.13  as illustrated in equation 2 below: 
 
   
   
        
   
   
                       (2)  
 
The annual average long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating is calculated for each 
one of the ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. The ratings are calculated for each 
country, providing a potential 504 (28 x 18) observations for the 28 countries rated by the 
three rating agencies between 1994 and 2011. The total observations are however 404 due 
to the fact that not all the countries are rated by all three rating agencies as well as the fact 
that each country’s initial assignment is not issued in 1994. For example, Angola’s initial 
ratings were assigned by the three agencies in 2010.   
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In addition to the numerically converted long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings, 
a dummy variable is assigned to each of the ratings to reflect the quality of the rating as 
either investment grade at Baa3 and above by Moody’s or BBB- above BBB- by Fitch and 
S&P or below investment grade at Ba1 and below Ba1 by Moody’s and BB+ and below BB+ 
by Fitch and S&P. The rating outlook and watchlisting are however not considered in 
assigning the grade of the rating as outlooks and watchlisting do not constitute an actual 
rating assignment but an imminent or probable direction of the assigned rating (Fitch, 2010; 
Moody, 2011; S&P, 2011) 
 
iii. Control variables 
 
In order to reduce the estimated capital flow regression models misspecification errors due to 
omission, variables of the macroeconomic indicators             as well as the indicators of 
the quality of the country governance           are included different types of capital flow 
regression models. To ensure consistency of measure and definition, each one of the annual 
country macroeconomic indicators and indicators of the quality of the country governance were 
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development and Governance Indicator databases. Table 
3 shows the list of the macroeconomic indicators and indicators of the quality of the country 
governance, as well as their expected relationship with the different types of capital flows. 
 
 
Table 3 control variables and their expected signs 
Control Variable   Unit FDI 
Portfol
io 
Equity 
Portfo
lio 
Bond 
Commercial 
bank loans  
GDP growth RGDPGRW 
annual % at 
constant 2000 
US$ 
+ + + + 
Trade  TRADE % of GDP +       
Telephone lines  INFR per 100 people +       
Exchange Rate Volatility EXCVOL Stdev - -   - 
Inflation, consumer prices  INFL annual % - -   - 
Gross domestic savings  GDS % of GDP   - - - 
Market capitalization of listed 
companies  
MRKT % of GDP   +     
Stocks traded, turnover ratio  STCKTNV %   +     
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Control Variable   Unit FDI 
Portfol
io 
Equity 
Portfo
lio 
Bond 
Commercial 
bank loans  
External debt stocks  EXTDEBT % of GNI     - - 
Principal rescheduled  RSDL 
current US$, % 
of Total External 
Debt 
    - - 
Short-term debt  SHRTDBT 
% of total 
external debt 
    - - 
Interest payments on 
external debt  
INTEXTDBT % of GNI     - - 
Domestic credit to private 
sector  
DCR % of GDP     - - 
Broad money growth  BMG annual %     + + 
Domestic Real interest rate  RRI %     + + 
Global Real interest rate  RRI %     - - 
S&P Global Equity Indices    
annual % 
change 
  +     
Voice and Accountability VOICE  RANKING + + + + 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
POL  RANKING + + + + 
Government Effectiveness GOV  RANKING + + + + 
Regulatory Quality REG  RANKING + + + + 
Rule of Law RULE  RANKING + + + + 
Control of Corruption CORR  RANKING + + + + 
 
 
b. Time series data properties and regression modelling 
One of the practical challenges in  estimating  long-run models with time series data such as the 
macroeconomic indicators, is that unless the time series variables are stationary  (integrated of 
order zero – I(0)), conventional ordinary least squared (OLS) regression models  cannot be 
applied (Koop, 2008).   Data such as the size of the economy (GDP) for example, show 
progression or pattern of progression over a period of time (Brooks, 2008; Koop, 2008). 
Estimates obtained from using such non-stationary data in OLS regression models without any 
transformation, results in spurious regressions  whose results may lead to meaningless or 
misleading conclusions (Brooks, 2008; Koop, 2008).   
 
To ensure that all the data used in the current study was stationary and not exhibiting any 
trending or unit root characteristics, non-stationarity tests were carried out using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips and Perron (PP) tests. The test for non-stationarity has a 
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basic objective to examine the null hypothesis (Ho) that Φ, in equation 3 below, equals one (Φ = 
1): 
.  
                       (3) 
 
In practice however, the test for non-stationarity or unit root is carried out by testing a one sided 
alternative hypothesis that Φ < 1. This is achieved by estimating equation 4 below, with the null 
hypothesis accepted or rejected, based on the comparison of the estimated α (which is 
equivalent to Φ – 1) to  specific critical values (Brooks, 2008; Koop, 2008).  
  
                          (4) 
 
Testing for α, the unit root hypothesis is rejected where α is more negative than -3.45 and 
accepted where α  is less negative than -2.57, with the following critical numbers representing 
the different significant levels(Brooks, 2008; Koop, 2008):  
 
10% significance = -2.57 
5% significance = -2.86 
1% significance =-3, 47 
 
As shown in table 4 below, both the ADF and PP tests rejected the unit root or non-stationary 
hypothesis, indicating that  both the dependent variables (different types of capital flows 
described in 5.1.4 above) and the independent variables (average annual credit ratings and 
control variables) were stationary.  
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Table 4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips and Perron (PP) tests 
Variable 
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
Variable 
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
  
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
BMG -88.39 -12.39 Fitch -7.24 -7.19 FDI -11.72 -8.43 
BMGZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) FitchZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) FDIZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
DCR -3.54 -3.74 Moody’s -5.91 -5.44 Equity -13.44 -9.81 
DCRZ(t) (0.0071) (0.0000) Moody’sZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) EquityZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RGDPGRW -21.93 -9.76 SP -6.86 -7.07 PNGBOND -24.82 -9.06 
RGDPGRWZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) SPZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) PNGBONDZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GDS -4.99 -3.72 CORR -2.10 -0.09 PNGCOMM -17.71 -8.15 
GDSZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) CORRZ(t) (0.2466) (0.0000) PNGCOMMZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
INTEXTDBT -10.70 -7.77 GOV -18.29 -9.51 PPGBOND -17.86 -9.41 
INTEXTDBTZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) GOVZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) PPGBONDZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MRKT -3.62 -3.44 POL -16.99 -9.48 PPGCOMM -17.65 -10.17 
MRKTZ(t) (0.0054) (0.0000) POLZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) PPGCOMMZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RSDL -20.28 -8.09 REG -18.33 -9.91     
 
RSDLZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) REGZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
 
RRI -15.81 -8.05 RULE -17.69 -9.73     
 
RRIZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) RULEZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
 
SHRTDBT -7.22 -5.98 VOICE -17.55 -9.19     
 
SHRTDBTZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000) VOICEZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
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Variable 
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
Variable 
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
  
Phillips-
Perron test 
for unit root 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test for unit root 
INFR -4.22 -4.40 TRADE -6.83 -5.30     
 
INFRZ(t) (0.0006) (0.0000) TRADEZ(t) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
 
54 
 
3.2 A framework for empirical measurement of short-term impact on 
financial markets 
The event study technique is a methodological approach also known as performance index 
tests, residual analysis and abnormal return analysis (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1980, 
1985). A general flow of steps for event studies as identified by Brown and Warner (1980; , 
1985) and applied by McWilliam and McWilliam (2000) are followed in testing the impact of 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings adjustments on the nominal foreign 
exchange rates and the composite equity stock markets  in African economies as described 
below:  
a. Identify the event/s of interest 
The event of interest is one that gives rise to a flow of new information into the market. In event 
studies, the event could either be a single event which occurs at one calendar time or a type of 
event which might occur frequently at different calendar times (Brown and Warner, 1980; 
Bowman, 1983). In this study the events that give rise to new information flowing into the market 
are the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating actions or adjustments as defined by 
the rating agencies (Fitch, 2007; Gaillard, 2009; Moody, 2011). These are multiple events that 
take place at different calendar times to reflect the rating agencies assessment of a sovereign 
credit risk through a rating upgrade or downgrade and/or placing a sovereign credit rating under 
active assessment through an outlook or watch-listing (Fitch 2007; S&P 2007; Moody 2011). For 
the current study, an event of interest is any public announcement by any one of Fitch, Moody’s 
or S&P, on an African sovereign credit rating upgrade, downgrade and change in outlook or 
watch-listing between 1994 and 2011. 
b. Identify the event window 
In order to accumulate the events of interest together in a single study, event studies introduce 
the concept of “event time” and event window (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1980; 
MacKinlay, 1997). While the event time is the date on which the sovereign credit rating is 
announced, for example, the event window is the period over which the impact brought on by 
the sovereign credit rating announcement is expected to last.  In order to create event windows 
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on which statistical analysis can be carried out, numerous similar long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating announcements, occurring on different calendar dates are standardised 
to create an event window. This is achieved by designating the date of the announcement and 
the dates around the window period, irrespective of their calendar date  around the date of the 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating adjustment announcement, such that the date 
of the announcement is designated “Day 0” to create an event time (Bowman, 1983; Brown & 
Warner, 1980; Kothari & Warner, 2006). Any period around the event date is then designated 
relative to the event time, such that one can determine whether the reaction to the rating 
adjustment is in anticipation (prior to event date) or in reaction (after the event has taken place) 
(MacKinlay, 1997) to the rating adjustment announcement. For example, one day after the 
sovereign credit rating adjustment announcement is designated as Day+1, while a day before 
the sovereign credit rating announcement is designated as Day-1. 
While  previous studies such as that by Steiner and Heinke (2001), have shown that the market 
through returns, have responded to the rating adjustments  as long as 100 days prior to and 90 
days after the adjustment announcement, there is no standard event window and it is up to the 
researcher to take a view on an appropriate window period (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 
1980; MacKinlay, 1997) . In deciding on the window period however, the researcher  needs to 
take into account the possibility of contamination of the event of interest as observed by Hand, 
et al (1992). The authors demonstrated, for example, that the market responds to information 
other than the rating adjustment announcement.    In instances where such  information reaches 
the market at the same time as the event of interest, this results in the clustering of events with 
the over or underestimation of the reaction to the event of interest, resulting in a Type I or Type 
II Error   (Hand et al., 1992).  
With the increase in the flow of information therefore, the number of instances of contamination 
for long event windows, in particular, also increase.  As pointed out by Healy and Palepu (2001) 
for example, in addition to regulatory requirements such as the audited financial results, 
voluntary communication by organisations (through management forecasts, analysts’ 
presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites etc.) and disclosures through 
information intermediaries, such as financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press 
have greatly increased the flow of information across the global financial markets.  For the 
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current study, a 30 day window period is used to coincide with the major economic news 
announcements that are made monthly (Balduzzi, Elton & Green, 2001; IMF, 2011; SARB, 
2008).  In addition, except for South Africa, Nigeria and to some extent, Kenya, most African 
financial markets are small and illiquid (Ncube, 2008) and choosing a shorter window period 
may not capture the full impact of the sovereign rating action.     
c. Abnormal reaction to the event  
In order to quantify the impact of the sovereign credit rating adjustment on financial markets, an 
abnormal reaction by the financial markets, reflected by returns significantly below or above the 
expected or normal returns, should be computed (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1980; 
MacKinlay, 1997). For such a reaction to an event of interest to be classified as abnormal, 
actual ex post reaction is measured against a benchmark (Brown & Warner, 1980; MacKinlay, 
1997), making it necessary to first establish the benchmark or normal  performance that would 
have been observed in the absence of the event of interest (Brown & Warner, 1980; Steiner & 
Heinke, 2001). The abnormal return is computed as the difference between the ex post reaction 
recorded around the event of interest and the normal or expected performance (Brown & 
Warner, 1985). Brown and Warner (1980) identified three models for the determination of 
expected reaction or normal returns of financial securities as described below:  
 The Mean Adjusted Return Model - considered the easiest of the three models, assumes 
that the ex ante expected return for a given security i is equal to a constant Ki, which only 
differs across securities, reflecting an average return of a security over a period of time.  
         
 
 
                  (5) 
 The Market Adjusted Return Model - assumes that ex ante expected returns are equal 
across securities but not necessarily constant for a given security. The model’s key 
assumption is that since the aggregate market index is a linear weighted average 
combination of all the stocks, the expected return of the single stock, i is equal to the 
expected market return:.  
                         (6) 
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 The Market and Risk Adjusted Model - presumes that some version of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model generates expected returns (Brown & Warner, 1980). The risk-adjusted 
market model, which adds an intercept term, alpha, to the classic CAPM is expressed by 
the formula: 
                   ,       (7) 
Where: 
         is the expected return on stock i in period t. 
      is the market return in period t. 
 β is the systematic risk of stock i relative to the market. 
 α  is  the intercept of the linear relationship between the returns of stock i relative to the 
return of the market.  
 _   is the unpredictable component of         with an expected value of zero. 
While the mean adjusted return model is considered the simplest of the three models,  Brown 
and Warner (1980) demonstrated that for monthly data,  differences between methodologies is 
quite small where abnormal return is present.  This is confirmed in subsequent tests with daily 
data confirming that the type of model used to determine the expected returns is immaterial in 
the event study technique data (Brown & Warner, 1985).  McKinlay (1997) concurs and 
attributes the lack of sensitivity to the expected (normal) return estimation model to the fact that 
the variance of the abnormal return is frequently not reduced much by choosing a more 
sophisticated model.   
 
For the current study both the Mean Adjusted Return Model and the Market and Risk Adjusted 
Models are used to compute the expected returns for the nominal foreign exchange rate and the 
composite national equity returns respectively. Given the lack of a benchmark market return 
index for the foreign exchange rate for African countries, the Mean Adjusted Return Model is 
used to estimate the nominal foreign exchange rate returns, with the expected return for each 
foreign exchange rate estimated as the average return over the 100 days preceding the event 
window. For the composite national equity returns, the expected return is calculated using the 
Market and Risk Adjusted Models, with the MSCI emerging market index representing the 
benchmark market return (   . While ideally the MSCI FM AFRICA, index would have been a 
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benchmark market return for the study, the limited data of the MSCI FM AFRICA index made it 
impossible to consistently use the data over the study period.  
The abnormal reaction is then measured as the difference between the observed ex post 
financial return on a national equity market and the return on foreign exchange rate around the 
event window against an estimated expected return or yield spread as follows: 
           −               (8) 
Where: 
       is the abnormal return on the national equity market or nominal foreign exchange 
rate at time t. 
      is the observed return on the national equity market or nominal foreign exchange 
rate at time t. 
         is the expected national equity market or nominal foreign exchange rate return 
d. Organizing and grouping the abnormal returns 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the abnormal returns must be aggregated in order to draw an 
overall inference for the event of interest in a cross section of securities of interest. More 
importantly, Brown  (1985) found through simulation of a sample of fifty securities that, while the 
excess returns for the different securities were not normally distributed, the aggregated excess 
returns in a cross section of securities converged to normality. This is confirmed by later studies  
by MacKinlay (1997) and Kothari and Warner (2006) as being the case for daily data as 
demonstrated by Brown (1985) in the earlier study. 
 
The aggregation of the abnormal reaction to the event of interest is  typically carried out in two  
steps (Hand et al., 1992): 
  First, the simple average abnormal returns (AAR) are computed as follows: 
     
 
 
                              (9) 
Where  
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      is the average abnormal return in period t.  
 n is the number of securities in the sample. 
The average abnormal returns are then summed over the window period to work out the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) as follows: 
 
       
 
 
                          (10) 
 
Where: 
       is the cumulative average abnormal return over the window period. 
 t is the window period.  
 
While equation 9 aggregates the excess returns across a cross section of securities, equation 
10 aggregates the excess returns over a period of time in order to accommodate a multiple 
period  event window, allowing for the measurements over the window period (MacKinlay, 
1997). 
e. Test for statistical significance 
To measure the probability that the excess returns came about as a result of the event and not 
due to some other random event, parametric or non-parametric statistical tests are employed to 
test for statistical significance. Parametric t-tests, while widely used in event studies, require that 
the calculated abnormal reaction to the event of interest be normally distributed and 
independent in order to be tested for significance (Bowman, 1983). According to Collins and 
Dent (1984), the requirement that abnormal returns be independent (not correlated) is, however, 
often not met in event studies,  especially for daily data. MacKinlay (1997), for example, found 
that daily stock returns in event studies were not normally distributed showing kurtosis  and 
skewness (distribution on both sides of the mean do not look the same) with a significant 
proportion showing heteroscedasticity, suggesting that non-parametric tests were more 
appropriate for daily data. MacKinlay (1997)’s findings showed that  the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed rank and the sign tests appeared to have greater power of estimating abnormal 
performance in the daily data as compared to the parametric tests. The author however 
concluded, after further analysis of a controlled sample, that the Wilcoxon signed rank and the 
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sign tests understated the probable type I error (when a statistical test rejects a true null 
hypothesis), confirming the conclusions by  Brown and Warner (1980) that parametric t-tests 
were reasonably well specified and performed better than non-parametric tests. Brown and 
Warner (1980) found in a subsequent study, (Brown and Warner, (1985), that while daily returns 
were far from normally distributed, their excess returns (AR), when aggregated across a number 
of securities were close enough to or are normally distributed, to apply the parametric statistical 
analysis.  
As with any daily data the abnormal reactions to an event over the window period may be  
susceptible to autocorrelation (when a variable is highly correlated with its lag) (Boehmer, 
1991). Without the assumption of independence between returns therefore, the null hypothesis 
of no abnormal returns would be rejected too often (Brown & Warner, 1980).  To overcome the 
possibility of autocorrelation, Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe 
(1990) proposed a t-statistic analysis that takes into account the possibility of  cross-sectional 
dependence between AARs by considering the standard deviation of cumulative average 
abnormal returns as presented in equation 11 below:  
  
     
        
             (11) 
Where  
           is the standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal returns at time t. 
       is the cumulative average abnormal returns at time t. 
3.2.2 Event Study data descriptions and modelling issues  
a. Long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating adjustment 
events 
 
In order to test for the short-term impact of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings on the daily national equity market returns and nominal exchange rate returns, all 
announcements of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings are identified as 
events of interest. These include a rating affirmation, rating upgrade, rating downgrade, 
negative or positive outlook or watchlisting. In addition, to test for the differences in the 
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announcement impact on the different grades of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings, the ratings are classified into investment and below investment grade. 
 
A number of studies show that financial crises leads to an increase in the number of sovereign 
credit rating events, with the rating agencies downgrading sovereigns as they enter the crises 
(Kaminsky, 2006; Kräussl, 2005; Mora, 2006). These present a potential of rating events that 
overlap over a short period of time, leading to clustering (Bowman, 1983; Hand et al., 1992).  
This may lead to a potential bias in the statistical estimate of the impact of the event of interest 
(Aktas, De Bodt & Cousin, 2007; Dimson & Marsh, 1986; Steiner & Heinke, 2001). The current 
study incorporates the years that incorporate a number of periods when the global financial 
markets experienced a number of crises that include the Mexican currency crisis (1994), the 
Asian currency crisis (1997–98), the Russian debt default (1998), the Brazilian crisis (1999), the 
Argentina currency crisis (2002) as well as the recent (2008) global financial crisis. 
 
In order to avoid the potential impact of the event clustering, the current study only focused on 
“clean events”, by eliminating from the sample, all overlapping events in line with the de-
clustering process by Hand, et al. (1992).Following this de-clustering approach, a total of 295 
“clean events”, presented in Figure 3, were identified from a potential 324 events. 
 
    
Figure 3: A sample of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating events 
Looking at Figure 3, two features can immediately be identified. First there is a higher number of 
below investment grade rating events than there is for investment grade ratings. This is 
understandable given there are more below investment grade rating issues (23) in Africa, 
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62 
 
compared to the 8 investment grade rating issues. Previous studies, such as those by Hand, et 
al. (1992) , Hite and Warga (1997) and Brooks (2004) have shown that the rating impact is more 
pronounced for below investment ratings, while there is no statistically significant impact for 
above investment rated sovereigns, and there is an expectation that the impact of long-term 
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings will be more pronounced in Africa.  
 
The second feature that is apparent is that the number of downgrades is very low for investment 
grade ratings suggesting that African countries that transition into an investment rating manage 
to sustain their investment rating. This may be due to the disciplining effect that comes with 
maintaining a rating, as suggested by Siddiqi (2007), as countries ensure that the conditions 
that informed the investment rating are maintained in order to maintain the low cost of debt 
brought on by the investment rating (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002; Larraín et al., 1997).  
 
b. National Equity stock and nominal foreign exchange returns 
 
While the number of operating stock exchanges in Africa rose from 7 in 1989 to 23 in 2007, 
South Africa's Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE), as shown in Tables 5 and 6, is by far 
the largest stock exchange by market capitalisation in Africa. By the end of 2009, the JSE 
market capitalisation was 805 Billion US$, almost ten times the second largest stock exchange 
in Africa (The Egyptian Exchange). The JSE also plays a critical role in South Africa’s economy 
with the market capitalisation almost three times the GDP.  
 
In comparison, the other stock exchanges in Africa are small and illiquid with turnover ratios 
ranging from half a percentage of market capitalisation to just under 30% (IMF, 2011). Singh 
(1999) for example, argued that given the level of development in Africa, only a small number of 
urban based firms would benefit from the stock market with the exclusion of the greater majority 
of the work force that are engaged in agriculture or informal activities. Irving (2005) supports this 
view, pointing out  that trade in African stock exchanges is dominated by trade in one or a few 
stocks that often make up a sizeable proportion of the market capitalisation.  Indeed the small 
stock and bond exchanges and the shallowness of the markets in Africa, may explain the fact 
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that in 2006, Africa received just over 1% of global portfolio flows, with just over 80% of Africa’s 
portfolio flows going to South Africa  (Ncube, 2008). 
 
Table 5: A list of African stock exchanges  
Stock Exchange Location Founded  Market 
Capitalisation -
March 2010 
Bourse Régionale des 
Valeurs Mobilières*-Done 
Abidjan – Côte 
d’Ivoire 
September 
1998 
XOF 391 billion 
Bourse des Valeurs 
Mobilieres d'Alger- Done 
Algers - Algerian 1993 DZD 7 billion 
Angola Stock Exchange- 
Done 
Proposed - first announced in 2006 
Botswana Stock 
Exchange- Done 
Gaborone - 
Botswana 
1989 USD 4.18 billion 
Douala Stock Exchange -
Bourse de Douala Done 
Douala -
Cameroon 
2001 XAF 82,602 million 
Bolsa de Valores de Cabo 
Verde-Done 
Mindelo- Cape 
Verde 
2005 CVE 20 trillion 
The Egyptian Exchange 
(formerly Cairo and 
Alexandria Stock 
Exchange ) -Done 
Cairo and 
Alexandria - Egypt 
1883 
EGP 418,523 
million 
Ghana Stock Exchange- 
Done 
 
 
Accra 
-Ghana 
1990 
USD 12,566.49 
million 
Nairobi Stock Exchange - 
Done 
Nairobi - Kenya 1954 
KES 10,77,622 
million 
Malawi Stock Exchange - 
done 
Blantyre -Malawi 1994 
MWK 1159,006.7  
million 
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Stock Exchange Location Founded  Market 
Capitalisation -
March 2010 
The Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius Done 
Port Louis 
Mauritius 
30-Mar-89 
USD 4,246.78 
million 
Casablanca Stock 
Exchange - Done 
Casablanca, 
Morocco 
1929 MAD 599 billion 
Bolsa de Valores de 
Mozambique/Maputo 
Stock Exchange 
Maputo 
Mozambique 
1999  
Namibia Stock Exchange 
Done 
Windhoek 
Namibian 
1992 NAD 642,419 Mil 
Abuja Securities and 
Commodities Exchange - 
Done 
Abuja -Nigeria 1998  
Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Done 
Lagos-Nigeria 1960 USD 125 billion 
Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange 
Johannesburg- 
South Africa 
1887 USD 800 billion 
Khartoum Stock Exchange 
-Done 
Khartoum-Sudan. 11994 USD 5 bil 
Swaziland Stock 
Exchange-Done 
Mbabane 
Swaziland 
1999 SZL 1.49 billion 
Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange -Done 
Dar es Salaam  
Tanzania 
1996-became 
operational in 
1998 
USD 3,580 million 
Bourse de Tunis -Done Tunis-Tunisia 
February 1996 
Founded 
USD 10,184 million 
Uganda Securities 
Exchange -Done 
Kampala-Uganda 
Licensed Jun 
1997 trading 
Jan 1998 
UGX 54 billion 
Lusaka Stock Exchange -
Done 
Lusaka Zambia 
Launched 
February 1994 
ZMK 25 trillion 
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Stock Exchange Location Founded  Market 
Capitalisation -
March 2010 
Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange -Done 
Harare- 
Zimbabwe 
Founded 1896 USD 3,195 million 
Source: The different African stock exchange websites 
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Tables 6: Summary of Africa stock exchanges market data 
Economy Market capitalization of listed companies (current 
US$ Billions)  Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) Turnover ratio (%) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Botswana 3.9 5.9 3.6 4.3 35.9% 47.7% 26.5% 36.7% 2.3% 2.2% 3.1% 2.6% 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.2 8.4 7.1 6.1 23.9% 42.2% 30.2% 27.3% 3.3% 2.5% 4.1% 2.0% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 93.5 139.3 85.9 91.1 87.0% 106.8% 52.9% 48.3% 54.8% 45.6% 61.9% 59.7% 
Ghana 3.2 2.4 3.4 2.5 25.4% 15.9% 20.4% 9.6% 2.1% 3.9% 5.2% 2.0% 
Kenya 11.4 13.4 10.9 11.0 50.6% 49.4% 36.0% 37.3% 14.6% 10.6% 11.8% 4.5% 
Malawi 0.6 - 1.8 - 18.6% - 41.5% - 3.5% - 3.9% - 
Mauritius 3.6 5.7 3.4 5.0 55.3% 75.3% 36.9% 56.2% 4.4% 8.0% 8.9% 0.3% 
Morocco 49.4 75.5 65.7 64.5 75.2% 100.4% 74.0% 70.6% 35.3% 42.1% 31.1% 12.0% 
Nigeria 32.8 86.3 49.8 33.4 22.3% 52.0% 24.0% 19.8% 13.6% 28.2% 29.3% 26.9% 
South Africa 715.0 833.5 491.3 805.2 277.4% 293.8% 177.7% 283.5% 48.8% 55.0% 60.6% 83.8% 
Swaziland 0.2 0.2 - - 7.5% 6.9% - - 0.0% - - - 
Tanzania 0.5 - 1.3 - 3.8% - 6.3% - 2.1% - - - 
Tunisia 4.4 5.4 6.4 9.3 14.4% 15.3% 15.8% 21.4% 14.3% 13.3% 25.5% 16.0% 
Uganda 0.1 - - - 1.2% - - - 5.2% - - - 
Zambia 1.2 2.3 - - 11.1% 20.6% - - 2.1% 4.1% - - 
Zimbabwe 26.6 5.3 - - 487.8% 98.0% - - 6.2% 5.1% - - 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 2011 
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One of the challenges in using the daily national equity stock indices and exchange rate data 
is that the close of trading in the different markets is not synchronised, resulting in the 
mismatch on the closing prices from the different markets (Brooks et al., 2004; Hand et al., 
1992; Reisen & von Maltzan, 1998). To overcome this challenge, with an exception of a few 
instances where data was sourced from the respective stock exchanges, the data was sourced 
from DataStream Global Market Indices and MSCI Global Equity Indices to ensure 
consistency. 
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4 ESTIMATION OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING EFFECT ON 
THE CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS  
4.1 Estimation of the long-term structural effect on capital flows  
This section presents the individual and collective significance of the sovereign credit ratings in 
explaining the differences in the ratio of capital flow to gross domestic product (GDP). The 
estimates are presented with the dependent variable (the ratio of the capital flow to GDP) and 
the independent variables being either in their original metric or in a ratio of the GDP as 
presented in table 3 above. The long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating in particular, 
is presented in its transformed numeric value as presented in table 2 above.  
In many instances, as presented in Appendix A, the Fitch and S&P ratings are highly 
correlated with minimal split between the two ratings. In order to avoid autocorrelation of the 
Fitch and S&P issued ratings, separate models are estimated for the ratings issued by the 
different rating agencies.  In addition, given the dominance of South Africa as a key destination 
for foreign capital flows, in particular portfolio flows (Arvanitis, 2005; Ncube, 2008), as well as 
being the  leading investor in the region (UNCTAD, 2010, 2011), it becomes critical to separate 
the influence of South Africa in the panel regression analysis. Indeed, as shown by Jefferis 
and Okeahalam (2000),  in addition to the size, openness, market-orientation of the individual 
economies as well as the size and liquidity of the stock exchange,  South Africa’s interest rate 
and GDP have an influence on the real stock market returns in Botswana and Zimbabwe. This 
is supported by  Arora and Vamvakidis (2005)  who,  in a study  of 47 African countries,  show 
that South Africa’s growth has a substantially positive impact on growth in Africa, even after 
controlling for other country specific variables. In an earlier study, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) 
also showed that a subsidiary of a multinational that is based in South Africa, was 32% per 
cent more likely to export to the African region and the rest of the world compared to when it 
was located anywhere else in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that South Africa is a gateway to 
the region. 
69 
 
 In order to test for the robustness of the models and remove the obvious bias brought on by 
South Africa, each model is estimated for the full sample that includes South Africa, as well as 
for the reduced sample that excludes South Africa. 
4.1.1 Estimation of the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on capital flows 
In addition to having the unexpected negative sign, own country Fitch long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating (RATING) results in the reduction of the adjusted R-squared 
when introduced to the FDI model as presented in table 7 below. While the RATING variable is 
of the expected positive sign for the portfolio equity (EQUITY) model, the R-squared remains 
unchanged at 56.1%, with the adjusted R-squared declining when the RATING variable is 
introduced to the model in table 8 below. The EQUITY model, however, improves with the 
introduction of the QUALITY of rating variable with both the R-squared and the adjusted R-
squared increasing slightly. This however, is the case only when South Africa is included in the 
sample. 
 In contrast to the FDI and EQUITY flows, there is a positive relationship between the RATING 
variable and all types of long-term debt inflows (long-term commercial bank loans from private 
banks and other private financial institutions and portfolio bond flows) as presented in tables 9 
and 10. The relationship, however, is only significant for the public and publicly guaranteed 
long-term commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions 
(PPGCOMM) for nonguaranteed long-term debt from bonds that are privately placed 
(PNGBOND) flows. In addition that for the PNGBOND is only significant when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample. While the RATING variable has the expected positive sign for the 
public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond flows (PPGBOND) and non-guaranteed long-
term commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions 
(PNGCOMM) models, the relationship is insignificant as presented in tables 9 and 10 below.   
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a. Estimation of the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on FDI inflows 
Consistent with theory, the 1st lag of the dependent variable (LAG1), real economic growth 
(GROWTH), infrastructure development (INFRASTRUCTURE) and the indicator for political 
stability (POL) are all significantly related to FDI investment rate in Africa. As presented in 
table 7, the economic growth hypothesis holds in Africa, with economic growth explaining the 
differences in the dependent variable at 1% significant level. In addition, the advantage 
brought on by developed infrastructure as suggested by Morisset   (1999) and Asiedu (2003),  
as represented by the number of telephones per 1000 people,  is significantly related to FDI 
flows, with a single unit of INFRASTRUCTURE explaining 0.07 of the dependent variable.   
Contrary to priori expectations however, TRADE while of the expected positive sign, is not 
significantly related to the FDI investment rate, suggesting that level of country openness as 
suggested by  literature (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Hooper et al., 2008; Janicki & Wunnava, 2004), 
is not a primary determinant of FDI to Africa. Surprisingly, there is a positive relationship 
between exchange rate volatility (EXCHVOL) and the dependent variable, suggesting that the 
risk of currency mismatch between the cost of production and revenue is not critical for FDI 
inflows to Africa. The relationship between the dependent variable and EXCHVOL however is 
weak and insignificant. The most significant World Bank Governance perception index was 
political stability and absence of violence (POL), which was found to be positively related to the 
dependent variable, suggesting that a strong perception of a stable political climate is 
important for the security of long term investment through FDI.  
The introduction of the long-term foreign currency FITCH sovereign credit rating (RATING) 
variable to the FDI investment rate model however,  does not improve the model fit, resulting 
in the decline in the adjusted R-squared. Despite improving the R-squared from 70.4% to 
70.5%, the RATING variable has an unexpected negative coefficient in addition to being 
insignificant, with the adjusted R-squared declining slightly from 69.3% to 69.2%. While the 
introduction of the dummy variable for the quality of the rating as either investment or below 
investment grade (QUALITY), results in the RATING variable being positive, this seems to be 
spurious, with the adjusted R-squared remaining unchanged even when the R-squared 
increases slightly to 70.7%.   
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As presented in table 7, the results hold, even when South Africa is excluded from the sample 
with the RATING and QUALITY variables, remaining insignificant.  As with the full sample, the 
RATING variable is negative and insignificant, becoming positive only when the QUALITY 
variable is introduced to the model. In addition, the introduction of the annual average South 
African rating (RSA), does not improve the explanatory power of the model nor does it improve 
the explanatory power of the RATING variable, with the adjusted R-squared declining to 71.2% 
from 71.4%. 
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Table 7: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on FDI 
inflows with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (FDI/GDP) 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Constant 2.028 -1.75 -2.045 
 
-2.247 -2.123 -2.441 -2.854 
 
 
(0.001) (0.016) (0.01) 
 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.204) 
 Dependent Variable Lag 
         
1
st
 Lag 0.688*** 0.68*** 0.671*** 
 
0.697*** 0.694*** 0.682*** 0.68*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Rating Variables 
         
RATING 
 
-0.046 0.008 
  
-0.021 0.04 0.035 
 
  
(0.441) (0.921) 
  
(0.749) (0.651) (0.701) 
 
QUALITY 
  
-0.511 
   
-0.61 -0.558 
 
   
(0.353) 
   
(0.3) (0.387) 
 
RSA 
       
0.037 
 
        
(0.843) 
 
Economic Variables 
         
Growth 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.315*** 
 
0.327*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
INFR 0.065** 0.079* 0.08** 
 
0.059* 0.065* 0.068* 0.069* 
 
 
(0.035) (0.028) (0.026) 
 
(0.066) (0.081) (0.068) (0.068) 
 
TRADE 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 
 
0.207) (0.164) (0.182) 
 
(0.282) (0.264) (0.288) (0.285) 
 
EXCHVOL 0.000 0.004 0.003 
 
0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
 
(0.581) (0.598) (0.625) 
 
(0.593) (0.6) (0.633) (0.648) 
 World Bank Governance Index 
         
POL 0.019** 0.02** 0.019** 
 
0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 
 
(0.011) (0.020) (0.019) 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
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Dependent Variable (FDI/GDP) 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
          
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
R-squared 0.704 0.705 0.707 
 
0.727 0.727 0.729 0.730 
 
Adj R-squared 0.693 0.692 0.692 
 
        0.715        0.714         0.714         0.712 
 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1%  
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b. Estimation of the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on portfolio equity inflows 
As expected, the portfolio equity net inflows to GDP (EQUITY) model performs well with the R-
squared of 56% and adjusted R-squared of 52.5% for the full sample, when South Africa is 
included in the sample. The model however, performs poorly when South Africa, which 
accounts for approximately two thirds of portfolio equity flows to the region for the estimation 
period, is excluded from the sample. As presented in table 8, the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable is highly significant with one unit of the 1st lag EQUITY explaining approximately 0.4 
units in the differences in the dependent variable for the full sample. In line with theory, the  
size of the equity stock market (MRKTCAP), provides the absorptive capacity for portfolio 
equity flows and is highly significant and positive, as also suggested by Portes and Rey 
(2005). Contrary to priori expectations and the findings by Jefferis and Okeahalam (2000)  
however, an increase in equity stock trading relative to the size of the stock exchange, does 
not explain the differences in the portfolio investment rate with the stock turnover 
(STCKTRNOV) variable insignificant and of an unexpected negative sign. The model however 
confirms the findings by Portes and Rey (2005) and Taylor and Sarno (1997), that the global 
market performance as proxied by the S&P global index (SPIND) is significantly related to 
portfolio flows with the SPIND variable both positive and highly significant at 1%. This is in line 
with the suggestion by Kaminsky and Schumkler (2002) that performance improvements in the 
international markets, improves the portfolio investment climate, and investment flows to 
emerging markets.  
Contrary to priori expectations however, domestic GROWTH does not explain the differences 
in the portfolio equity inflows. This is not surprising though, since South Africa’s GROWTH, 
which accounts for over 75% of the equity flows to the region, grew at an average of 3.2% 
between 1994 and 2010, compared to the average output growth of 4.1% in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s On the other hand, the fastest growing oil producing economies such as that of 
Equatorial Guinea do not have equity stock markets and hardly receive any portfolio equity 
flows.   In addition, as argued by Gerlos, et al. (2003), traditional mechanisms of country links 
with the rest of the world such as openness to trade (TRADE), do not help much to explain 
EQUITY investment rate in Africa. 
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As with the FDI model, the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating (RATING) does 
not explain the differences in the portfolio equity investment rate, with the introduction of the 
RATING variable resulting in the adjusted R-squared declining from 52.7% to 52%. While 
insignificant, the improvement in the model performance with the introduction of the QUALITY 
variable suggests that, in line with priori expectation and literature (Brooks et al., 2004; Hand 
et al., 1992; Hooper et al., 2008), the QUALITY of the rating is a prerequisite to access 
portfolio equity flows.  In contrast to the FDI model, the introduction of the QUALITY variable 
slightly improves the model performance with R-squared and adjusted R-squared increasing to 
57.6% and 52.9% from 56.1% and 52.7% respectively. 
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Table 8: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on 
portfolio equity flows with p-value in parenthesis 
  
Dependent Variable (Portfolio Equity/GDP) 
  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 
 
0.183 0.132 -0.211 
 
0.043 0.157 0.124 0.089 
  
(0.637) (0.811) (0.721) 
 
(0.818) (0.569) (0.667) (0.899) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
         
1
st
 Lag 
 
0.396*** 0.396*** 0.374*** 
 
0.146 0.15 0.153 0.154 
  
(0.000) (0.000)) (0.001) 
 
(0.316) (0.307) (0.301) (0.306) 
Rating Variables 
         
RATING 
  
0.006 0.087 
  
-0.013 -0.001 -0.002 
   
(0.894) (0.229) 
  
(0.568) (0.971) (0.965) 
QUALITY 
   
-0.598 
   
-0.091 -0.087 
    
(0.144) 
   
(0.688) (0.716) 
RSA 
        
0.003 
         
(0.955) 
Economic Variables 
         
Growth 
 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.074 
 
0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
  
(0.305) (0.309) (0.279) 
 
(0.706) (0.717) (0.751) (0.760) 
MRKTCAP 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.114) (0.102) (0.096) (0.110) 
STCKTRNOV 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.01 
 
0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  
(0.554) (0.548) (0.329) 
 
(0.304) (0.262) (0.315) (0.334) 
SPIND 
 
0.021*** 0.021*** 0.02*** 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.146) (0.164) (0.163) (0.188) 
F Prob 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.285 0.369 0.471 0.587 
R-squared 
 
0.561 0.561 0.576 
 
0.118 0.125 0.128 0.128 
Adj R-squared 
 
0.527 0.520 0.529 
 
0.027 0.013 -0.005 -0.028 
Panel A full sample  Panel B excluding South Africa  * Significance at 10%  ** Significance at 5%   ***Significance 1% 
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c. Estimation of the effect Fitch issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on portfolio bond net flows  
While performing weaker than the FDI and portfolio equity investment rate models, both the 
public and publicly guaranteed (PPGBOND) and non-guaranteed (PNGBOND) portfolio bond 
net flow rate models are significant with the average R-squared of between 23% and 16% 
respectively. Contrary to  the suggestion by Froot and Stein (1991),  that foreign debt is 
substituted by local debt as domestic wealth grows,  neither the economic growth (GROWTH) 
nor the growth in domestic credit (DCR) explain PPGBOND or PNGBOND net flow rates, with 
both variables having an insignificant relationship with PPGBOND or PNGBOND net flow 
rates. In addition, the DCR variable is negative when South Africa is excluded from the sample 
for PPGBOND net flow rate model, but remains positive for the PNGBOND net flow rate 
model.   
The 1st lag of the dependent variable does not explain the current PPGBOND and PNGBOND 
bond flows, with the 1st lag negative and insignificant for both types of the bond debt net flow 
rate models. This may be due to the low debt capacity in the developing economies as 
suggested by  Reinhart (2000). As shown in table 9 however, it is the lags of the rescheduled 
debt (RSDLDBT) that have a positive and significant relationship with both the PPGBOND and 
PNGBOND net flow rates.   The impact of RSDLDBT, however, is asymmetric with the 1st lag 
of RSDLDBT negative and significant for PNGBOND, but negative and insignificant for 
PPGBOND. In contrast, the 2nd lag of RSDLDBT is positive and significant for PPGBOND, 
suggesting, as posited by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), that borrowers do not necessarily close 
off  credit to previously defaulting sovereigns as economies transition to a developed state, 
with the debt markets opening up for previous defaulters as soon as their debt capacity is 
restored.  
As shown in table 9, the impact of interest on external debt (INTEXTDBT) is heterogeneous on 
the different types of portfolio bond flows, with a positive and significant relationship to 
PPGBOND model, but negative and insignificant for PNGBOND model, suggesting that the 
capacity to meet interest on current debt commitments is seen as a positive sign of debt 
capacity for the public and publicly guaranteed bonds, but not for the non-guaranteed debt.   
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Table 9 Panel regression estimations for the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on portfolio 
bond flows with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant -0.325 -0.339 -0.488 
 
-0.224 -0.34 -0.341 -1.948 
 
0.015 -0.070 -0.099 
 
0.012 -0.107 -0.153 0.164 
 
(0.089) (0.171) (0.108) 
 
(0.279) (0.211) (0.288) (0.092) 
 
(0.884) (0.509) (0.423) 
 
(0.917) (0.379) (0.254) (0.690) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag -0.032 -0.033 -0.0310 
 
-0.0170 -0.029 -0.029 -0.0360 
         
 
(0.681) (0.675) (0.688) 
 
(0.831) (0.726) (0.727) (0.669) 
         Rating Variables 
                 
RATING 
 
0.003 0.023 
  
0.026 0.026 0.014 
  
0.028** 0.032 
  
0.030** 0.036** 0.038** 
  
(0.930) (0.580) 
  
(0.508) (0.556) (0.752) 
  
(0.017) (0.646) 
  
(0.030) (0.021) (0.016) 
QUALITY 
  
-0.2550 
   
-0.003 0.125 
   
-0.0480 
   
-0.116 -0.140 
   
(0.393) 
   
(0.992) (0.735) 
   
(0.6) 
   
(0.403) (0.323) 
RSA 
       
0.135 
        
-0.026 
        
(0.147) 
        
(0.416) 
Economic Variables 
                 
Growth 
         
0.012 0.011 0.0120 
 
0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 
          
(0.300) (0.348) (0.323) 
 
(0.390) (0.289) (0.293) (0.305) 
GDS 
         
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 
          
(0.858) (0.821) (0.788) 
 
(0.390) (0.289) (0.293) (0.305) 
BMG 
         
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
          
(0.539) (0.516) (0.517) 
 
(0.969) (0.783) (0.806) (0.715) 
BM 
         
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
          
(0.339) (0.075) (0.070) 
 
(0.610) (0.612) (0.553) (0.571) 
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Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
INTEXTDBT 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 
  
0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 
 
-0.009 -0.029 -0.022 
 
-0.010 -0.014 -0.003 -0.013 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.801) (0.415) (0.592) 
 
(0.814) (0.740) (0.945) (0.779) 
1
st
 Lag RSDLDBT -0.094 -0.094 -0.100 
  
-0.1010 -0.098 -0.090 
 
-0.81*** -0.73*** -0.72*** 
 
-0.80*** -0.73*** -0.71*** -0.73*** 
 
(0.222) (0.228) (0.200) 
  
(0.185) (0.200) (0.205) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
2
nd
 Lag RSDLDBT 0.645*** 0.650*** 0.665*** 
  
0.612*** 0.648*** 0.648*** 
         
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
SHRTDBT 
         
-0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0040 
 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.0040 -0.0030 
          
(0.623) (0.412) (0.383) 
 
(0.772) (0.378) (0.473) (0.510) 
DCR 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  
-0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
0.0020 0.0010 0.0020 
 
0.003 0.001 0.0020 0.0020 
 
(0.049) (0.138) (0.099) 
  
(0.719) (0.484) (0.523) 
 
(0.168) (0.324) (0.284) 
 
(0.406) (0.844) (0.594) (0.679) 
World Bank Governance Index 
                 
RULE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
 
(0.977) (0.966) (0.963) 
  
(0.968) (0.945) (0.945) 
         
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.005 0.001 0.0018 
 
0.019 0.006 0.0083 0.0113 
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.2225 
 
0.238 0.241 0.2411 0.2536 
 
0.145 0.180 0.1815 
 
0.141 0.175 0.1798 0.1845 
Adj R-squared 0.187 0.182 0.181 
 
0.203 0.1999 0.1937 0.2007 
 
0.096 0.126 0.1214 
 
0.083 0.111 0.1090 0.1065 
Panel A full sample     Panel B excluding South Africa  
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed   PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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The introduction of the RATING and the QUALITY variables however, do not improve 
the PPGBOND net flow rate model performance with adjusted R-squared declining to 
18.2% and 18.05% when the RATING and the QUALITY variables are introduced 
respectively. This is also the case when South Africa is excluded from the sample, with 
the introduction of the RATING and QUALITY variables resulting in the adjusted R-
squared declining to 19.99% and 19.37%. In contrast, the introduction of the South 
African average annual long term foreign currency sovereign credit rating (RSA) 
variable improves the model performance slightly with the adjusted R-squared 
increasing to 20.07%. 
In contrast to the PPGBOND net flow rate model however, the RATING variable has a 
positive and significant relationship with PNGBOND net flow rate.   This is robust, with 
the RATING variable remaining positive and significant at 5%, when the QUALITY and 
RSA rating variables are introduced to the sample that excludes South Africa. In 
addition, the coefficients of the RATING increase to 0.036 and 0.038 when the 
QUALITY and RSA rating variables are introduced to the model, suggesting the 
amplification of the RATING by the QUALITY of the sovereign credit rating and the RSA 
rating. The p-value for the RATING also declines to 0.021 and 0.016 from 0.03 when 
the QUALITY and RSA rating variables are introduced to the model respectively. 
d. Estimation of the effect of Fitch long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on commercial banks and other 
private financial institutions 
As shown in table 10, a history of borrowing from commercial banks and other private 
financial institutions explain future borrowings, with the 1st and 2nd lags of PGGCOMM 
and PNGCOMM both positive and significant for the full sample of all the rated 
countries. The 2nd lag however, is insignificant and negative when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample, while the coefficient for the 1st lag increases, suggesting that  
borrowing capacity declines over a period of time for economies other than South 
Africa.   
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In contrast to the portfolio bond and equity flow rate however, while insignificant, there 
is a positive relationship between GROWTH and PPGCOMM, suggesting that 
economic performance does improve access to public and publicly guaranteed 
borrowing from the commercial bank and other private borrowers (PPGCOMM). In 
addition, in line with priori expectation, the current commitments towards the servicing 
of bank and other private borrower’s debt reduce access to PPGCOM, with the interest 
on external debt (INTREXTBT) variable of the expected negative sign. As with the 
GROWTH variable however, the relationship between INTREXTBT and PPGCOMM is 
insignificant.  Contrary to expectations however, short- term indebtedness (SHRTDBT) 
is positive while the DCR is insignificant confirming that there is no substitution between 
domestic credit and debt from commercial banks and other private borrowers.   
While the RATING and QUALITY variables are of the expected positive sign, their 
explanatory power of PPGCOMM and PPNGCOMM is insignificant. The introduction of 
the RATING variable as shown in table 10, improves the R-squared of the PPGCOMM 
model to 9.6% from 9%. The adjusted R-squared however remains the same at 6%, 
while the introduction of the QUALITY variable results in a decline to the adjusted R-
squared to 5.4%. With the exclusion of South Africa from the sample however, the 
model fit improves with the introduction of the RATING and QUALITY variables  
improving the R-squared  to 13.2% and 13,9% from 12.3% while also improving the 
adjusted R-squared  from 9.1% to 9.4% and 9.5% respectively. The RSA rating variable 
however reduces the performance of the model with the adjusted R-squared declining 
to 9.0% even though R-squared increases to 14.2%, contrasting the regional rating 
finding observed in the portfolio bond model above. 
In addition to increasing the R-squared to 40.7% from 39.8% and the adjusted R-
squared to 38.8% from 38.3%, the DCR variable becomes negative with the 
introduction of the RATING variable to the full sample PNGCOMM net flow rate model. 
The RATING variable however, while showing the expected positive signs, is 
insignificant.  The QUALITY variable on the other hand while insignificant, also 
increases the R-squared to 41.7% and adjusted R-squared to 39.4%. 
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Table 10: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the 
net flows from commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial PNG/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant -0.055 -0.137 -0.135 
 
-0.041 -0.137 -0.047 0.270 
 
-0.092 -0.151 -0.090 
 
-0.082 -0.112 -0.097 -0.167 
 
(0.576) (0.285) (0.374) 
 
(0.688) (0.300) (0.765) (0.631) 
 
(0.041) (0.012) (0.204) 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.054) (0.355) 
                  Dependent 
Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 
0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
 
0.43*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
 
0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2
nd
 Lag  0.125** 0.130** 0.130** 
 
-0.093 -0.086 -0.096 -0.096 
 
0.191*** 0.177*** 0.170 
 
-0.003 -0.010 -0.013 -0.014 
 
(0.029) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
(0.250) (0.287) (0.240) (0.241) 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
 
(0.954) (0.865) (0.829) (0.809) 
                  Rating Variables 
                 
RATING 
 
0.012 0.012 
  
0.016 0.002 0.003 
  
0.013 0.003 
  
0.007 0.005 0.005 
  
(0.316) (0.502) 
  
(0.248) (0.928) (0.862) 
  
(0.136) (0.744) 
  
(0.231) (0.425) (0.499) 
QUALITY 
  
0.003 
   
0.171 0.138 
   
0.114 
   
0.029 0.037 
   
(0.984) 
   
(0.289) (0.418) 
   
(0.107) 
   
(0.573) (0.505) 
RSA 
       
-0.026 
        
0.006 
        
(0.557) 
        
(0.687) 
Economic 
Variables 
                 
Growth 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 
         
 
(0.382) (0.340) (0.341) 
 
(0.483) (0.473) (0.463) (0.455) 
         
INTEXTDBT -0.016 -0.023 -0.023 
 
-0.025 -0.036 -0.063 -0.071 
         
 
(0.720) (0.618) (0.643) 
 
(0.584) (0.443) (0.237) (0.196) 
         
SHRTDBT 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
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Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial PNG/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
(0.394) (0.618) (0.619) 
 
(0.309) (0.415) (0.362) (0.326) 
         
DCR 
         
0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 
 
0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 
          
(0.585) (0.183) (0.094) 
 
(0.081) (0.485) (0.690) (0.633) 
World Bank 
Governance Index 
                 
GOV 
         
0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 
          
(0.008) (0.022) (0.036) 
 
(0.071) (0.087) (0.095) (0.143) 
                  
F Prob 0.012 0.016 0.029 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.090 0.096 0.096 
 
0.123 0.132 0.139 0.142 
 
0.398 0.407 0.417 
 
0.645 0.648 0.649 0.650 
Adj R-squared 0.060 0.060 0.054 
 
0.091 0.094 0.095 0.090 
 
0.383 0.388 0.394 
 
0.634 0.636 0.634 0.632 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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The PGNCOMM model performance improves significantly when South Africa is excluded from 
the sample with R-squared increasing to 64.5% while adjusted R-squared increases to 63.4%. 
The introduction of the RATING variable, as with the full sample, further improves the 
performance of the PNGCOMM model with R-squared and adjusted R-squared increasing to 
64.8% and 63.6% respectively. In contrast to the full sample, for the PNGCOMM model 
however, the introduction of the QUALITY variable does not improve the model performance 
with the adjusted R-squared declining to 63.2%.   
In addition, while explaining only 0.002 units of PPGCOMM, the perception of an effective civil 
service that is free from political influence index (GOV) is significant and positive for both 
models, suggesting that in the absence of public and public guarantees, borrowing from the 
commercial banks and other private borrowers is significantly improved by sound public service 
governance. 
4.1.2 Estimation of the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on capital flows 
In contrast to the FITCH issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating, the Moody’s 
RATING variable is significant for all the FDI investment grade models as presented in table 11 
below. As presented in tables 12 to 14, contrary to priori expectation however, Moody’s RATING 
variable has a negative sign and is in significant for portfolio equity (EQUITY) and all types of 
long-term debt inflow models (long-term commercial bank loans from private banks and other 
private financial institutions and portfolio bond flows) 
a. Estimation of the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on   FDI flows 
The introduction of Moody’s RATING variable to the FDI investment rate model, not only 
improves the model fit with the adjusted R-squared increasing to 40.1% from 36.3%, the 
RATING variable is also of the expected positive sign in addition to being significant at 5%. As 
presented in table 11, this was found to be the case for both the full sample as well as when 
South Africa is excluded from the sample, rejecting the null hypothesis that the Moody’s issued 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating does not explain the differences in FDI flows 
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in Africa. In contrast, the introduction of the QUALITY variable does not improve the FDI 
investment rate model with the introduction of the QUALITY variable resulting in the decline of 
the adjusted R-squared to 39.4%.     
 The FDI model performs in line with priori expectations with the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable explaining 0.421 unit increase in the dependent variable. As with the Fitch FDI 
investment rate model, the GROWTH variable is also the expected positive sign and significant. 
In contrast to the decline in the 1st lag of the dependent variable, the coefficient of the GROWTH 
variable however increases to 0.26 from 0.229 when the RATING variable is introduced to the 
model. In addition, the p-value of the GROWTH variable improves from 0.043 to 0.019, 
suggesting an amplification of the role of the GROWTH variable on FDI, when considered with 
the good sovereign credit rating.  This was also found to be the case with the 
INFRASTRUCTURE variable, with the co-efficient of the INFRASTRUCTURE variable 
increasing from 0.014 to 0.022 when the RATING variable is introduced to the model. The 
INFRASTRUCTURE variable however, while of the expected positive sign, remains 
insignificant.  
As with the FITCH estimated FDI investment rate model, the TRADE variable is surprisingly 
negative and insignificant, suggesting that openness and integration with the rest of the world is 
not important for FDI inflows for the countries rated by Moody. Contrary to the Fitch FDI 
investment rate model however, the EXCHVOL (exchange rate volatility variable) is of the 
expected negative sign as well as being significant. In addition, as with the GROWTH and 
INFRASTRUCTURE variables, the coefficient of the EXCHVOL is amplified with the introduction 
of the RATING variable decreasing from a -1.0678 to -1.693 while the p-value decrease from 
0.04 to 0.033, confirming the reinforcing role of the RATING variable.   
As with the Fitch rated sample FDI investment rate model, the most significant WORLD Bank 
Governance Index variable was the POL (political stability variable), with a positive relationship 
between the POL variable and the dependent variable.. The POL variable however while 
remaining positive, becomes insignificant with the introduction of the RATING variable to the 
model, suggesting the substitution of the political risk proxy by the RATING variable. In addition, 
the POL variable coefficient declines to 0.016 from 0.031 with the introduction of the RATING 
variable.  
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As shown in table 11, the performance of the model improves significantly with the exclusion of 
South Africa from the sample, with R-squared and adjusted R-squared increasing to 56% and 
52.1% from 40.5% and 36.2% respectively. In addition, while all the other explanatory variables 
remain the same as with the full sample, the POL variable remains significant with the 
introduction of the RATING variable, suggesting that irrespective of the quality improvement in 
the sovereign credit rating, political stability remains a key determinant for FDI inflows for 
countries other than South Africa. The coefficients and p-values of the GROWTH, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, TRADE and EXCHVOL, however improve with the introduction of the 
RATING variable, confirming the reinforcing role of the RATING variable. The 1st lag of the 
dependent variable as with the full sample model however, declines from 0.41 to 0.289 with the 
introduction of the RATING variable, suggesting that despite a history of investment in a 
particular country, a negative RATING will impact subsequent FDI inflows.  
 The QUALITY variable on the other hand remains negative and insignificant with the model 
adjusted R-squared declining to 51.7% from 52.8% when the QUALITY variable is introduced to 
the model. The introduction of the RSA rating variable however, improves the model R-squared 
and adjusted R-squared to 57.2% and 52% from 56.2% and 51.77% respectively, with the RSA 
rating of the expected positive sign. 
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Table 11: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the 
FDI flows with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (FDI/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 0.512 2.114 2.385 
 
0.013 -2.583 -3.226 -4.493 
 
(0.580) (0.127) (0.148) 
 
(0.991) (0.101) (0.104) (0.082) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
        
1
st
 Lag 0.421*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 
 
0.401*** 0.289*** 0.298*** 0.278** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) 
Rating Variables 
        
RATING 
 
0.279** 0.31** 
  
0.363** 0.413** 0.371* 
  
(0.014) (0.041) 
  
(0.020) (0.024) (0.052) 
QUALITY 
  
0.255 
   
-0.547 -0.609 
   
(0.756) 
   
(0.587) (0.548) 
RSA 
       
0.134 
        
(0.437) 
Economic Variables 
        
Growth 0.229** 0.262** 0.266** 
 
0.295** 0.299** 0.313** 0.328*** 
 
(0.043) (0.019) (0.018) 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) 
INFR 0.014 0.022 0.025 
 
0.014 0.026 0.031 0.031 
 
(0.749) (0.609) (0.566) 
 
(0.746) (0.543) (0.487) (0.494) 
TRADE -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
 
-0.01 -0.022 -0.018 -0.017 
 
(0.349) (0.293) (0.333) 
 
(0.515) (0.162) (0.316) (0.335) 
EXCHVOL -1.678** -1.693** -1.7** 
 
-3.102*** -2.126* -2.282* -2.7** 
 
(0.040) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
(0.005) (0.060) (0.052) (0.038) 
World Bank Governance Index 
        
POL 0.031*** 0.016 0.016 
 
0.039*** 0.023* 0.022* 0.023* 
 
(0.004) (0.169) (0.207) 
 
(0.001) (0.072) (0.086) (0.079) 
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.405 0.448 0.449 
 
0.560 0.560 0.562 0.572 
Adj R-squared 0.362 0.401 0.394 
 
0.521 0.528 0.517 0.520 
Panel A full sample Panel B excluding South Africa * Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance 1% 
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b. Estimation of the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on portfolio equity inflows 
As presented in table 12, the Moody’s RATING variable has an insignificant relationship with the 
EQUITY investment rate. In addition, the introduction of the RATING and QUALITY variables 
results in the decline in the EQUITY investment rate model adjusted R-squared from 50.9% to 
50.4% and 49.9% respectively. This is also the case when South Africa is excluded from the 
model, with R-squared remaining at 56% when the RATING variable is introduced to the model 
and only increasing slightly to 56.2% with the introduction of the QUALITY variable. The 
adjusted R-squared however declines from 52.8% to 52.1% and 51.7% with the introduction of 
both the RATING and QUALITY variables respectively. As with the FDI model, while the RSA 
rating is insignificant, the coefficient of the variable is of the expected positive sign. The 
introduction of the RSA variable to the EQUITY investment rate model also improves the model 
fit with the R-squared and adjusted R-squared improving to 57.2% and 52% respectively.  
The most significant variable for the EQUITY variable is the 1st lag of the dependent variable, 
with one unit of the 1st lag of the dependent variable explaining 1.022 of the current dependent 
variable for the full sample and 0.995 when South Africa is excluded from the sample. As with 
the Fitch EQUITY investment rate model however, the GROWTH variable is negative and 
insignificant with both the coefficient and p-value declining with the introduction of the RATING 
variable.  
Contrary to expectations, the relationship between the MRKTCAP and the dependent variable, 
while of the expected positive sign, is only significant at 10% when South Africa is excluded from 
the sample. The STCKTRNOV variable however, remains negative and insignificant for both the 
full sample and the reduced sample, while the SPIND has the expected positive sign but remains 
insignificant. 
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Table 12: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the 
portfolio equity flows with p-value in parenthesis  
  
Dependent Variable (Portfolio Equity/GDP) 
  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 
 
1.855 0.478 1.208 
 
-1.446 0.549 -6.570 0.000 
  
(0.418) (0.924) (0.821) 
 
(0.819) (0.939) (0.481) (0.000) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
         
1
st
 Lag 
 
1.024*** 1.024*** 1.022*** 
 
0.995*** 0.995*** 0.991*** 0.967*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating Variables 
         
RATING 
  
0.11 -0.017 
  
0.053 -0.223 -0.656 
   
(0.756) (0.971) 
  
(0.910) (0.737) (0.386) 
QUALITY 
   
1.112 
   
2.01 1.775 
    
(0.693) 
   
(0.558) (0.604) 
RSA 
        
0.983 
         
(0232) 
Economic Variables 
         
Growth 
 
-0.213 -0.197 -0.195 
 
-0.037 -0.039 -0.068 0.105 
  
(0.685) (0.711) (0.714) 
 
(0.939) (0.938) (0.892) (0.839) 
MRKTCAP 
 
0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
0.1 0.099* 0.101* 0.074 
  
(0.693) (0.764) (0.789) 
 
(0.075) (0.084) (0.081) (0.226) 
STCKTRNOV 
 
-0.047 -0.043 -0.043 
 
-0.109 -0.105 -0.11 -0.139 
  
(0.450) (0.500) (0.502) 
 
(0.200) (0.247) (0.230) (0.142) 
SPIND 
 
0.024 0.028 0.028 
 
0.016 0.017 0.016 0.025 
  
(0.619) (0.584) (0.583) 
 
(0.777) (0.767) (0.776) (0.670) 
F Prob 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 
 
0.536 0.536 0.537 
 
0.560 0.560 0.562 0.572 
Adj R-squared 
 
0.509 0.504 0.499 
 
0.528 0.521 0.517 0.520 
Panel A full sample Panel B excluding South Africa * Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance 1% 
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c. Estimation of the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on portfolio bond inflows 
The full sample PPGBOND model while slightly less fitting of the estimated data, performed well 
with the with R-squared of  between 27.94% and 33.56% and the F-static significant at 1%, to 
explain the variation in the public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond net flow rates. In line 
with the priori expectations, the interest on the external debt (INTEXTDBT) variable  is of the 
expected negative sign, suggesting that debt servicing commitments reduce the capacity to 
carry any additional debt in line with the argument by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
 As shown in table 13,  in line with the argument by Gelos, et al. (2003) that default negatively 
impacts access to capital,  one unit of the current year rescheduled debt results in an average 
fifty five units reduction in PPGBOND net flow rate and is highly significant at 5%. However, as 
suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff  (2008), a debt reschedule does not necessarily close out 
access to debt capital. As shown in table 13, while the current year debt reschedule is 
negatively related to PPGBON, the 1st lag of rescheduled debt is both significant and positive, 
suggesting that debt rescheduling, while negatively impacting on ability to access public and 
publicly guaranteed portfolio bonds in the current year, creates capacity to access public and 
publicly guaranteed portfolio bond debt in subsequent years.  
Surprisingly, the variable for corruption is both positive and significant while that of POLITICAL 
and RULE are negative and significant, suggesting that while poor political stability and the rule 
of law will discourage PPGBOND flows, the perception of government corruption does not  have 
a negative impact on access to bond debt. 
 As expected,  the variable of the 1st lag of the dependent variable while the expected positive 
sign, is insignificant for the full sample, and only becomes significant when the QUALITY 
variable is included in the model. In contrast, the 1st lag of the dependent variable is both 
significant and positive when South Africa is excluded from the model, suggesting that while it 
may be difficult to access debt in the international bond markets for developing economies as 
posited by Gelos, et al. (2003), it becomes   easier once a country has established a track 
record on the debt market.  
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The introduction of the RATING variable however, does not improve the model performance, 
suggesting, as with the FITCH model, that public guarantees may be sufficient to allay any risk.  
As shown in table 13, the introduction of the RATING variable while improving the R-squared to 
28.28% from 27.94%, results in the reduction of the adjusted R-squared to 18.61% from 
19.34%. The introduction of the RATING variable also results in the F-statistic increase from 
0.0035 to 0.0059, indicating that the annual average long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
rating does not explain the variability in public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond net capital 
flows in Moody’s rated African countries. In contrast, the introduction of the rating QUALITY 
variable not only improves the F-statistic to 0.0028, but also increases the R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared to 32.30% and 21.89%, suggesting, as posited by Reinhart (2000),  that the 
quality of the rating as opposed to the rating itself, is critical in accessing international bond 
markets. In addition to being statistically significant, the introduction of the rating QUALITY 
variable improves the p-values of the RSDLTDBT, the lag of the RSDLDBT, POL and RULE to 
1% significant from 5% significant level (and 10% for RULE), suggesting, that the QUALITY 
variable not only explains but reinforces and amplifies the explanatory significance of the other 
variables.  In contrast to the EQUITY model however, the introduction of the RSA rating variable 
results in the reduction of the adjusted R-squared to 19.23%, with the increase in the p-values 
of the CORR, POL, RULE and RSDLBT, suggesting that for PPGBOND flows, as opposed to 
the FDI and portfolio equity  flows, the regional proxy of South Africa does not hold.  
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Table 13: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the 
portfolio bond flows with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 0.384 0.651 0.022 
 
0.548 1.026 1.108 1.460 
 
-0.257 -0.307 -0.370 
 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 
 
(0.391) (0.294) (0.974) 
 
(0.158) (0.075) (0.107) (0.209) 
 
(0) (0.005) (0.003) 
 
(0.783) (0.877) (0.919) (0.729) 
Dependent 
Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag 0.1480 0.1440 0.165** 
 
0.196** 0.192** 0.190** 0.183** 
 
-0.26** -0.26*** -0.27*** 
 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 
 
(0.135) (0.146) (0.093) 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040) 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
(0.915) (0.915) (0.916) (0.896) 
Rating 
Variables 
                 
RATING 
 
-0.0320 0.0740 
  
-0.0560 -0.0690 -0.0450 
  
0.0040 0.0120 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
(0.530) 0.323) 
  
(0.257) (0.367) (0.658) 
  
(0.537) (0.257) 
  
(0.974) (0.974) (0.863) 
QUALITY 
  
-0.6660 
   
0.0750 0.0530 
   
-0.0620 
   
0.0000 0.0000 
   
(0.057) 
   
(0.821) (0.876) 
   
(0.327) 
   
(0.986) (0.995) 
RSA 
       
-0.0310 
        
0.0010 
        
(0.705) 
        
(0.621) 
 
Economic 
Variables 
                 
Growth 
         
0.009 0.009 0.0110 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
          
(0.310) (0.302) (0.239) 
 
(0.306) (0.310) (0.319) (0.364) 
INFR 0.0290 0.0250 0.053** 
 
0.033** 0.0290 0.0260 0.0310 
         
 
(0.105) (0.192) (0.028) 
 
(0.042) (0.084) (0.237) (0.234) 
         
BMG 
         
0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
          
(0.025) (0.026) (0.021) 
 
(0.179) (0.182) 0.199) (0.191) 
DCR 
         
0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 
 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
          
(0.702) (0.710) (0.758) 
 
(0.702) (0.710) (0.758) (0.778) 
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Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
INTEXTDBT -0.0680 -0.0910 -0.0450 
 
-0.1230 -0.1650 -0.1720 -0.1860 
         
 
(0.524) (0.423) (0.692) 
 
(0.191) (0.104) (0.107) (0.103) 
         
RSDLDBT -56.11** -55.208** -48.632*** 
 
-55.869** -55.053** -55.779** -53.446** 
         
 
(0.030) (0.033) (0) 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) 
         
1st Lag  
RSDLDBT 24.326** 23.189** 21.669*** 
 
24.365** 22.746** 22.888** 22.141** 
         
 
(0.031) (0.043) (0) 
 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) 
         
 
World Bank 
Governance 
Index 
                 
CORR 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.04*** 
 
0.037*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
         
 
(0.000) (0) (0) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
         
POL -0.018*** -0.017** -0.017*** 
 
-0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.017** 
         
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0) 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
         
RULE -0.028* -0.026* -0.040*** 
 
-0.035** -0.034** -0.033** -0.036* 
         
 
(0.073) (0.094) (0) 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.046) (0.057) 
         
F Prob 0.0035 0.0059 0.0028 
 
0.0056 0.0066 0.0121 0.0201 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.001 
 
-0.702 -0.710 -0.758 -0.778 
R-squared 0.2794 0.2838 0.3230 
 
0.3165 0.3331 0.3337 0.3356 
 
0.2645 0.2677 0.2757 
 
0.6098 0.7493 0.8501 0.8944 
Adj R-squared 0.1934 0.1861 0.2189 
 
0.2153 0.2198 0.2056 0.1923 
 
0.2318 0.2266 0.2263 
 
0.0363 0.0363 0.0363 0.0397 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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In contrast to the PPGBOND, the 1st lag of the dependent variable is both significant 
and negative for the non-guaranteed portfolio bond net flows (PNGBOND) model.   The 
variable for broad money growth (BMG) on the other hand is both positive and 
significant at 5% suggesting that, while previous private non-guaranteed portfolio bond 
flows reduce the capacity for further access to this type of debt, the growth in domestic 
financial markets, improves access to non-guaranteed bond debt markets. GROWTH 
on the other hand while the expected positive sign, is insignificant, confirming the 
findings by Gelos, et al.(2003) that the macroeconomic variables do not explain access 
to international debt.   
The RATING variable for the PNGBOND model is of a positive sign, but remains 
insignificant. In addition, the introduction of the RATING variable, while increasing the 
model R-squared slightly to 26.77% from 26.45%, results in a decline in the adjusted R-
squared from 23.18% from 22.66%. In contrast to the PPGBOND model where the 
QALITY of the rating was positive and significant, the QUALITY variable is negative and 
insignificant for the PNGBOND model. In addition, the introduction of the QUALITY 
variable results in the adjusted R-squared declining slightly to 22.63% from 22.66%.  
As expected, the PNGBOND model, while having very high R-squared of between 
60.98% and 89.44% when South Africa is excluded from the sample, performs poorly 
and is insignificant with the adjusted R-squared of between 3.63% and 3.97% and F-
statistic of -0.7. This is understandable given that, except for South Africa, none of the 
countries rated by Moody’s issued any private non-guaranteed bond debt during the 
estimation period (between1994 and 2011). 
d. Estimation of the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on commercial banks and 
other private institutions net flows 
Both the 1st lag and 2nd lag of the dependent variable are negative and significant for 
the PPGCOMM model suggesting, as expected, that previous borrowing reduces the 
borrowing capacity for future borrowing from commercial banks and private institutions.  
Contrary to priori expectation however, the economic growth (GROWTH) variable both 
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is negative and insignificant, while exchange rate volatility (EXCHVOL) has the 
expected negative sign as well as being significant. Indeed, it is expected that a 
mismatch and uncertainty on the currency of debt and that of revenue generation 
increase vulnerability to default (Edwards, 2001). In addition, while insignificant, the 
interest on external debt (INTEXTDBT) is of the expected negative sign, while the real 
interest rate (RRI) variable is significant, with the expected negative sign, suggesting 
that as the domestic real interest rates increase, international commercial debt 
increases to substitute expensive domestic debt.  
While insignificant, the introduction of the RATING variable to the PPGCOMM model 
improves both the R-square and adjusted R-squared to 34.9% and 27.5% from 33.2% 
and 26.5% respectively. In addition, the introduction of the RATING variable improves 
the p-values of the GROWTH variable to be significant at 10%, while the p-value of  
those of REG and RULE also improve to 0.002 and 0.016 from 0.007 and 0.033 
respectively, confirming the reinforcing role of the RATING variable.  In contrast, the 
introduction of the rating QUALITY variable does not improve the model performance 
resulting in the decrease of adjusted R-squared to 26.5% while the R-squared remains 
the same, with the p-values GROWTH, REG and RULE increasing slightly.  
   
Contrary to priori expectation however, the introduction of the South African rating 
(RSA) variable improves both the R-squared and adjusted R-squared to 39% and 
27.6% from 36, 5% and 25.9% respectively. The RSA rating variable, however, is not 
significant in addition to having the unexpected negative sign. The introduction of the 
RSA rating however, improves the p-values of the variables such as REG and 
INTEXTDBT (to 10% and 5% significant from being insignificant). 
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Table 14: Panel regression estimations for the effect of Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the 
net flows from commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions with p-value in parenthesis  
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable(Commercial PNG/GDP 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 0.205 0.581 0.577 
 
-0.157 0.221 0.218 1.248 
 
0.058 0.053 0.000 
 
-0.078 -0.056 -0.259 0.044 
 
(0.267) (0.072) (0.085) 
 
(0.507) (0.615) (0.645) (0.130) 
 
(0.654) (0.852) (0.999) 
 
(0.598) (0.857) (0.486) (0.933) 
Dependent 
Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag -0.189* -0.176* -0.175* 
 
-0.175 -0.166 -0.166 -0.168 
 
0.396*** 0.397*** 0.394*** 
 
0.533*** 0.533*** 0.532*** 0.524 
 
(0.051) (0.068) (0.078) 
 
(0.110) (0.130) (0.153) (0.143) 
 
(0) (0) (0) 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
2
nd
 Lag  -0.225*** -0.244*** -0.244*** 
 
-0.196** -0.217** -0.217** -0.218** 
 
0.266** 0.266** 0.257** 
 
0.174 0.174 0.154 0.150 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.044) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
 
(0.129) 
(0.133) 
 
(0.190) (0.203) 
Rating Variables 
                 
AAR 
 
-0.034 -0.033 
  
-0.033 -0.032 -0.015 
  
0.000 0.008 
  
-0.001 0.019 0.023 
  
(0.155) (0.257) 
  
(0.307) (0.415) (0.712) 
  
(0.987) (0.748) 
  
(0.934) (0.484) (0.407) 
Rating Quality 
  
-0.009 
   
-0.004 -0.048 
   
-0.066 
   
-0.146 -0.148 
   
(0.956) 
   
(0.986) (0.825) 
   
(0.651) 
   
(0.323) (0.317) 
RSA 
       
-0.084 
        
-0.023 
        
(0.127) 
        
(0.419) 
Economic 
Variables 
                 
Growth -0.041 -0.047* -0.047 
 
0.043 0.039 0.039 0.023 
         
 
(0.146) (0.099) (0.102) 
 
(0.128) (0.174) (0.178) (0.445) 
         
EXCHVOL -0.731*** -0.777*** -0.777*** 
 
-0.775*** -0.858*** -0.857*** -0.690** 
         
 
(0) (0) (0) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) 
         
INTEXTDBT -0.022 -0.042 -0.042 
 
-0.017 -0.040 -0.040 -0.096 
         
 
(0.705) (0.479) (0.482) 
 
(0.790) (0.561) (0.569) (0.222) 
         
RRI -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 
-0.035*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.050*** 
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Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable(Commercial PNG/GDP 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
         
DCR 
         
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
          
(0.946) (0.945) (0.961) 
 
(0.553) (0.570) (0.338) (0.311) 
SWSRRI 
         
-0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
 
0.014 0.013 0.015 -0.005 
          
(0.707) (0.748) (0.755) 
 
(0.674) (0.736) (0.695) (0.905) 
World Bank 
Governance 
Index 
                 
REG 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
0.012 0.017 0.017 0.020* 
         
 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.214) (0.117) (0.130) (0.069) 
         
RULE -0.014** -0.016** -0.016** 
 
-0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 
         
 
(0.033) (0.016) (0.019) 
 
(0.376) (0.243) (0.251) (0.188) 
         
                  
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.332 0.349 0.349 
 
0.354 0.365 0.365 0.390 
 
0.354 0.354 0.356 
 
0.452 0.452 0.459 0.464 
Adj R-squared 0.265 0.275 0.265 
 
0.271 0.271 0.259 0.276 
 
0.326 0.318 0.312 
 
0.421 0.413 0.413 0.410 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance at 1% 
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In contrast to the PPGCOMM where the 1st and 2nd lags of the dependent variable are 
negative, both lags of the nonguaranteed borrowing rate from the commercial banks 
and other private institutions (PNGCOMM) are significant and positive for the full 
sample model. While retaining the positive sign, the 2nd lag of the dependent variable is 
however insignificant when South Africa is excluded from the sample. In addition, the 1st 
lag of the dependent variable remains significant with the coefficient increasing to 0.533 
from 0.396 when South Africa is excluded from the sample. The DCR (Growth in 
Domestic credit) as with the FITCH PNGCOMM model however is insignificant, 
discounting the substitution of international debt with local debt as suggested by Hite 
and Warga (1997) and Gelos, et al. (2003).  
The introduction of the RATING variable not only results in the R-squared remaining the 
same at 35.4%, but results in the decline in the adjusted R-squared to 31.8% from 
32.6%. Similarly the QUALITY variable results in the adjusted R-squared declining to 
31.2%, with minimal increase of the R-squared to 35.6%. The introduction of the 
RATING and QUALITY variables also result in the increase in the p-value of the 2nd lag 
of the dependent variable to 0.11 and 0.15 from 0.01 respectively. This lack of 
explanatory power of the RATING and QUALITY variables on PNGCOMM borrowing 
rate, persists when South Africa is excluded from the sample, with the introduction of 
the RATING and QUALITY variables resulting in the reduction of the adjusted R-
squared to 41.3% from 42.1%.  Similarly, the introduction of the RSA rating results in 
the decline in the adjusted R-squared to 41%.  
4.1.3 Estimation of the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on capital flows 
As presented in tables 15 to 18 below, S&P issued long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating capital flow rate models perform well for all types of capital flows, 
with the F-statistic significant for all the estimates. The impact of S&P long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on the different types of capital flows, however, is 
mixed. While the RATING variable is the expected positive sign for FDI, it is negative 
for the EQUITY, becoming positive only when the QUALITY variable is introduced to 
the model as presented in tables 15 and 16 respectively. In addition, while the RATING 
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variable is negatively related to the PPGBOND and PNGBOND net borrowing rate, the 
RATING variable is only significant for the PPGBOND model. The RATING is also 
negative for the PPGCOMM net flow rate model but becomes positive when the 
QUALITY variable is introduced to the model, and only when South Africa is excluded 
from the sample. As shown in table 18 in contrast, the RATING variable is insignificant 
for the PNGCOMM net flow rate model and becomes negative when the QUALITY 
variable is introduced to the model. The different capital flow models are discussed in 
details in the paragraphs below. 
a. Estimation of the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on FDI net inflows 
In line with the empirical specifications, the FDI inflow rate model in table 15 performs 
well with the 1st lag of the dependent variable positive and highly significant at 1%. 
Everything remaining the same, one unit increase in the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable explains approximately 0.57 unit increase in the dependent variable. In 
addition, the GROWTH variable is positive and significant at 1%, with one unit of the 
GROWTH variable explaining just over 0.29 units of the dependent variable and 
increasing to 0.31 units when South Africa is excluded from the sample. In line with 
priori expectations, the INFRASTRUCTURE variable as well as the TRADE variables, 
while insignificant,  are of the expected positive sign, with the POLITICAL variable 
significant and positively related to the dependent variable. 
The RATING variable however, while of the expected positive sign, is insignificant and 
does not improve the model performance, with the introduction of the RATING variable 
resulting in the slight decline of the adjusted R-squared from 59.8% to 59.6%. In 
addition, the introduction of the RATING variable results in the decline of the 
POLITICAL and INFRASTRUCTURE variable coefficients to 0.02 and 0.044 from 0.021 
and 0.058 respectively, suggesting in contrast to the Moody’s issued sovereign credit 
rating, that the RATING variable does not reinforce the other variable. The adjusted R-
squared however improves slightly to 59.8% when the rating QUALITY variable is 
introduced to the model, with the R-squared improving to 61.7%. The rating QUALITY 
variable however, is insignificant and also negatively related to the dependent variable.   
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Table 15: Panel regression estimations for the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on FDI 
with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (FDI/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant -1.904 -2.306 -2.731 
 
-2.055 -2.593 -3.125 -4.597 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.132) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
        
1
st
 Lag 0.572*** 0.575*** 0.569*** 
 
0.578*** 0.58*** 0.574*** 0.567*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating Variables 
        
RATING 
 
0.044 0.099 
  
0.058 0.124 0.12 
  
(0.465) (0.222) 
  
(0.363) (0.154) (0.168) 
QUALITY 
  
-0.622 
   
-0.781 -0.689 
   
(0.308) 
   
(0.262) (0.339) 
RSA 
       
0.128 
        
(0.607) 
Economic Variables 
        
Growth 0.295*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 
 
0.309*** 0.313*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFR 0.058 0.044 0.047 
 
0.061 0.042 0.045 0.049 
 
(0.141) (0.322) (0.289) 
 
(0.165) (0.379) (0.352) (0.313) 
TRADE 0.01 0.011 0.012 
 
0.007 0.01 0.011 0.01 
 
(0.227) (0.171) (0.151) 
 
(0.390) (0.277) (0.230) (0.279) 
EXCHVOL 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 
0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.521) (0.442) (0.411) 
 
(0.528) (0.422) (0.385) (0.416) 
World Bank Governance Index 
        
POL 0.021** 0.02** 0.022** 
 
0.027*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.017) 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
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Dependent Variable (FDI/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.613 0.614 0.617 
 
0.636 0.638 0.641 0.642 
Adj R-squared 0.598 0.596 0.598 
 
0.619 0.618 0.619 0.617 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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The introduction of the RATING variable remains insignificant when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample with the adjusted R-squared declining slightly to 61.8% from 
61.9%, despite the increased R-squared to 63.8% from 63.6%. As with the full sample 
model, the introduction of the RATING variable results in the slight decline of the 
POLITICAL and INFRASTRUCTURE variable coefficients while those of GROWTH, 
TRADE and EXCHVOL variables improve slightly. The introduction of the S&P issued 
RSA rating variable, in contrast to the Fitch issued rating does not improve the model 
fit, with the adjusted R-squared declining slightly from 61.9% to 61.7%.  
b. Estimation of the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on portfolio equity flows 
Overall, the EQUITY net flow rate model performs according to priori expectation with 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable and the MARKTCAP positive and significant. In line with the suggestion by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Hernandez, et al. (2001), that a positive global 
investment environment improves the investment flows to developing economies, the 
SPIND variable is also positive and significant. In line with the findings for the Fitch and 
Moody’s models, the GROWTH and STCKTRNOV variables are negative and 
insignificant.  
As with the FDI model, the EQUITY model performs well with the R-squared of 55.5% 
and adjusted R-squared of 58.1%. The introduction of the RATING variable however, 
while increasing the R-squared to 56.1%, results in the decline of the adjusted R-
squared to 51.7%. The adjusted R-squared however increases to 52.1% when the 
rating QUALITY variable is introduced to the model with R-squared increasing to 
57.1%.
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Table 16: Panel regression estimations for the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on 
portfolio equity with p-value in parenthesis 
  
Dependent Variable (Portfolio Equity/GDP) 
  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant 
 
0.293 -0.230 -0.674 
 
0.371 0.394 0.341 -0.528 
  
(0.449) (0.738) (0.384) 
 
(0.088) (0.243) (0.315) (0.623) 
Dependent Variable Lag 
         
1
st
 Lag 
 
0.392*** 0.380*** 0.363*** 
 
0.102 0.102 0.099 0.116 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.471) (0.475) (0.486) (0.422) 
Rating Variables 
         
RATING 
  
0.065 0.123 
  
-0.003 0.0163 0.029 
   
(0.36) (0.147) 
  
(0.93) (0.649) (0.458) 
QUALITY 
   
-0.46209 
   
-0.781 -0.689 
    
(0.213) 
   
(0.262) (0.339) 
RSA 
        
0.128 
         
(0.607) 
Economic Variables 
         
Growth 
 
-0.067 -0.059 -0.056 
 
0.006 0.0054 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.241) (0.311) (0.333) 
 
(0.825) (0.842) (0.881) (0.869) 
MRKTCAP 
 
0.008*** 0.0083*** 0.009*** 
 
0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 0.009** 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.01) (0.008) 
STCKTRNOV 
 
-0.008 -0.009 -0.011 
 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
  
(0.415) (0.324) (0.245) 
 
(0.673) (0.671) (0.741) (0.648) 
SPIND 
 
0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 
0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.004 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.16) (0.163) (0.163) (0.154) 
F Prob 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.117 0.183 0.184 0.214 
R-squared 
 
0.555 0.561 0.571 
 
0.172 0.172 0.193 0.205 
Adj R-squared 
 
0.518 0.517 0.521 
 
0.077 0.059 0.064 0.059 
Panel A full sample Panel B excluding South Africa * Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance 1% 
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As with the Fitch rated sample model, except for South Africa, many of the S&P rated 
economies in the sample do not receive portfolio equity flows. This is reflected in the 
estimated model that performs poorly when South Africa is excluded from the sample, 
with the R-squared ranging from 17.2% to 20.5% while the adjusted R-squared range 
from 5.9% to 7.7%. The estimate is spurious, with the 1st lag of the dependent variable 
that is significant but of a negative sign, suggesting, contrary to expectations, that the 
history of portfolio equity flows discourages future portfolio equity flows. The model is 
also insignificant with the F-statistic ranging from 0.117 to 0.214.  
The introduction of the RATING and rating QUALITY variables do not improve the 
model performance with the adjusted R-squared declining from 7.7% to 5.9% with the 
introduction of the RATING variable and 6.4% with the inclusion of the QUALITY 
variable. The RATING variable is also the unexpected negative sign and only becomes 
positive when the QUALITY variable is introduced to the model.  
c. Estimation of the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on portfolio bond flows 
Overall the public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond net flow rates (PPGBOND) 
model performed well with the R-squared and adjusted R-squared of between 43.65% 
and 48.95% and 41.41% and 45.42% respectively. As expected, debt rescheduling 
during the current year is negatively related to the dependent variable. However, as 
suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), the market does forgive defaulters following 
a reschedule, with the 1st  lag of rescheduled debt (RSDLDBT) highly significant and 
positive. The economic growth (GROWTH) variable, however, while positively related to 
the dependent variable, is insignificant. A history of borrowing in the bond market, 
however, improves access to the bond market, with the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable positive and significant.  
As shown in table 17, it is the QUALITY of the rating as opposed to the actual rating 
that determines access to bond debt. Contrary to expectation, the introduction of the 
RATING variable does not improve the model performance with the adjusted R-squared 
declining from 41.41% to 41.18%, In contrast,  the introduction of the QUALITY 
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variable, while insignificant, improves the adjusted R-squared slightly to 41.42% in 
addition to being the expected positive sign.  
The model remains significant at 1% when South Africa is excluded from the sample, 
with the 1st lag of rescheduled debt remaining highly significant and positive. In contrast 
to the full sample model however, the RATING variable is significant at 10%, 
suggesting as with the FITCH model, that for countries other than South Africa, in 
addition to the rating QUALITY, the rating level does have an effect on the PPGBOND 
net flows. In addition, the introduction of the RATING variable results in the gross 
domestic savings (GDS) variable becoming significant at 10% when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample, while the coefficients of the GROWTH and GDS variables 
also increase slightly, confirming the reinforcing role of the RATING variable.   
Interestingly, the introduction of the RSA rating variable improves the model 
performance significantly with the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared increasing to 
48.95% and 45.42% respectively. In addition, the RSA rating variable is positive and 
significant, reinforcing the role of the South African rating as a proxy for regional risk. 
The South African rating also seems to substitute for some of the local variables.   In 
addition to the GDS variable becoming insignificant with the introduction of the RSA 
variable, the p-values of the RATING and QUALITY variables increase to 0.411 and 
0.928 from 0.276 and 0.832 respectively. The substitution effect of the RSA variable is 
supported by the increasing p-value to 0.058 from 0.01 of the 1st lag of the dependent 
variable, when the RSA rating variable is introduced to the model.  
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Table 17: Panel regression estimations for the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on 
portfolio bond with p-value in parenthesis 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant -0.674 -0.296 -0.303 
 
-0.806 -0.348 -0.404 -5.663 
 
0.022 0.024 0.019 
 
0.029 0.035 0.027 -0.138 
 
(0.056) (0.501) (0.545) 
 
(0.034) (0.453) (0.450) (0.016) 
 
(0.754) (0.772) (0.838) 
 
(0.653) (0.641) (0.756) (0.697) 
Dependent 
Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 
 
0.212*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.149* 
         
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.058) 
         Rating 
Variables 
                 
RATING 
 
-0.058 -0.057 
  
-0.077 -0.068 -0.051 
  
0.000 0.001 
  
-0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.157) (0.317) 
  
(0.096) (0.276) (0.411) 
  
(0.967) (0.940) 
  
(0.876) (0.952) (0.922) 
QUALITY 
  
-0.013 
   
-0.106 -0.044 
   
-0.012 
   
-0.019 -0.018 
   
(0.975) 
   
(0.832) (0.928) 
   
(0.887) 
   
(0.840) (0.850) 
RSA 
       
0.410** 
        
0.013 
        
(0.022) 
        
(0.630) 
Economic 
Variables 
                 
Growth 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
0.020 0.021 0.020 0.011 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.956) (0.993) (0.994) 
 
(0.712) (0.696) (0.707) (0.831) 
 
(0.703) (0.705) (0.708) 
 
(0.664) (0.668) (0.679) (0.675) 
GDS 0.013 0.020 0.020 
 
0.013 0.022* 0.022* 0.019 
         
 
(0.274) (0.117) (0.118) 
 
(0.295) (0.097) (0.096) (0.155) 
         
BMG 
         
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
          
(0.166) (0.171) (0.170) 
 
(0.066) (0.072) (0.071) (0.074) 
BM 
         
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
          
(0.515) (0.539) (0.534) 
 
(0.449) (0.443) (0.609) (0.660) 
 RSDLDBT -0.788 -0.860 -0.860 
 
-0.759 -0.828 -0.823 -0.728 
         
 
(0.398) (0.355) (0.357) 
 
(0.430) (0.386) (0.391) (0.441) 
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Dependent Variable (Portfolio PPG Bond/GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Portfolio PNG Bond/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
1
st
 Lag 
RSDLDBT 7.92*** 7.49*** 7.50*** 
 
8.05*** 7.51*** 7.54*** 7.3*** 
 
-0.90*** -0.91*** -0.90*** 
 
-0.99*** -1.00*** -0.99*** -0.98*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2
nd
 Lag 
RSDLDBT 
         
-0.114* -0.114* -0.113* 
 
-0.116** -0.118** -0.116** -0.114** 
          
(0.055) (0.059) (0.063) 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038) 
SHRTDBT 
         
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
          
(0.246) (0.248) (0.253) 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.062) 
DCR 
         
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
          
(0.184) (0.195) (0.200) 
 
(0.300) (0.329) (0.449) (0.540) 
F Prob 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.4365 0.444 0.444 
 
0.4569 0.4683 0.4685 0.4895 
 
0.2280 0.2281 0.2284 
 
0.2280 0.2281 0.2284 0.2296 
Adj R-squared 0.4141 0.4181 0.4142 
 
0.4324 0.4401 0.4360 0.4542 
 
0.1902 0.1846 0.1791 
 
0.1902 0.1846 0.1791 0.1746 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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While the R-squared and adjusted R-squared for the PNGBOND models are lower at 
between 22.8% and 22.96% and 17.46% and 19.02% respectively, the PNGBOND 
model performs well with the F-statistic significant at 1%.  
The RATING and QUALITY variables however, remain insignificant for the non-
guaranteed portfolio bond net flow rates model (PNGBOND). The introduction of the 
RATING and QUALITY variables also result in the decline of the adjusted R-squared to 
18.46% and 17.91% from 19.02%. In addition, as opposed to the PPGBOND model, the 
introduction of the RSA rating variable does not improve non-guaranteed portfolio bond 
net flow rates, with the adjusted R-squared declining to 17.46%, while the RATING and 
QUALITY variable coefficients improve slightly to 0.0012 and -0.018 from 0.0007 and -
0.192 respectively. 
As shown in table 17, contrary to a positive relationship between the 1st lag of 
rescheduled debt and PPGBOND, the relationship between PNGBOND and the 1st lag 
of rescheduled debt is negative and significant. In addition, 2nd lags of rescheduled 
debt, is also highly significant and negative, suggesting that in the absence of public 
guarantees, debt rescheduling does not improve access to bond debt. This is the case 
for the full sample as well as the reduced sample that excludes South Africa.  
d. Estimation of the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit on commercial bank and other 
private institutions net flows 
As presented in table 18 below, in contrast to the FDI, portfolio equity and portfolio bond 
flows; the 1st lag of the dependent variable, while positive, is insignificant for public and 
publicly guaranteed net flows from commercial bank loans from private banks and other 
private financial institutions (PPGCOMM). Surprisingly, the 2nd lag of the dependent 
variable is highly significant at 1%, but has an unexpected negative relation to the 
dependent variable, suggesting that previous borrowing may reduce debt capacity to 
borrow from private banks and other private financial institutions over time.  Economic 
growth (GROWTH) however, is positive and significant suggesting that good economic 
performance may offset the decline in credit capacity.   
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Contrary to expectations, the PPGCOMM has a positive and significant relationship with 
the interest burden on external debt (INTEXTDBT).  This is unexpected as one would 
expect the increased burden of servicing debt to decrease the capacity to carry more 
debt over a period of time. This is in line with the findings by Reinhart, et al. (2003) that 
the debt capacity for developing economies such as those in Africa was low at 15% of 
GDP, as the burden of indebtedness increase. In line with Froot and Stein (1991)’s 
suggestion that  reduction of domestic cost of capital results in the substitution of 
foreign debt, the RRI is negative and highly significant at 1% level. . 
Interestingly, the sovereign credit rating (RATING) appears to be a proxy for good 
governance with the REG variable becoming insignificant with the introduction of the 
RATING variable. However, while improving the R-squared to 21.6% and 21.9% 
respectively, the introduction of the RATING and QUALITY variables result in the 
adjusted R-squared declining to 16.8% and 16.5% respectively. In addition, the 
RATING and QUALITY variables are negative and insignificant, suggesting that private 
bank and other private institutions may be employing alternative measures of risk rating 
to the bond market.   
The RATING variable remains insignificant when South Africa is excluded from the 
sample, with the introduction of the RATING variable to the PPGCOMM net flow rate 
model resulting, in the decline of the adjusted R-squared declining from 16.5% to 16.1% 
The introduction of the RSA rating however, improves the model performance 
significantly with the adjusted R-squared increasing to 19.2% while the R-squared 
increase to 25.8%. As with the PPGBOND model, the RSA rating variable is also 
positive and significant, also improving the p-value for the RATING variable to 0.701 
from 0.969. 
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Table 18: Panel regression estimations for the effect of S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the net 
flows from commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions with p-value in parenthesis  
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial PNG/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Constant -0.139 -0.058 -0.142 
 
-0.122 -0.043 -0.139 -2.305 
 
0.021 -0.071 -0.035 
 
-0.06 -0.071 -0.035 0.386 
 
(0.364) (0.756) (0.515) 
 
(0.507) (0.846) (0.596) (0.012) 
 
(0.796) (0.425) (0.749) 
 
(0.45) (0.425) (0.749) (0.509) 
Dependent 
Variable Lag 
                 
1
st
 Lag 0.089 0.083 0.081 
 
0.085 0.081 0.079 0.051 
 
0.32*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 
 
0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.353*** 
 
(0.318) (0.351) (0.366) 
 
(0.374) (0.401) (0.415) (0.594) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2
nd
 Lag  -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 
 
-0.26*** -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.26*** 
 
0.26** 0.179** 0.18** 
 
0.18** 0.179** 0.180** 0.179** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
 
(0.001) (0.028) (0.027) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Rating 
Variables 
                 
RATING 
 
-0.012 -0.001 
  
-0.011 0.001 0.009 
  
0.002 -0.002 
  
0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.447) (0.967) 
  
(0.533) (0.969) (0.701) 
  
(0.806) (0.87) 
  
(0.806) (0.866) (0.90) 
QUALITY 
  
-0.120 
   
-0.134 -0.062 
   
0.057 
   
0.057 0.042 
   
(0.456) 
   
(0.487) (0.744) 
   
(0.57) 
   
(0.566) (0.68) 
RSA 
       
0.174** 
        
-0.032 
        
(0.014) 
        
(0.46) 
Economic 
Variables 
                 
Growth 0.044 0.042 0.041 
 
0.047 0.045 0.044 0.044 
         
 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.030) 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) 
         
INTEXTDBT 0.092* 0.092* 0.103** 
 
0.089* 0.089* 0.100* 0.137** 
         
 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.043) 
 
(0.091) (0.093) (0.071) (0.016) 
         
EXCHVOL 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
         
 
(0.484) (0.688) (0.665) 
 
(0.548) (0.756) (0.717) (0.675) 
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Dependent Variable (Commercial  PPG /GDP) 
 
Dependent Variable (Commercial PNG/GDP) 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
RRI -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02** 
         
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) 
         
DCR 
         
0.000 0.002 0.002 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
          
(0.88) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
(0.13) (0.189) (0.194) (0.24) 
SWSRRI 
         
-0.023 0.003 0.002 
 
0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.012 
          
(0.35) (0.90) (0.941) 
 
(0.88) (0.90) (0.94) (0.70) 
World Bank 
Governance 
Index 
                 
REG -0.008* -0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.010* -0.010 -0.008 -0.013** 
         
 
(0.082) (0.108) (0.190) 
 
(0.096) (0.111) (0.173) (0.047) 
         
RULE 0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 
 
0.009* 0.010* 0.00*9 0.010* 
         
 
(0.060) (0.054) (0.085) 
 
(0.065) (0.059) (0.083) (0.053) 
         
GOV 
         
0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
(0.387) (0.799) (0.932) 
 
(0.73) (0.799) (0.932) (0.79) 
                  
F Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.213 0.216 0.219 
 
0.215 0.217 0.220 0.258 
 
0.272 0.312 0.314 
 
0.312 0.312 0.314 0.317 
Adj R-squared 0.170 0.168 0.165 
 
0.165 0.161 0.158 0.192 
 
0.250 0.284 0.280 
 
0.288 0.284 0.280 0.278 
Panel A full sample 
Panel B excluding South Africa 
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
PNG – Non guaranteed 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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In contrast to the public and publicly guaranteed borrowing from private banks and 
other private financial institutions (PPGCOMM), a history of non-guaranteed borrowing 
(PMGCOMM), seems to improve future net flow rates. The 1st and 2nd lags of the 
dependent variable have a positive and significant relationship to PNGCOMM for the 
full sample, with a higher long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating, improving 
access.  
The introduction of the RATING variable to the model however,   while of the expected 
positive sign, is insignificant. The introduction of the RATING also improves the model 
performance, with the adjusted R-squared increasing to 28.4% from 25%, while the R-
squared increases to 31.2% from 27.2%. The introduction of the rating QUALITY 
variable on the other hand, results in the slight increase of the R-squared to 31.4%, but 
does not improve the model performance with the adjusted R-squared declining to 28%. 
The RATING variable also becomes negative when the rating QUALITY variable is 
introduced to the full sample PNGCOMM net flow rate model, with the p-value 
increasing slightly to 0.866 from 0.806.  
As shown in table 18, in contrast to the full sample PNGCOMM model, sovereign credit 
rating does not improve access to non-guaranteed borrowing from private banks and 
other private institutions when South Africa is excluded from the sample. While the R-
squared remains at 31.2%, with the introduction of the RATING variable, the adjusted 
R-squared declines to 28.4% from 28.8%. In addition, the rating QUALITY variable 
results in a further decline in the adjusted R-squared to 28%, while the  introduction of 
the RSA rating results in a further decline in the model performance, with the adjusted 
R-squared declining to 27.8% , while the R-squared increases to 31.7%.  
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4.2  Estimation of the short-term announcement impact on 
financial markets 
The following sections present the announcement impact of the long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit ratings on the aggregate equity stock and exchange rate 
returns. Previous studies have shown financial markets in below investment rated 
economies react differently to long-term sovereign credit rating adjustments to those in 
investment rated economies markets with the reaction more pronounced in below 
investment grade economies (Brooks et al., 2004; Hand et al., 1992; Reisen & von 
Maltzan, 1998). Cantor and Packer (1996a), for example, show that the sovereign credit 
rating adjustments have a highly significant impact on below investment rated sovereign 
bonds yields, while the impact is insignificant on investment rated sovereigns. Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002), on the other hand, show that sovereign credit rating 
announcements’ impact on emerging market sovereign bonds yield is significant when 
put on a negative outlook review, in line with the findings by  Brooks, et al. (2004) that 
the impact on equity stock returns was only significant for downgrade announcements. 
To this effect, separate tests are conducted for investment rated and below investment 
rated sovereigns in the current study. In addition, the different types of rating 
announcements (downgrade, upgrades, positive outlooks and watchlistings and 
negative outlooks and watchlistings and rating confirmations) are tested separately for 
investment rated and below investment rated sovereigns. .   
4.2.1 Estimation of the announcement impact of the long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit on the aggregate national equity stock 
markets  
Contrary to the findings by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), however, the average 
excess aggregate stock returns are not statistically different from the normal returns for 
both the full sample as well as when South Africa is excluded from the sample, during 
the negative outlook or watchlisting announcement window period. As presented in 
table 19 below, there is a significantly negative average excess aggregate equity stock 
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return 15 days (day -15) prior to below investment rated sovereign downgrade 
announcements for a full sample. The negative composite stock return downgrade 
impact however is weak at 10% significant level. While the significantly negative 
average excess aggregate equity stock return  downgrade announcement impact is 
also computed when South Africa is excluded from the sample, this is slightly delayed 
to  10 days prior to a downgrade announcement (day -10). The negative downgrade 
announcement impact however is not persistent and is only computed for a single day, 
suggesting that the negative average excess aggregate equity stock returns may be 
due to a reaction to an event other than the negative rating adjustment. 
In contrast, there is a persistent and statistically significant positive reaction to a positive 
rating outlook or watchlisting announcement on below investment rated sovereigns in 
Africa. While the reaction to the positive rating outlook or watchlisting announcement is 
delayed, with the statistically significant positive aggregate equity stock returns 
computed only from the day of the announcement (day 0), the positive impact is 
statistically significant into the fourth day (day +4) following the announcement. This is 
followed by three more days on days +10, +11, and +12 following the positive rating 
outlook or watchlisting. The positive aggregate equity stock returns are however only 
statistically significant when South Africa is excluded from the sample. 
 Delayed positive average excess aggregate stock returns are also computed 10 days 
(+10) following the below investment grade rating affirmation announcement. The 
positive aggregate equity stock rating affirmation announcement impact persists up to 
the 15th day following the rating affirmation announcement (day +15).   
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Table 19: Estimation of below investment long-term foreign currency sovereign 
credit ratings announcement impact on the aggregate national equity stock 
markets 
Day 
Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
-15 -0.011* -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
-14 -0.018 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 
-13 -0.015 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.007 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 
-12 -0.009 -0.005 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.021 -0.002 0.001 
-11 -0.002 -0.013 -0.008 0.000 0.013 0.016 -0.003 0.003 
-10 -0.005 -0.010* -0.003 0.005 0.013 0.021 -0.003 0.005 
-9 -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 0.011 0.015 0.023 -0.003 0.003 
-8 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 0.014 0.015 0.020 -0.003 0.001 
-7 -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 0.008 0.012 0.018 -0.002 0.000 
-6 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 0.012 0.011 0.020 0.003 0.001 
-5 -0.006 -0.006 -0.016 0.011 0.010 0.020 0.002 0.003 
-4 -0.020 -0.007 -0.017 0.009 0.008 0.017 0.005 0.003 
-3 -0.018 -0.012 -0.009 0.013 0.006 0.015 0.005 0.006 
-2 -0.017 -0.016 -0.026 0.011 0.004 0.017 0.011 0.011 
-1 -0.018 -0.016 -0.047 0.012 0.005 0.020 0.011 0.016 
0 -0.019 -0.010 -0.048 0.010 0.010 0.026* 0.011 0.016 
+1 -0.017 -0.009 -0.056 0.001 0.007 0.024* 0.011 0.017 
+2 -0.017 -0.012 -0.051 0.004 0.010 0.029* 0.009 0.013 
+3 -0.022 -0.017 -0.047 0.005 0.008 0.029* 0.009 0.010 
+4 -0.026 -0.016 -0.037 0.011 0.004 0.025* 0.012 0.013 
+5 -0.028 -0.017 -0.046 0.008 0.003 0.023 0.013 0.015 
+6 -0.020 -0.026 -0.048 0.009 0.003 0.024* 0.011 0.019 
+7 -0.018 -0.025 -0.050 0.007 -0.002 0.018 0.012 0.021 
+8 -0.014 -0.031 -0.044 0.014 0.003 0.023 0.014 0.021 
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Day 
Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
All  
Excl  
RSA 
+9 -0.004 -0.035 -0.047 0.011 0.006 0.025 0.011 0.022 
+10 -0.007 -0.030 -0.042 0.008 0.008 0.026* 0.014 0.024* 
+11 -0.010 -0.035 -0.042 0.009 0.011 0.027* 0.011 0.024* 
+12 -0.015 -0.033 0.045 0.015 0.005 0.024* 0.011 0.024* 
+13 -0.013 -0.026 -0.048 0.013 0.004 0.023 0.015 0.030* 
+14 -0.008 -0.027 -0.050 0.015 0.006 0.026 0.016 0.032** 
+15 -0.007 -0.026 -0.059 0.009 0.008 0.030 0.012 0.034** 
NB: There were no tests carried out for the rating upgrade on the below investment grade sovereign ratings with only one upgrade event during the 
sample period. 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
 
For investment rated sovereigns, there is a persistent and statistically significant 
positive announcement impact, two days prior (day -2) to an upgrade announcement, 
that continues to the 6th day (day +6) following the upgrade announcement. The positive 
announcement reaction to the rating upgrade however, is insignificant when South 
Africa is excluded from the sample, suggesting that the significant rating upgrade may 
be transmitted from South Africa.  
As shown in table 20 below, the positive average excess aggregate stock returns are 
also significant for positive outlook or watchlisting. In contrast to the upgrade however, 
the positive average excess aggregate stock returns to a positive outlook or watchlisting 
are significant only when South Africa is excluded from the sample. In addition, the 
positive outlook or watchlisting impact on investment grade rated sovereigns is not 
persistent and only significant on the 8th day prior to the positive outlook or watchlisting 
announcement.  
In contrast to the positive outlook or watchlisting, the negative outlook or watchlisting 
announcement impact on an investment grade rating is significant for a number of days 
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when South Africa is excluded from the sample.  The statistically significant negative 
outlook or watchlisting announcement impact is first computed on 9 days (day -9) prior 
to a negative outlook or watchlisting announcement, persisting up to the 15th day 
following the announcement. While the negative outlook or watchlisting is weakly 
significant at 10% 9 days (day -9) prior to the negative outlook or watchlisting 
announcement, the significant level increases to 5%, on the day of the negative outlook 
or watchlisting announcement (day 0) and 2 days following the announcement (day +1 
and +2). While the significant level drops to 10% from the 3rd day (day +3) following the 
negative outlook or watchlisting announcement, negative average excess aggregate 
equity stock returns significance level increase to 5%, 14 days following the 
announcement that persists on the 15th day following the announcement. Surprisingly 
the aggregate equity stock reaction to a downgrade is insignificant for the investment 
rated sovereigns, while there is a statistically negative reaction to a rating affirmation. 
As with the rating upgrade however, the reaction to a rating affirmation is only 
significant when South Africa is included in the sample and insignificant when South 
Africa is excluded from the sample.  The investment rated sovereign rating affirmation 
seems to be anticipated by the market with the statistically significant negative 
aggregate equity stock returns computed only on days -14, -13 and -12. 
 Table 20: Estimation of investment grade long-term foreign currency sovereign 
credit ratings announcement impact on the aggregate national equity stock 
markets 
Day 
Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
-15 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.006* -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
-14 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.008 0.014 -0.009* -0.007 
-13 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.010* -0.007 
-12 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.007 -0.014* -0.013 
-11 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.012 0.006 0.012 -0.008 -0.009 
-10 0.000 0.006 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 -0.013 0.005 0.015 -0.006 -0.004 
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Day 
Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
-9 0.000 0.008 -0.010 0.000 -0.014 -0.020* 0.002 0.014 -0.007 -0.007 
-8 0.000 0.008 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 0.004 0.016** 0.003 0.001 
-7 0.003 0.011 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.012 0.011 0.029 0.007 0.009 
-6 0.007 0.014 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.013 0.007 0.021 0.004 0.006 
-5 0.006 0.009 -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.017 0.006 0.018 0.000 0.004 
-4 0.006 0.009 -0.006 0.000 -0.009 -0.021 0.007 0.022 0.002 0.002 
-3 0.010 0.009 -0.018 0.000 -0.011 -0.022 0.008 0.030 -0.002 -0.004 
-2 0.018* 0.019 -0.043 0.000 -0.014 -0.026 0.004 0.035 -0.002 -0.003 
-1 0.026* 0.027 -0.039 0.000 -0.020 -0.032* 0.001 0.029 -0.002 -0.004 
0 0.021* 0.020 -0.040 0.000 -0.018 -0.029** 0.006 0.035 -0.007 -0.007 
+1 0.022 0.021 -0.040 0.000 -0.023 -0.037** 0.006 0.035 -0.008 -0.010 
+2 0.025* 0.023 -0.037 0.000 -0.026 -0.042** 0.006 0.031 -0.005 -0.006 
+3 0.023 0.020 -0.031 0.000 -0.019 -0.034* 0.013 0.041 -0.007 -0.010 
+4 0.026* 0.018 -0.029 0.000 -0.021 -0.035 0.014 0.049 -0.007 -0.012 
+5 0.025* 0.019 -0.037 0.000 -0.029 -0.044* 0.015 0.042 -0.007 -0.011 
+6 0.024* 0.019 -0.036 0.000 -0.027 -0.041* 0.015 0.036 -0.008 -0.010 
+7 0.020 0.015 -0.035 0.000 -0.027 -0.042* 0.013 0.033 -0.009 -0.009 
+8 0.019 0.016 -0.033 0.000 -0.023 -0.041* 0.021 0.038 -0.007 -0.009 
+9 0.013 0.005 -0.031 0.000 -0.021 -0.040* 0.020 0.040 -0.021 -0.029 
+10 0.016 0.006 -0.031 0.000 -0.020 -0.038 0.025 0.051 0.004 0.006 
+11 0.018 0.007 -0.032 0.000 -0.017 -0.036 0.018 0.037 0.003 0.006 
+12 0.018 0.006 -0.034 0.000 -0.018 -0.038 0.016 0.035 0.000 0.001 
+13 0.025 0.014 -0.037 0.000 -0.019 -0.039 0.017 0.039 0.000 0.000 
+14 0.030 0.019 -0.037 0.000 -0.026 -0.046** 0.017 0.036 -0.001 0.000 
+15 0.030 0.020 -0.037 0.000 -0.029 -0.050** 0.018 0.029 -0.004 -0.002 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
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a. Estimation of the announcement impact of the long-term 
foreign currency sovereign credit announcement on the 
nominal foreign exchange rate  
Contrary to the statistically significant positive reaction to the positive outlook or 
watchlisting announcement by the aggregate equity stocks, the reaction from the 
nominal foreign exchange rate is insignificant for below investment rated sovereigns.   
As shown in table 21, however the positive reaction to the upgrade announcement on 
below investment rated sovereigns, is significant and persists throughout the entire 
window period (from day -15 to day +15), with the significance level increasing to 5% 
closer to the rating announcement. While the positive average excess nominal foreign 
exchange returns are not significant on days 14 to 10 and between days 8 and 7, the 
positive average excess aggregate foreign exchange returns are significant at 10% 
level on days -9 and -6 and increasing to 5% on day -3 and persists until the 15th day 
following the upgrade announcement. Contrary to the aggregate equity stock return 
reaction to an upgrade, that is only significant when South Africa is included in the 
sample, the nominal foreign exchange rate reaction is only significant when South 
Africa is excluded from the sample.   Similarly there is no negative announcement 
(downgrade or negative outlook or watchlisting) on the nominal exchange rated returns 
for below investment rated sovereigns, suggesting, as with the aggregate stock returns, 
that the market rewards positive rating news but does not punish the negative rating 
announcements for below investment grade ratings. This is contrary to the previous 
studies such as  that of Hand, et al. (1992) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) who 
found that negative rating announcements were more pronounced for below investment 
grade ratings. 
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Table 21: Estimation of below investment long-term foreign currency sovereign 
credit ratings announcement impact on nominal foreign exchange rate 
Day 
Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
-15 0.002 0.001* -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
-14 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
-13 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
-12 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
-11 0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 
-10 0.002 0.004* -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
-9 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003* 
-8 0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003* 
-7 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 
-6 0.003 0.005* -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 
-5 0.000 0.002 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 
-4 0.001 0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001 
-3 0.005 0.012** -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.001 
-2 0.004 0.011* -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.000 
-1 0.004 0.012* -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.011 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
0 0.004 0.013* -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
+1 0.005 0.013** -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
+2 0.005 0.012* -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
+3 0.005 0.014* -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.014 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 
+4 0.005 0.014* -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.015 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
+5 0.005 0.014 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.016 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
+6 0.006 0.013* -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.017 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
+7 0.007 0.014* -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.017 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
+8 0.006 0.013 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.018 0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
+9 0.009* 0.014** -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.019 0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
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Day 
Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
+10 0.010 0.017* -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.019 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.005 
+11 0.009 0.015* -0.006 0.000 -0.005 -0.019 0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.005 
+12 0.009 0.016* -0.007 0.001 -0.006 -0.021 0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.006 
+13 0.006 0.016* -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.021 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 
+14 0.007 0.015* -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.022 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
+15 0.006 0.014* -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.022 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
As shown in table 22 below, there is a significant nominal foreign exchange rate 
reaction to an investment rated sovereign downgrade announcement. The negative 
downgrade announcement impact was computed for both the sample including and 
excluding South Africa, with the negative average excess nominal foreign exchange 
returns computed from the 3rd day prior to a downgrade announcement and continuing 
until the 11th day following the downgrade announcement. 
As shown in table 22, there is also an anticipated negative reaction to the negative 
outlook or watchlisting announcement on an investment grade rating that is highly 
significant at 5% level, when South Africa is excluded from the sample. The average 
excess nominal foreign exchange rate returns are however, an unexpected positive and 
not persistent, observed for a single day on 7 days (day -7) prior to the negative outlook 
or watchlisting, suggesting a reaction to an event other than the rating negative outlook 
or watchlisting announcement.   
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Table 22: Estimation of investment grade long-term foreign currency sovereign 
credit ratings announcement impact on nominal foreign exchange rate 
Day 
Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive Confirmed 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
All 
Excl 
RSA 
-15 0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
-14 0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
-13 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 
-12 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.001 
-11 0.006 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.001 
-10 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.000 
-9 0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.006 -0.004 
-8 0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.008 0.003 
-7 0.009 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.005** 0.006 0.019 0.006 0.001 
-6 0.009 0.004 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.002 
-5 0.006 0.006 -0.006 -0.010 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.021 0.009 0.003 
-4 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.008 0.004 
-3 0.002 0.007 -0.005* -0.008* -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.025 0.009 0.006 
-2 0.004 0.006 -0.005 -0.008* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.026 0.009 0.005 
-1 0.006 0.006 -0.007* -0.010** -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.009 0.004 
0 0.005 0.006 -0.009* -0.013** -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.027 0.008 0.002 
+1 0.008 0.009 -0.010* -0.013* 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.023 0.007 0.002 
+2 0.008 0.011 -0.011* -0.015* 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.026 0.007 0.000 
+3 0.007 0.011 -0.011* -0.014* -0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.023 0.008 0.001 
+4 0.011 0.016 -0.012** -0.014** -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.025 0.009 0.002 
+5 0.009 0.015 -0.012 -0.017** -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.020 0.008 -0.001 
+6 0.003 0.011 -0.014** -0.017** -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.009 0.000 
+7 0.006 0.012 -0.015** -0.019** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.016 0.009 -0.001 
+8 0.004 0.011 -0.019** -0.024** -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.009 -0.001 
+9 0.004 0.008 -0.019** -0.022** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.025 0.006 -0.003 
+10 0.006 0.012 -0.017** -0.019** -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.024 0.008 0.000 
+11 0.002 0.010 -0.017** -0.018* -0.004 -0.003 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.002 
+12 0.001 0.010 -0.017 -0.017 -0.006 -0.005 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.000 
+13 0.001 0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.023 0.007 0.001 
+14 0.002 0.012 -0.017 -0.016 -0.004 0.000 0.014 0.027 0.005 0.000 
+15 0.000 0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.002 0.001 0.021 0.027 0.004 -0.004 
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance 1% 
 
123 
 
4.2.2 Conclusions 
The first part of this section reveals that the effect of the long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P (RATINGS) on the different 
types of capital flows is marginal.  The empirical estimation of the different types of 
capital flows show that the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings are not a 
substitute for the economic factors that they do not encapsulate, nor do they promote 
new capital flows.  In particular, the empirical models reveal that the RATINGS reinforce 
the primary determinants of capital flows, with the introduction of the RATING variable 
accentuating the model of economic control variables, through improved p-values 
and/or increased coefficients. In addition, the empirical estimation shows that a 
RATING becomes important for explaining the differences in capital flows, where there 
is already a history of the particular type of capital inflow. This is contrary to the findings 
by Kim and Wu (2008) that the RATINGS promote capital flow through their 
development of financial markets. In contrast, the current study shows that the 
relationship between the RATING and capital flows is only positive where the financial 
markets are already in place. For example, with the exclusion of South Africa (with the 
highly developed equity market and accounting for almost two thirds of portfolio equity 
flows to Africa) from the portfolio equity net flow rate model, the models become 
insignificant even where the RATING variable is included in the model. 
On the other hand, the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings have a 
significant relationship with each of the other types of capital flows namely, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), portfolio bond (Bond) and borrowing from commercial banks 
and other private institutions. Interestingly, while FDI and borrowing from commercial 
banks and other private institutions is widely distributed across the number of countries 
in Africa as shown in Appendix A, South Africa is the regular issuer of bond debt in the 
global markets, and, as observed with the portfolio equity flows, one would have 
expected the portfolio bond models to perform poorly when South Africa is excluded 
from the sample. This was found not to be the case, with the portfolio bond flow models 
performing well, even when South Africa is excluded from the sample. 
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In particular, the empirical analysis reveals significant relationships between the long-
term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and the following types of capital flows: 
 Moody’s issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and FDI inflow 
rates. This is interesting, particularly considering that only Moody’s issued ratings 
have a positive and significant effect on FDI. While the coefficient for the S&P and 
Fitch rating variables are of the expected positive sign, they were insignificant. 
Looking at the capital flow data in Appendix A though, it is evident that, of the 8 
countries rated by Moody’s in Africa,  5 countries, namely, Angola, Egypt, 
Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia, are major recipients of FDI in Africa, 
accounting for approximately 41% of FDI flows during the observation period 
(1994 to 2011). This supports the finding that the RATING becomes important for 
explaining the differences in capital flows, where there is already a history of the 
particular type of capital inflow as opposed to promoting new capital flows;  
 S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and public and 
publicly guaranteed portfolio bond borrowing rates (PPGBOND), only when South 
Africa is excluded from the sample;   and 
 Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and non-
guaranteed portfolio bond flows (PNGBOND). 
In some instances however, while the relationships between the long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit ratings and the capital flows are statistically insignificant, the 
empirical analysis revealed a marginal contribution of the RATINGS in the explanation 
of the differences in capital flows to the different countries. In these instances, the 
introduction of the long term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings to the capital flow 
rate models improves the models’ fit, supportive of the finding that the RATINGS 
reinforce, as opposed to substituting, the primary determinants of capital flows: 
 The introduction of Fitch issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings improve the public and publicly guaranteed commercial banks and other 
private borrowing rate model fit with the adjusted R-squared increasing slightly 
from 9.1% to 9.5%, when South Africa is  excluded from the sample. In contrast, 
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the Fitch RATING improves the  non-guaranteed commercial banks and other 
private borrowing rate model fit  for all the samples, with the adjusted R-squared 
increasing from 38.3% to 38.8% when South Africa is included in the  sample and 
from 63.6% to 63.6% when South Africa is excluded from the sample; 
 The introduction of Moody issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
rating on the other hand, improves the public and publicly guaranteed borrowing 
rate from commercial banks and other private institutions model, when South 
Africa is excluded from the sample, with the adjusted R-squared improving slightly 
from 21.53 to 21.98%; and 
 S&P issued long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating  improves the 
borrowing rate from non-guaranteed commercial banks and other private 
institutions and the public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond models, with the 
adjusted R-squared increasing from  25% to 28.4% and from 43.24 to 44.01% 
respectively. 
In line with expectations and in support of the argument by Arora and Vamvakidis 
(2005), the empirical analysis further reveals evidence of South Africa’s effect  on 
capital flows to other African countries. In particular, the panel regression models 
demonstrate that South Africa’s Fitch, Moody’s and S&P RATINGS operate as a proxy 
for the regional rating, with a significant effect on  the debt capital flows namely, the 
portfolio bond and the commercial bank and other private institutions net flow (public 
and publicly guaranteed  and non-guaranteed). In some instances, as is the case with 
the  PPGBOND, own country S&P sovereign credit  rating becomes insignificant with 
the introduction of South Africa’s S&P issued RATING variable to the model, suggesting 
a substitution of own country RATING by the South African RATING.   
 On the other hand, while not statistically significant, South Africa’s FITCH issued 
sovereign credit rating has a positive relationship with PPGBOND net flow rates for 
countries other than South Africa, with the introduction of the South African RATING 
variable, improving both the model R-squared and adjusted R-squared. Similarly, the 
introduction of South Africa’s Moody’s RATING variable improves both the PPGCOMM 
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and PNGBOND flow rates panel regression models R-squared and adjusted R-
squared, when South Africa is excluded from the sample.  
The second part of the section analyses the short-term, transitory long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating event announcement impact on the aggregate national 
equity stock and nominal foreign exchange rate returns. The event study analysis 
reveals that the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings events have an 
announcement impact on the aggregate national equity stock and nominal foreign 
exchange rate returns. In particular, the event study analyses reveal that, contrary to 
the findings of studies such those by Hand, et al. (1992) and Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002), both the rating upgrades and downgrades as well as the imminent rating 
changes events have an announcement impact on the aggregate national equity stock 
and nominal foreign exchange rate returns for Africa. 
The long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings announcement impact is 
however asymmetric for below investment and investment grade ratings, with the 
downgrade and negative outlook announcement insignificant for below investment 
grade ratings, while the opposite is true for positive rating announcements.  The 
analyses reveal that any improvement in below investment grade rating, either through 
a positive outlook or watchlisting, yields significant positive equity stock and foreign 
exchange returns. In addition, there is a positive below investment grade rating upgrade 
impact on the foreign exchange returns when South Africa is excluded from the sample, 
suggesting improved market focus with the expected progression towards investment 
grading. This is supported by the positive and significant outlook and watchlisting 
impact on below investment rated equity stock returns, only when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample.  
In contrast, both positive and negative rating announcements have a significant 
transitory impact on the investment grade rating aggregate national equity stock and 
nominal foreign exchange rate returns. Consistent with the findings, where the panel 
regression model performed poorly when South Africa was excluded from the sample, 
the event study analyses reveal that a positive upgrade announcement impact on the 
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aggregate equity stock returns for investment grade ratings is significant only when 
South Africa is included in the sample. In contrast, the negative outlook or outlook 
announcement impact is highly significant on the aggregate equity stock returns only 
when South Africa is excluded from the sample, while the downgrade impact is 
significant on the nominal foreign exchange rate for both samples.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Overview of the study and research findings 
With designations such as the Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations, 
(a designation afforded to agencies whose ratings are used as a benchmark by the U.S. 
government in financial regulations), the regulatory endorsements afforded to the rating 
agencies, make them a de facto requirement to access international debt markets 
(Cantor, 2004). Three international rating agencies namely Fitch, Moody’s and S&P in 
particular, dominate the sovereign credit rating market (SEC 2003, 2011).  
A number of studies have shown that sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s 
and S&P  have a short-term announcement impact on the cost of borrowing as well as 
return on equity stock returns (Hooper et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Reisen & von 
Maltzan, 1998). Studies such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) argue that  the  lack  of 
capital flows  from developed to poor countries is related to, among other factors, their 
sovereign default risk as reflected in their sovereign credit ratings. Ratha, et al. (2007), 
for example, show that access and cost of foreign capital can be improved through the 
acquisition and improvement of sovereign ratings,  with an estimated savings in bond 
yield spreads of between 320 and 450 basis points on improvement of a rating from B 
to BBB. Taylor and Sarno (1997), on the other hand, show through unit root tests that 
there was a permanent component of statistical significance of credit ratings affecting 
portfolio flows to developing countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000)  also show that, for 11 
Central and Eastern Europe transition economies,  in addition to the market size, the 
main factor influencing FDI inflows was the country risk as represented by the 
Institutional Investor's Country credit rating. 
It is within this context that, in an effort to facilitate access to foreign private capital, the 
United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched separate programs to assist 
developing economies, including those of Africa, to acquire sovereign credit ratings 
(S&P, 2003; USDepartmentState, 2002). Indeed it is suggested that sovereign credit 
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ratings improve both the access and cost of capital for both the sovereign government 
as well as the sub-sovereigns and corporates domiciled in the sovereign (S&P, 2003). 
Peter and Grandes (2005), for example, show that in the case of South Africa, the 
sovereign credit rating was the most significant variable in explaining the cost of capital 
for  resident corporations, suggesting that corporates can piggyback on the sovereign 
credit rating to access foreign debt at favourable rates. Siddiqi (2007)  further suggests 
that the process of acquiring the sovereign credit rating, not only improves transparency 
but may also promote policy discipline in order to maintain a favourable rating, while 
also providing regional differentiation where there is information asymmetry. 
 Despite their implied importance in assisting especially developing countries to access 
foreign capital, it is surprising that many of the  empirical studies on sovereign credit 
ratings have focused on their short-term announcement impact and not on their long-
term structural influence on capital flows, leaving a critical knowledge gap  (Cantor & 
Packer, 1996b; Hooper et al., 2008). Kim and Wu (2008), partly address this knowledge 
gap, by studying the impact of S&P issued sovereign credit ratings on financial 
developments and capital flows in emerging economies. While studies such as those by 
Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Janicki and Wunnava (2004), also attempt to address this 
knowledge gap, these studies were focused on the periodically issued, industry survey 
based International Investor country risk  rating, as opposed to the independent ratings 
issued by  Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. In addition to that, these studies are focused on 
emerging markets and exclude the developing African economies, whose financial 
markets are largely still in their infancy.  
With this background evidence in mind, the current study investigates the long-term 
structural impact of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings (RATING) 
issued by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s  (S&P) on capital inflows to Africa for 
the period between 1994 and 2011. Through regression analysis, the long-term effect  
of  long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the different types of capital 
flows namely, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity (EQUITY), portfolio bond 
(BOND) as well as commercial private banks and other private institutions 
(COMMERCIAL) is investigated.  In so doing, the conjecture that the RATING is a de 
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facto requirement to access capital is explored empirically, while controlling for the 
macroeconomic factors, which have been proved to influence both the capital flows and 
the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings. Secondly, the study investigates 
the short-term transitory impact of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings on the aggregate national equity stock and nominal foreign exchange rates in 
Africa. Specifically, the study tests the hypotheses that: 
1. Sovereign credit ratings do not have a long-term marginal effect on the foreign 
private capital flows to African economies; 
2. Sovereign credit ratings do not have a statistically significant announcement 
impact on the aggregate equity stock returns in Africa; and 
3. Sovereign credit ratings do not have a statistically significant announcement 
impact on the nominal foreign exchange rate returns in Africa. 
Overall, the empirical evidence support priori expectations and the findings by 
Hernández, et al. (2001), that the country’s past investment rate (total net capital 
inflow/GDP) was an important determinant of capital flows to developing economies. 
For FDI flows, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the growth hypothesis 
advanced by studies such as those by (Ajayi, 2006; Martin & Rose-Innes, 2004; 
Mlambo, 2005). Contrary to priori expectations however, the empirical evidence shows 
a positive but insignificant relationship between trade openness and FDI flows. The 
empirical evidence further corroborates the findings by Singh and Jun (1995), Sachs 
(2003) and Asiedu (2003), that political stability has a positive and significant 
relationship with FDI flows.  
Confirming the findings by Gerlos, et al. (2003), the empirical evidence reveals that 
traditional mechanisms of country links with the rest of the world, such as trade 
openness, transactional liquidity and macroeconomic indicators, do not help much to 
explain access to debt flows. Except for public and publicly guaranteed borrowing from 
commercial banks and other private institutions, the model results show that the effect 
of economic growth on portfolio equity and debt inflows (bond and borrowing from 
commercial banks and other private institutions), is insignificant. 
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While empirical estimation of regression models partially support the findings by Kim 
and Wu (2008), that there is relationship between the long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings (RATINGS) and the different types of capital flows, the current 
study reveals that the contribution of the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings to capital flows is marginal. In particular, the empirical evidence shows that  the 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings are not a substitute for the economic 
factors that they encapsulate, as suggested by the findings by Cantor and Packer 
(1996a) for bond yield spreads nor that they encourage new capital flows as suggested 
by Kim and Wu (2008).   Instead, the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings 
are found to reinforce the primary determinants of capital flows such as the economic 
growth, history of particular capital flow to the country and equity stock market 
capitalisation.  For example, as shown in Appendix A, compared to South Africa, with a 
more developed equity stock market and a history of significant portfolio equity 
(EQUITY) flows over the observation period (1994 to 2011), countries rated by Moody’s 
receive proportionally insignificant equity flows compared to FDI. This is revealed in the 
empirical evidence through a positive and significant relationship between the 
RATINGS and the FDI flow for a sample of Moody’s rated countries. In contrast, the 
relationship between Moody’s RATING and portfolio equity flows (EQUITY) is 
insignificant, suggesting that with smaller equity stock markets and limited history of 
portfolio equity flows, countries such as Botswana continue to attract fewer portfolio 
flows despite their investment grade Moody’s RATINGS.  
The empirical evidence further reveals that sovereign credit ratings issued by the 
different rating agencies have an asymmetric relationship with capital flows. For 
example, while the relationship between the FDI investment rate (FDI/GDP) models fit 
the modelled data with R-squared ranging from 40.6% and 73%, the relationship 
between FDI investment rate and Fitch issued RATINGS was negative while the 
opposite was true for S&P issued RATINGS, despite the fact that S&P and Fitch, 
disagree in only 4 of the 16 sovereigns for which they issue the ratings over the 
observation period. In addition, as opposed to the positive and significant relationship 
between S&P issued RATINGS and non-guaranteed commercial private banks and 
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other private institutions (PNGCOMM), Fitch issued RATINGS revealed a positive and 
significant relationship with non-guaranteed portfolio bond flow rates (PNGBOND).  
 To some extent, the empirical evidence supports Arora and Vamvakidis (2005)’s  
suggestion that  South Africa has a potential to influence  the regional access to 
outside private capital flows. The introduction of South Africa’s Fitch issued RATING 
to the public and publicly guaranteed portfolio bond flow rate (PPGBOND) model for 
example, not only improves the model R-squared but also the adjusted R-squared. 
This is also the case for South Africa’s S&P issued RATINGS, with the rating having a 
positive and significant relationship with the public and publicly guaranteed portfolio 
bond net flow rates to countries other than South Africa. The relationship between 
South Africa’s RATING and capital flows to countries other than South Africa, was 
however not confined to the PPGBOND net flow rates. In addition to a positive and 
significant relationship between S&P issued South African RATING and the public and 
publicly guaranteed commercial banks and other private institutions (PPGCOMM) net 
flow rates to countries other than South Africa, the introduction of Moody’s issued 
South African RATING to the PPGCOMM net flow rate model for a sample that 
excludes South Africa, improved the model fit with the adjusted R-squared increasing 
from 27.1% to 27.6%. 
Despite the lack of a long-term relationship between the long term foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings and portfolio equity flows, the empirical evidence supports the 
findings by studies such as those by Brooks, et al. (2004),  and Reisen and von Maltzan 
(1998) that the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings have an 
announcement impact on the aggregate equity stock returns. In addition, contrary to the 
findings by Brooks, et al (2004), and Gaillard (2009) that only downgrades have an 
announcement impact on the aggregate equity stock returns, the event study results 
also show that both the upgrades and downgrades have an announcement impact on 
the aggregate equity stock returns in Africa.  The event study analysis further 
corroborates the findings by Hite and Warga (1997), that both the actual and imminent 
rating change have a significant announcement impact on the aggregate national equity 
stock and nominal foreign exchange rate returns. 
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The event study analysis reveals that in the short-term, while there is an incentive for a 
positive rating announcement, the punishment for a negative announcement is not 
significant.  This is contrary to earlier studies that the downgrade impact was more 
pronounced for below investment grade ratings (Cantor & Packer, 1996a; Reisen & von 
Maltzan, 1998)  In particular, empirical evidence shows that there is a positive and 
significant rating announcement impact for below investment grade ratings while the 
negative rating announcement is insignificant, suggesting that the market prices the 
negative rating action upfront for below investment markets in Africa .  
In contrast to below investment grade ratings, while there is an incentive to improve the 
investment grade rating, there is equally a punishment for a negative rating 
announcement. In addition, the event analysis reveal that for the aggregate equity stock 
market in particular, the upgrade announcement impact on investment grade ratings is 
only significant  when South Africa is included in the sample, and insignificant when 
South Africa is excluded from the sample. In contrast, the negative outlook and 
watchlisting announcement show persistent and negative aggregate equity stock 
returns when South Africa is excluded from the sample. For the nominal foreign 
exchange rate, only the downgrade announcement on an investment grade rating show 
a negative return, while there is no significant announcement impact for the negative or 
positive outlook or watchlisting.   
5.2 Contributions of the Study 
The key contribution of the thesis is that, it undertakes a comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the long-term effect of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings issued by the three dominant rating agencies on capital flows in Africa. Indeed 
while there is conjecture that sovereign credit ratings are a de facto requirement to gain 
access to foreign capital, many studies on the subject focused on the short-term 
announcement impact of the ratings on bond yield spreads and equity stock returns 
(Brooks et al., 2004; Gaillard, 2009; Reisen & von Maltzan, 1998).  Kim and Wu (2008) 
attempted to close this gap by investigating the long-term effect of sovereign credit 
ratings on the different types of capital flows. Kim and Wu (2008)’s study  however, 
134 
 
partially closed this knowledge gap by only focusing on sovereign credit ratings issued 
by S&P, one of the three leading rating agencies. In addition, the study’s sample was 
made up of countries classified as emerging economies, excluding many African 
countries that are classified as developing economies.  Indeed, many studies on the 
effect of sovereign credit ratings have thus far only included Egypt, South Africa and 
Tunisia (Brooks et al., 2004; Cavallo & Valenzuela, 2007; Gaillard, 2009) leaving a gap 
on the effect of sovereign credit ratings on the African economies that are 
predominantly not integrated with the international financial markets (Kasekende, 
Ndikumana & Rajhi, 2009).     
The thesis systematically and separately tests the long-term relationship between the 
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
and different types of capital flows (FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio bond and commercial 
borrowing), providing a new direction of literature for developing economies that are 
largely not financially integrated with the international financial markets. While the 
current empirical analysis extends previous work by studies such as those by Kim and 
Wu (2008), Asiedu (2003) and Janicki and Winnava (2004) by introducing the sovereign 
credit ratings to the reduced form equation specified by Edwards (1984) and widely 
applied in studies on capital flows (Asiedu & Lien, 2004; Bevan & Estrin, 2004), the 
study demonstrates the importance of separating sovereign credit ratings issued by the 
different  rating agencies. In particular, the lag in the rating adjustment identified by 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym  (2010), becomes critical when a weighted average annual 
rating has to be computed.  While the lag in the rating adjustment is insignificant where 
a single agency rating issue is investigated and applied by Kim and Wu (2008), the 
timing of the rating adjustment becomes critical when a time proportioned annual 
average rating has to be computed for multiple agency issued ratings.  
 
 By testing the relationship between South Africa’s sovereign credit ratings and capital 
flows to countries other than South Africa, the study tests the hypothesis that, by virtue 
of its economic advantage, South Africa has an influence on the regional  business and 
consumer confidence and by extension the attractiveness of the region to capital flows 
(Arora & Vamvakidis, 2005). Indeed literature and data shows that South Africa’s 
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economy and financial market is fundamentally different to many of the countries in the 
region. In addition to being a regular issuer of debt in the global market, South Africa’s 
financial market is highly developed as well as being broad, with the flows to the 
country more skewed towards portfolio flows as compared to FDI across the region    
(Arvanitis, 2005; Ncube, 2008). In addition, South Africa is also a leading investor in the 
region, making it difficult for South Africa to be compared to any particular peer 
economy across the region (UNCTAD, 2011; UNCTD, 2010). Indeed, Jefferis and 
Okeahalam (2000) show that, while South Africa’s equity stock market is impacted on 
by the global financial developments,  Zimbabwe and Botswana’s equity stock markets 
are impacted on by the regional financial and economic developments as represented 
by  South Africa’s real interest rates and GDP. 
 
 By separately testing two samples, one that includes South Africa as well as the other 
one that excludes South Africa, the current study takes a significant step towards 
demonstrating some of the weaknesses in generalised inferences from analytical 
frameworks such as regression analysis and event study methodologies (Brooks, 2008; 
Kothari & Warner, 2006). This is demonstrated in particular by the portfolio equity 
models that become statistically insignificant when South Africa, which accounts for 
over 70% of portfolio equity flows over the observation period, is excluded from the 
sample. This is further demonstrated by the differences in the announcement impact 
from event studies that are fundamentally different for a sample that includes South 
Africa as opposed to one that excludes South Africa.  
5.3 Lessons for Future Research 
While the study attempted to test the role of a strong regional economy on capital flows, 
through an empirical analysis of the effect of South Africa’s long-term foreign currency 
sovereign credit rating on capital flow rates on countries other than South Africa, there 
is an opportunity to further explore this topic. In particular, the study did not capture the 
effect of sub regional dominant economies such as those of Nigeria in West Africa and 
Kenya in East Africa.   To this effect, future research on the effect of long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating on capital flow rates can make further contributions to 
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this topic by exploring the effect of sub regional dominant economies sovereign credit 
ratings on capital flows to the sub region. In particular, this needs to be in the context of 
the sub regional economic blocks such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Malefane (2007), for example, demonstrates that markets seeing FDI flow to smaller 
economies such as that of Lesotho, are more likely attracted to a larger regional market 
as opposed to the domestic market. Similarly, one will expect any negative sovereign 
risk rating on Nigeria to be transmitted across ECOWAS where Nigeria not only has the 
biggest economy, but also hosts the biggest equity stock exchange, a larger population 
as well as sharing a common passport with the members of ECOWAS. 
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APPENDIX A  
Moody’s - Sovereign Rating History as in July 2012 
Fitch - 
Complete 
Sovereign 
Rating 
History as 
in July 
2012Country 
Date 
long-
term 
short-
term 
outlook/Watch 
long-
term 
outlook/Watch 
Angola 23 May 2012 BB- B positive BB- positive 
Angola 24 May 2011 BB- B stable BB- stable 
Angola 19 May 2010 B+ B positive B+ positive 
Benin 25 Jan 2012 withdrawn withdrawn withdrawn withdrawn withdrawn 
Benin 15 Sep 2004 B B stable B stable 
Cameroon 
30 May 2012 
B B stable B stable 
Cameroon 
6 Mar 2007 
B B stable B- stable 
Cameroon 
12 Jun 2006 
B B stable CCC positive 
Cameroon 
21 Dec 2005 
B- B positive CCC positive 
Cameroon 
4 Nov 2005 
B- B positive CCC+ positive 
Cameroon 
15 Feb 2005 
B- B stable CCC+ stable 
Cameroon 
5 Jul 2004 
B B 
Rating Watch 
Negative 
B 
Rating Watch 
Negative 
Cameroon 
4 Sep 2003 
B B stable B stable 
Cape Verde 
22 Jun 2009 
B+ B stable BB- stable 
Cape Verde 
11 Mar 2008 
B+ B positive BB- positive 
Cape Verde 
15 Aug 2003 
B+ B stable BB- stable 
Egypt 15 Jun 2012 B+ B negative B+ negative 
Egypt 30 Dec 2011 BB- B negative BB negative 
Egypt 28 Jun 2011 BB B negative BB+ negative 
Egypt 
3 Feb 2011 
BB B 
Rating Watch 
negative 
BB+ 
Rating Watch 
negative 
Egypt 28 Jan 2011 BB+ B negative BBB- negative 
Egypt 18 Aug 2008 BB+ B stable BBB- stable 
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Fitch - 
Complete 
Sovereign 
Rating 
History as 
in July 
2012Country 
Date 
long-
term 
short-
term 
outlook/Watch 
long-
term 
outlook/Watch 
Egypt 18 Jun 2007 BB+ B positive BBB stable 
Egypt 15 Dec 2004 BB+ B stable BBB stable 
Egypt 2 Dec 2003 BB+ B stable BBB negative 
Egypt 21 Aug 2002 BB+ B stable BBB stable 
Egypt 22 Jan 2002 BBB- F3 negative BBB+ negative 
Egypt 22 Aug 2001 BBB- F3 stable BBB+ stable 
Egypt 21 Sep 2000 BBB- F3 stable A- stable 
Egypt 19 Aug 1997 BBB- F3 - A- - 
Gabon 5 Apr 2012 BB- B positive BB- positive 
Gabon 29 Oct 2007 BB- B stable BB- stable 
Gambia 6 Jul 2007 - - - - - 
Gambia 21 Dec 2005 CCC C stable CCC stable 
Gambia 26 Jan 2005 CCC+ C stable CCC+ stable 
Gambia 11 Nov 2002 B- B stable B- stable 
Kenya 16 Jan 2009 B+ B stable BB- stable 
Kenya 30 Jan 2008 B+ B negative BB- negative 
Kenya 12 Dec 2007 B+ B stable BB- stable 
Lesotho 31 May 2011 BB- B negative BB negative 
Lesotho 27 Apr 2010 BB- B stable BB negative 
Lesotho 18 Sep 2006 BB- B stable BB stable 
Lesotho 4 Nov 2005 BB- B negative BB+ negative 
Lesotho 30 Nov 2004 BB- B stable BB+ stable 
Lesotho 26 Sep 2003 B+ B positive BB positive 
Lesotho 2 Sep 2002 B+ B stable BB stable 
Libya 13 Apr 2011 - - - - - 
Libya 13 Apr 2011 B B stable B stable 
Libya 
1 Mar 2011 
BB B 
Rating Watch 
negative 
BB 
Rating Watch 
negative 
Libya 
21 Feb 2011 
BBB F3 
Rating Watch 
negative 
BBB 
Rating Watch 
negative 
Libya 7 May 2009 BBB+ F2 stable BBB+ stable 
Malawi 25 Aug 2009 - - - - - 
Malawi 6 Mar 2007 B- B stable B- stable 
Malawi 21 Dec 2005 CCC C positive CCC positive 
Malawi 30 Jul 2004 CCC+ C positive CCC+ positive 
Malawi 20 May 2003 CCC+ C stable CCC+ stable 
Mali 4 Dec 2009 - - - - - 
Mali 30 Apr 2004 B- B stable B- stable 
Morocco 19 Apr 2007 BBB- F3 stable BBB stable 
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Fitch - 
Complete 
Sovereign 
Rating 
History as 
in July 
2012Country 
Date 
long-
term 
short-
term 
outlook/Watch 
long-
term 
outlook/Watch 
Mozambique 
15 Jul 2003 
B B stable B+ stable 
Namibia 9 Dec 2011 BBB- F3 stable BBB stable 
Namibia 13 Dec 2010 BBB- F3 positive BBB positive 
Namibia 7 Dec 2005 BBB- F3 stable BBB stable 
Nigeria 21 Oct 2011 BB- B stable BB stable 
Nigeria 22 Oct 2010 BB- B negative BB negative 
Nigeria 23 May 2008 BB- B stable BB stable 
Nigeria 30 Jan 2006 BB- B stable BB- stable 
Rwanda 24 Aug 2010 B B stable B stable 
Rwanda 16 Dec 2006 B- B positive B- positive 
South Africa 
13 Jan 2012 
BBB+ F2 negative A negative 
South Africa 
17 Jan 2011 
BBB+ F2 stable A stable 
South Africa 
9 Nov 2008 
BBB+ F2 negative A negative 
South Africa 
17 Jun 2008 
BBB+ F2 stable A stable 
South Africa 
25 Jul 2007 
BBB+ F2 positive A positive 
South Africa 
25 Aug 2005 
BBB+ F2 stable A stable 
South Africa 
21 Oct 2004 
BBB F3 positive A- positive 
South Africa 
2 May 2003 
BBB F3 stable A- stable 
South Africa 
11 Mar 2003 
BBB- F3 
Rating Watch 
positive 
BBB+ 
Rating Watch 
positive 
South Africa 
20 Aug 2002 
BBB- F3 positive BBB+ positive 
South Africa 
21 Sep 2000 
BBB- F3 stable BBB+ stable 
South Africa 
27 Jun 2000 
BBB- F3 - BBB+ - 
South Africa 
19 May 2000 
BB+ B - BBB+ - 
South Africa 
28 May 1998 
BB B - BBB - 
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Fitch - 
Complete 
Sovereign 
Rating 
History as 
in July 
2012Country 
Date 
long-
term 
short-
term 
outlook/Watch 
long-
term 
outlook/Watch 
South Africa 
17 Feb 1998 
BB B 
Rating Watch 
positive 
BBB 
Rating Watch 
positive 
South Africa 
5 Jun 1996 
BB B - BBB - 
South Africa 
26 Oct 1995 
BB B - - - 
South Africa 
22 Sep 1994 
BB - - - - 
Tunisia 2 Mar 2011 BBB- F3 negative BBB negative 
Tunisia 
14 Jan 2011 
BBB F2 
Rating Watch 
negative 
A- 
Rating Watch 
negative 
Tunisia 24 May 2001 BBB F2 stable A- stable 
Tunisia 21 Sep 2000 BBB- F3 positive A- positive 
Tunisia 26 Sep 1996 BBB- F3 - A- - 
Tunisia 26 Oct 1995 BBB- F3 - - - 
Tunisia 14 Sep 1995 BBB- - - - - 
Uganda 7 Oct 2011 B B stable B stable 
Uganda 19 Aug 2009 B B positive B positive 
Uganda 17 Mar 2005 B B stable B stable 
Zambia 1 Mar 2012 B+ B negative B+ negative 
Zambia 2 Mar 2011 B+ B stable B+ stable 
Source: Fitch Ratings 
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Moody’s - Sovereign Rating History as in July 2012 
 
Foreign Currency Ceilings Government Bonds Outlook Date 
 
Bonds & 
Notes  
Bank 
Deposit  
Foreign 
Currency 
Local 
Currency   
 
Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term 
    
Angola 
Rating Raised Ba1 NP B1 NP Ba3 Ba3 Stable June-11 
Review for Upgrade Ba3 NP B2 NP B1 B1 RUR+ February-11 
Rating Assigned Ba3 NP B2 NP B1 B1 Positive May-10 
Botswana 
Outlook Changed -- -- A2 -- A2 A2 Stable November-11 
Outlook Changed -- -- A2 -- A2 A2 Negative February-10 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- A2 Stable March-09 
Outlook Changed Aa3 -- A2 -- A2 -- Stable March-09 
Outlook Changed Aa3 -- A2 -- A2 -- Positive August-07 
Rating Raised Aa3 -- -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
Rating Assigned A2 P-1 A2 P-1 A2 A1 Stable March-01 
Egypt 
Rating Lowered & 
Review for 
Downgrade 
Ba3 NP B3 -- B2 B2 RUR- December-11 
Rating Lowered Ba2 NP B2 -- B1 B1 Negative October-11 
Rating Lowered Ba1 NP B1 -- Ba3 Ba3 Negative March-11 
Rating Lowered Baa3 P-3 Ba3 -- Ba2 Ba2 Negative January-11 
Outlook Changed Baa2 P-2 Ba2 -- Ba1 Ba1 Stable August-09 
Outlook Changed Baa2 P-2 Ba2 -- Ba1 Ba1 Negative June-08 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- Ba1 -- June-08 
Rating Raised Baa2 P-2 -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- Baa3 Negative May-05 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- Baa1 Negative November-01 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- Ba1 -- -- July-01 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- -- Baa1 -- March-99 
Rating Raised Ba1 -- Ba2 -- -- -- Stable November-97 
Review for Upgrade Ba2 -- Ba3 -- -- -- RUR+ October-97 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Positive August-97 
Outlook Assigned -- -- -- -- -- -- Stable March-97 
Rating Assigned Ba2 NP Ba3 NP -- -- -- October-96 
Mauritius 
Rating Raised A2 -- Baa1 -- Baa1 Baa1 Stable June-12 
Review for Upgrade Baa1 -- Baa2 -- Baa2 -- RUR+ March-12 
Rating Confirmed Baa1 -- Baa2 -- Baa2 -- Stable December-07 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- Baa2 Stable December-07 
Review for 
Downgrade 
Baa1 -- Baa2 -- Baa2 Baa1 RUR- August-07 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- Baa1 -- June-06 
Rating Raised Baa1 -- -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
Review for 
Downgrade 
-- -- -- -- -- A2 RUR- March-06 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Negative December-05 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- -- A2 -- January-99 
Rating Assigned Baa2 P-2 Baa2 P-2 Baa2 -- -- March-96 
Morocco 
Rating Raised Baa2 P-2 -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
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Foreign Currency Ceilings Government Bonds Outlook Date 
 
Bonds & 
Notes  
Bank 
Deposit  
Foreign 
Currency 
Local 
Currency   
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Stable June-03 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- -- Ba1 Negative December-01 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- Ba1 -- -- July-99 
Rating Assigned Ba1 NP Ba2 NP -- -- Stable March-98 
Namibia 
Rating Assigned A3 -- Baa3 -- Baa3 Baa3 Stable September-11 
Senegal 
Rating Assigned A2 -- A2 -- B1 B1 Stable March-11 
South Africa 
Outlook Changed A1 -- A3 -- A3 A3 Negative November-11 
Rating Raised A1 -- A3 -- A3 -- Stable July-09 
Rating Lowered -- -- -- -- -- A3 Stable July-09 
Review for 
Downgrade 
-- -- -- -- -- A2 RUR- March-09 
Outlook Changed A2 -- Baa1 -- Baa1 -- Positive June-07 
Rating Raised A2 P-1 -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
Rating Raised Baa1 -- Baa1 -- Baa1 -- Stable January-05 
Review for Upgrade Baa2 -- Baa2 -- Baa2 -- RUR+ October-04 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Positive February-03 
Rating Raised Baa2 P-2 Baa2 P-2 Baa2 A2 Stable November-01 
Review for Upgrade Baa3 -- Ba1 NP Baa3 Baa1 RUR+ October-01 
Rating Assigned -- NP -- -- -- -- -- October-01 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Positive February-00 
Rating Confirmed Baa3 -- Ba1 -- Baa3 Baa1 Stable October-98 
Review for 
Downgrade 
Baa3 -- Ba1 -- Baa3 Baa1 RUR- July-98 
Outlook Assigned -- -- -- -- -- -- Stable March-97 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- -- Baa1 -- November-95 
Rating Assigned -- -- Ba1 NP -- -- -- October-95 
Rating Assigned Baa3 -- -- -- Baa3 -- -- October-94 
Tunisia 
Rating Lowered Baa1 P-3 Baa3 P-3 Baa3 Baa3 Negative January-11 
Rating Raised A3 P-2 -- -- -- -- -- May-06 
Rating Raised Baa2 -- Baa2 P-2 Baa2 -- Stable April-03 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- Baa3 -- -- October-00 
Outlook Changed -- -- -- -- -- -- Positive February-00 
Rating Assigned -- -- -- -- -- Baa2 -- June-99 
Outlook Assigned -- -- -- -- -- -- Stable March-97 
Rating Assigned -- -- Ba1 NP -- -- -- October-95 
Rating Assigned Baa3 -- -- -- -- -- -- April-95 
Source: Moody’s Investor Services 
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Standard and Poor’s - Sovereign Rating History as in July 2012 
    
Local-currency rating Foreign-currency rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Angola 10 July 2012 BB- Stable B BB- Stable B 
Angola 12 July 2011 BB- Stable B BB- Stable B 
Angola 19 May 2010 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Benin 10 July 2012 B Stable B B Stable B 
Benin 1 Dec. 2010 B Stable B B Stable B 
Benin 
19 Dec. 
2007 
B Positive B B Positive B 
Benin 
10 April 
2007 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Benin 7 Sept. 2006 B Negative B B Negative B 
Benin 1 Nov. 2005 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Benin 
29 Dec. 
2003 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Botswana 10 July 2012 A- Stable A-2 A- Stable A-2 
Botswana 
23 Nov. 
2011 
A- Stable A-2 A- Stable A-2 
Botswana 
15 Feb. 
2010 
A Stable A-1 A- Stable A-2 
Botswana 
19 Feb. 
2009 
A+ Negative A-1 A Negative A-1 
Botswana 6 April 2006 A+ Stable A-1 A Stable A-1 
Botswana 1 Nov. 2005 A+ Stable A-1 A Stable A-1 
Botswana 2 April 2001 A+ Stable A-1 A Stable A-1 
Burkina Faso 10 July 2012 B Stable B B Stable B 
Burkina Faso 6 Aug. 2008 B Stable B B Stable B 
Burkina Faso 6 July 2006 B Positive B B Positive B 
Burkina Faso 1 Nov. 2005 B Stable B B Stable B 
Burkina Faso 
5 March 
2004 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Cameroon 10 July 2012 B Stable B B Stable B 
Cameroon 
26 Feb. 
2007 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Cameroon 3 May 2006 B- Stable C B- Stable C 
Cameroon 1 Nov. 2005 CCC Stable C CCC Stable C 
Cameroon 3 Dec. 2004 CCC Stable C CCC Stable C 
Cameroon 
26 Nov. 
2003 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Cape Verde 10 July 2012 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Cape Verde 24 May 2011 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Cape Verde 
24 Dec. 
2009 
B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Cape Verde 4 Dec. 2008 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
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Local-currency rating Foreign-currency rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Egypt  10 July 2012 B 
Watch 
Neg 
B B 
Watch 
Neg 
B 
Egypt  
25 June 
2012 
B 
Watch 
Neg 
B B 
Watch 
Neg 
B 
Egypt  
10 Feb. 
2012 
B Negative B B Negative B 
Egypt  
24 Nov. 
2011 
B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Egypt  18 Oct. 2011 BB- Negative B BB- Negative B 
Egypt  
10 March 
2011 
BB+ Negative B BB Negative B 
Egypt  1 Feb. 2011 BB+ 
Watch 
Neg 
B BB 
Watch 
Neg 
B 
Egypt  
12 June 
2007 
BBB- Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Egypt  3 Nov. 2005 BBB- Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Egypt  1 Nov. 2005 BBB- Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Egypt  
14 March 
2005 
BBB- Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Egypt  
22 Aug. 
2003 
BBB- Negative A-3 BB+ Negative B 
Egypt  22 May 2002 BBB Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Egypt  
22 June 
2001 
BBB+ Negative A-2 BBB- Negative A-3 
Egypt  3 July 2000 A- Negative A-1 BBB- Negative A-3 
Egypt  15 Jan. 1997 A- Stable A-1 BBB- Stable A-3 
Gabon 10 July 2012 BB- Stable B BB- Stable B 
Gabon 8 Nov. 2007 BB- Stable B BB- Stable B 
Ghana 10 July 2012 B Stable B B Stable B 
Ghana 
27 Aug. 
2010 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Ghana 
16 March 
2009 
B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Ghana 
19 Sept. 
2007 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Ghana 6 April 2006 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Ghana 1 Nov. 2005 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Ghana 4 Sept. 2003 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Kenya  10 July 2012 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Kenya  
19 Nov. 
2010 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Kenya  4 Aug. 2008 B Positive B B Positive B 
Kenya  
10 March 
2008 
B Stable B B Stable B 
Kenya  4 Feb. 2008 B Negative B B Negative B 
155 
 
    
Local-currency rating Foreign-currency rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Kenya  2 Jan. 2008 B+ 
Watch 
Neg 
B B+ 
Watch 
Neg 
B 
Kenya  8 Sept. 2006 BB- Stable B B+ Stable B 
Libya 10 July 2012 NR     NR     
Libya 
10 March 
2011 
NR     NR     
Libya 
10 March 
2011 
BB Negative B BB Negative B 
Libya 
22 Feb. 
2011 
BBB+ 
Watch 
Neg 
A-2 BBB+ 
Watch 
Neg 
A-2 
Libya 
18 March 
2009 
A- Stable A-2 A- Stable A-2 
Madagascar  10 July 2012             
Madagascar  11 May 2009 NR NM NR NR NM NR 
Madagascar  
18 March 
2009 
B- Negative B B- Negative B 
Madagascar  2 Feb. 2009 B Negative B B Negative B 
Madagascar  1 Nov. 2005 B Stable B B Stable B 
Madagascar  25 May 2004 B Stable B B Stable B 
Mali 10 July 2012             
Mali 03-Jul-08 NR NM NR NR NM NR 
Mali 1 Nov. 2005 B Stable B B Stable B 
Mali 5 May 2004 B Stable B B Stable B 
Morocco 10 July 2012 BBB Stable A-2 BBB- Stable A-3 
Morocco 13 July 2011 BBB Stable A-2 BBB- Stable A-3 
Morocco 
23 March 
2010 
BBB+ Stable A-2 BBB- Stable A-3 
Morocco 
11 April 
2008 
BBB Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Morocco 
18 June 
2007 
BBB Positive A-3 BB+ Positive B 
Morocco 
26 March 
2007 
BBB Positive A-3 BB+ Positive B 
Morocco 6 April 2006 BBB Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Morocco 1 Nov. 2005 BBB Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Morocco 9 Aug. 2005 BBB Stable A-3 BB+ Stable B 
Morocco 
8 March 
2004 
BBB Stable A-3 BB Positive B 
Morocco 
21 Feb. 
2003 
BBB Stable A-3 BB Stable B 
Morocco 2 Nov. 2001 BBB Negative A-3 BB Negative B 
Morocco 
2 March 
1998 
BBB Stable A-3 BB Stable B 
Mozambique 10 July 2012 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Mozambique 
21 Dec. 
2007 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
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Local-currency rating Foreign-currency rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Mozambique 6 April 2006 B Positive B B Positive B 
Mozambique 1 Nov. 2005 B Positive B B Positive B 
Mozambique 7 July 2004 B Positive B B Positive B 
Nigeria 10 July 2012 B+ Positive B B+ Positive B 
Nigeria 
29 Dec. 
2011 
B+ Positive B B+ Positive B 
Nigeria 18 Jan. 2011 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Nigeria 
21 Aug. 
2009 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Nigeria 
27 March 
2009 
BB Negative B BB- Negative B 
Nigeria 6 Feb. 2006 BB Stable B BB- Stable B 
Rwanda  10 July 2012 B Positive B B Positive B 
Rwanda  
29 Dec. 
2011 
B Positive B B Positive B 
Senegal 10 July 2012 B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Senegal 27 May 2010 B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Senegal 8 Dec. 2009 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Senegal 26 May 2009 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Senegal 27 July 2006 B+ Negative B B+ Negative B 
Senegal 1 Nov. 2005 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Senegal 
18 Dec. 
2000 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Seychelles 10 July 2012             
Seychelles 
17 Aug. 
2009 
NR NR   NR NR   
Seychelles 1 Oct. 2008 B Negative B SD NM SD 
Seychelles 7 Aug. 2008 B Negative B SD NM SD 
Seychelles 1 Aug. 2008 B+ 
Watch 
Neg 
B CCC 
Watch 
Neg 
C 
Seychelles 2 Nov. 2007 B+ Negative B B Negative B 
Seychelles 
15 Sept. 
2006 
B+ Stable B B Stable B 
South Africa 10 July 2012 A Negative A-1 BBB+ Negative A-2 
South Africa 
28 March 
2012 
A Negative A-1 BBB+ Negative A-2 
South Africa 25 Jan. 2011 A Stable A-1 BBB+ Stable A-2 
South Africa 
11 Nov. 
2008 
A+ Negative A-1 BBB+ Negative A-2 
South Africa 3 Nov. 2005 A+ Stable A-1 BBB+ Stable A-2 
South Africa 1 Nov. 2005 A+ Stable A-1 BBB+ Stable A-2 
South Africa 1 Aug. 2005 A+ Stable A-1 BBB+ Stable A-2 
South Africa 7 May 2003 A Stable A-1 BBB Stable A-3 
South Africa 
12 Nov. 
2002 
A- Positive A-2 BBB- Positive A-3 
South Africa 25 Feb. A- Stable A-2 BBB- Stable A-3 
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Local-currency rating Foreign-currency rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Long-term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
Outlook 
Short-
term 
Sovereign 
Credit 
Rating 
2000 
South Africa 
6 March 
1998 
BBB+ Stable A-2 BB+ Stable B 
South Africa 
20 Nov. 
1995 
BBB+ Positive NR BB+ Positive NR 
South Africa 3 Oct. 1994       BB Positive NR 
Tunisia 10 July 2012 BB Stable B BB Stable B 
Tunisia 23 May 2012 BB Stable B BB Stable B 
Tunisia 28 July 2011 BBB Negative A-3 BBB- Negative A-3 
Tunisia 
16 March 
2011 
BBB Stable A-3 BBB- Stable A-3 
Tunisia 18 Jan. 2011 BBB+ 
Watch 
Neg 
A-2 BBB 
Watch 
Neg 
A-3 
Tunisia 1 April 2009 A- Stable A-2 BBB Stable A-3 
Tunisia 6 April 2006 A Stable A-1 BBB Stable A-3 
Tunisia 1 Nov. 2005 A Stable A-1 BBB Stable A-3 
Tunisia 
21 March 
2000 
A Stable A-1 BBB Stable A-3 
Tunisia 
10 April 
1997 
A Stable A-1 BBB- Stable A-3 
Uganda 10 July 2012 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Uganda 9 Dec. 2008 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Zambia 10 July 2012 B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Zambia 
22 March 
2011 
B+ Stable B B+ Stable B 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct. 
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Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
To African FDI net inflows countries 1991- 2010  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
Country 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 1991-2010 
Angola 1 897 5 056 7 468 -274 14 147 
Libya 88 -295 1 550 14 019 15 363 
Algeria 42 1 708 4 769 11 104 17 624 
Tunisia 1 909 2 329 3 100 10 437 17 776 
Morocco 1 875 315 4 942 10 850 17 982 
Sudan 110 1 232 6 452 12 440 20 235 
South Africa 1 892 7 649 16 757 21 776 48 074 
Nigeria 5 993 6 329 11 927 33 689 57 938 
Egypt 3 059 4 903 8 023 44 213 60 198 
Total (Africa) 21 176 43 147 90 568 231 745 386 636 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators  
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Top African portfolio equity net inflow countries 1991- 2010 
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
Country 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 1991-2010 
Zambia - 20 15 88 123 
Togo 3 56 48 20 127 
Tunisia 119 122 42 -59 223 
Namibia 86 174 48 21 329 
Mauritius 24 53 54 284 416 
Egypt - 1 281 615 -1 253 643 
Morocco 282 227 654 -86 1 077 
Nigeria - - 751 4 911 5 662 
South Africa 2 263 29 593 13 226 34 112 79 194 
Total (Africa) 2 853 31 614 15 575 38 140 88 182 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators  
 
Top African portfolio bond net inflow countries 1991- 2010 
Portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$) 
Country 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 1991-2010 
Senegal - - - 200 200 
Seychelles - - - 303 303 
Ghana - 250 -250 750 750 
Gabon - - - 883 883 
Morocco - 229 275 738 1 242 
Egypt. - 100 2 650 2 143 4 893 
South Africa 2 234 4 185 6 494 8 695 21 608 
Total (Africa) 1 284 4 972 10 846 11 912 29 015 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators  
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Top African commercial banks and other lending net flow countries 1991- 2010 
Commercial banks and other lending (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$) 
Country 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 1991-2010 
Algeria 1 230 -4 628 -2 409 -2 942 -8 750 
Nigeria -2 514 -1 296 -861 -542 -5 213 
South Africa 768 -4 348 45 1 269 -2 266 
Cote d'Ivoire -90 -915 -582 -663 -2 251 
Morocco 270 177 -1 072 -1 046 -1 671 
Ethiopia 185 -205 301 1 546 1 827 
Angola 1 429 137 2 837 653 5 056 
Total (Africa) -1 300 -11 487 -1 351 -1 483 -15 621 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators  
